THE ETHICS OF ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

by

Lynne Belaief

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The central attempt of this dissertation is to develop an ethical theory which could be justly attributed to Whitehead. Since Whitehead has not written any formal ethics, the theory is developed by derivation from his relevant metaphysical doctrines, mainly as given in Process and Reality. It is further supported by interpretation of various philosophically informal statements of ethical import Whitehead has made.

In order to determine the relationship the ethical theory must have to Whitehead's metaphysics and to determine the method by which the ethics should itself be developed, (for example, the decision of the evidence to which it should appeal), the first chapter undertakes an analysis of Whitehead's concept of philosophical method and of the goals and nature of philosophy itself. The general principles there determined are subsequently used both to guide the process of analysis and to function as a criterion of its success.

The second chapter analyzes Whitehead's metaphysical doctrines relevant to obtain the minimal requisites for an ethical theory that is not a private interest theory, namely the existence of freedom, self-identity and objective ethical values. All are found to be successfully derivable from a Whiteheadian perspective, and that in a manner which allows important and unique consequences to be further derived in ethics.

Supported by these mainly polemical conclusions, the third chapter explicates the ethics in content. Included is an analysis of particular ethical values on both the social and individual levels, for example, love, justice, adventure, harmony, courage and wisdom. The ethics is located as one classifiable as 'creative ethics', with a central emphasis on the introduction of novelty in ethical vision. The primary contrast is with absolutistic ethical theories which stress the value of obedience to permanent ethical standards; the absolutistic value of justice is contrasted with Whitehead's central value of love.

It is again claimed that the ethics of process philosophy is nonetheless not a subjectivist theory although it does share several important doctrines with the Subjectivists, for example, the claim that the satisfaction of individual

interest is desireable. Analysis of the latter attitude issues in the conclusion that to Whitehead genuine satisfaction of the ethical will cannot be reached in the finite world. There is thus produced an inevitable tension between virtue and happiness. The doctrines announce a recognition of tragedy as an inescapable concomitant of finitude. The injustice here inherent provokes the consequent recognition that irrationality necessarily obtains on the ethical level.

The fourth chapter briefly introduces several of Whitehead's religious doctrines for the single purpose of exhibiting the writer's conviction that it is in the religious dimension that the irrational tragedy which Whitehead finds in the ethical dimension can be, and is, made rational. The Appendix offers some speculative judgments concerning the possibility of a Whiteheadian doctrine of personal immortality. The latter is discovered to be a final requirement for a completely rational explanation of the ethical situation. The necessity is important since rationality has both methodological and metaphysical primacy to Whitehead: in short, it is a pervasive Whiteheadian demand.

The process of analysis exhibits continuous testimony to support a classification of Whitehead's philosophical perspective as an intentional synthesis of categories from both Idealism and Realism, as Whitehead himself suggests. The question of the success of this announced attempt is intermitently considered throughout the work; the evaluation is a positive judgment of its radical importance both to his ethics and his metaphysics. It is concluded that Whitehead's philosophical meaning and significance cannot be adequately grasped without attending to his partial contiguity with the Idealist tradition, with particular similarity to the Idealism of Hegel and the neo-Hegelians, Bradley and Royce.

For Professor Justus Buchler

Philosopher and Teacher

The life of reason seems to be the life that not only has the capacity to pursue ends disinterestedly but that is devoted to one overarching end as both a ground and a consummation of all values.... Reason is a form of love, as love (in an equally just perspective) is a form of reason. It is love of inventive communication. ... Fear of invention--of communication lest it harbor products that demand query--is what we must mean by superstition. The rational man is willing to undergo the labor of assimilation, since he implicitly perceives that the incompletion within life is perpetual and that the denial of query is stagnation and ruin. ...It is for reason to discover and appraise itself from time to time and, like the god that it was early said to be, find that its work is good.

Buchler, 1951

If this philosophical labor has any value for reason, it is through the guidance and the example of Professor Buchler, whose philosophy and teaching arise from his self and constitute the life of reason.

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Abbreviations are used for the following works of Whitehead:

AE: The Aims of Education, and Other Essays.

AI: Adventures of Ideas

ESP: Essays in Science and Philosophy

FR: The Function of Reason

MT: Modes of Thought

PR: Process and Reality

S: Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect

SMW: Science and the Modern World

RM: Religion in the Making

Chapter I. Whitehead's Concept of Philosophy and Philosophical Method

Section A. The Rationalistic Faith

Because each of Whitehead's mature philosophical works contains important recommendations concerning the proper task of philosophy and its proper method, and because, ironically, depth of insight is often directly related to variability and development of insight, no official Whiteheadian position can be demonstrated. To reach some decision on these subjects, the sequel will therefore depend on citations of selected relevant remarks wherever they appear. Relevance will be determined by the decision to elaborate the main insights of Process and Reality to the exclusion of various conflicting views which appear elsewhere. The several scattered references, both explicit and consequent, in that volume which maintain that philosophy is a science will not however be accepted. The refusal is not made because this judgment is later clearly denied validity,[1] but because Process and Reality itself, considered as a philosophical product, denies this alleged inclusion. Philosophy is not a science if Process and Reality is a legitimate philosophical product, and, of course, it is.

At least one useful and important conviction is consistently asserted in, or implied by, all of Whitehead's philosophical writings, namely his faith in rationalism. The appellation of rationalism is precarious unless it is immediately noted that Whitehead's assessment of the term, as he well knew,

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[1] See especially the last essays: "Mathematics and the Good" and "Immortality".

is not within the classical rationalist tradition. The alleged importance of Whitehead's rationalistic faith is based on the assumption that it can be taken as ultimately characteristic of his concept of philosophical method and aim, and can afford explanatory insight into Whitehead's fundamental metaphysical commitments from which, it will be maintained, the rationalistic faith derives. Throughout I shall assume there is a basic consistency of meaning in this rationalistic faith unless critical justice requires recognition of a change in Whitehead's perspective. Although it is essential that this working hypothesis be held as tentative, it will be applied in a straightforward manner so that if it is a mistake, it is clearly so.

Various metaphysical doctrines will be introduced as explanatory of the methodology; in particular the notions of process, actuality, internal relations, perspectival elimination, teleology, and God's dual nature. These doctrines will be stated as Whiteheadian presuppositions and will not be argued for on the metaphysical level, such argument being outside the scope of this essay. Discussion will be confined to clarification whenever ambiguity of interpretation would entail different methodological consequences.

Whitehead's characterization of the hope of rationalism, "That we fail to find in experience any elements intrinsically incapable of exhibition as examples of general theory..." (PR 67) is a careful and self-conscious methodological stipulation. Derivatively, it suggests that the goal of philosophy can be viewed as "The divination of the generic notions which apply to all facts." (PR 8). To intentionally characterize rationalism as a faith, as are all foundational metaphysical judgments, rather than holding it as a dogma, has deliberate and important consequences for Whitehead's conception of philosophy. Since rationalism is not held as a

metaphysical premise but as "an ideal which is seeking satisfaction," (PR 67), it would follow that "the accurate expression of the final generalities is the goal of philosophical discussion and not its origin." (PR 12).

This characterization of rationalism deviates from the classical rationalist presupposition that clear and certain first principles are available from which all other propositions are allegedly deduced. To Whitehead, the foundational philosophical scheme is, at best, only provisionally held as certain in so far as it has not been yet confronted by any unassimilable data, or not yet found internally inconsistent. The various derivative propositions implied by the scheme can, a fortiori, be no more certain, and may be less certain, than the scheme itself. Indeed, in regard to some derivative propositions, all that may justly be claimed is that "Something of the sort is true." (Plato). Philosophy therefore is not to be considered as a final system of complete propositions which characterize the world. It is rather a process of search aimed at historical progress. Philosophy deludes itself if it subscribes to the self-contradictory notion of a final historical completion.

Thus philosophy is necessarily a search, hopefully a progress, but never a final possession of total knowledge. This characterization is a consequence of Whitehead's serious confrontation of the fact of man's finitude as well as of his fundamental belief in the pervasive existence of radical evolutionary novelty in the universe. Because of the metaphysical consequences of the above notions, Whitehead implies that the scope of human thought is necessarily limited. On the social level, the obvious and necessary experiential limits within any particular "cosmic epoch" produce limits to the knowledge available. At any particular time there is necessarily ignorance of the future consequences of any present occurrence.

This situation may be seen as one source of the misplaced skeptical rejection of the use of reason to reach truth, for example by Bergson and by certain mystics, as if there were some type of judgment available to finite beings which could transcend all temporal limitations. But there is not.

It is Whitehead's view of the ontological situation which enforces the recognition that knowledge obtained by any means whatsoever, can never be a total and final assertion of truth. Actual entities (the ultimately real things) involve durational transition in their very essence, and since the meaning of an actual entity is a relational meaning, the future consequences of anything is part of its meaning. Even though the consequences lie in a future which Whitehead believes is structurally immanent in the present, the consequences cannot be known in advance with certainty. Radical novelty in the universe precludes any precise determination. Thus the total meaning of any particular event or thing cannot be made available to the finite mind whose vision is necessarily confined within some temporal limits--as the Greek dramatists knew well enough, the consequences of this natural condition of finitude can be tragic.[2]

However, although the body of knowledge can never be a total or final fact, Whitehead repeatedly suggests that there are no particular set limitations to human insight. The attempted finding of such alleged limitations has been a major, and futile, preoccupation of many modern epistemologies. Certainly it is the actual (experienced) world that is the original material for philosophical interpretation. Thus each epoch characteristically excludes various anachronistic or dormant interpretations of experience and

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[2]See Chap. III, Sec. K, for consequences in ethics.

patterns its known world within contingently developed limits, as one type of progress. Whitehead recognizes that "history discloses another type of progress" (MT 80) and the suggestion is important. This type of progress occurs through "the introduction of novelty of pattern into conceptual experience...There is a new vision of the great Beyond," (MT 80). Interpretation of the structures of these novel patterns is a major way in which new concepts not previously known do arise.

The creation of novel patterns within the domain of philosophy is identified by Whitehead as the task of speculative reason. The products of speculative reason, namely speculative philosophy, characteristically evoke charges of unintelligibility or meaninglessness from contemporary critics. (See below, Sec. I). Such attitudes illustrate the fact that knowledge is also limited by the dominant characteristic interests and sense of importance which communally obtain during any circumscribed historical and intellectual period. Although it is a complete mistake to imagine that any conventionally stipulated limit is final, on the level of individual insight <u>some</u> limits to knowledge inevitably arise. The inevitability is due to the natural necessity that finite beings judge the world from some particular perspective, limited to some exclusive set of presuppositions. The acceptance of the perspective is contingent, although it may be conscious. Any individual insight can only be partial, necessarily precluding any ultimately total characterization of even his <u>own</u> experience of the world. Because Whitehead holds that "'decision' cannot be construed as a casual adjunct of an actual entity [but] constitutes the very meaning of actuality," (PR 68), we are always consciously and unconsciously rejecting an indeterminate number of alternative possible views. Therefore philosophical judgments, like all judgments, have necessary perspectival limitations,

being partial characterizations of the totality which is available. Moreover, what is available is, as noted above, never itself the final totality, since the finite temporal world is in constant and radical evolution.

These notions reflect various ontological claims. According to Whitehead the real concrete things are always to be defined by their relations, for to him no static essence is ultimately real. Thus, since there is an indeterminate number of relations defining each thing, even at a particular temporal epoch the total meaning of any individual thing ("a complete fact") remains forever unavailable to finite minds. In order to conceive anything at all, such minds must select and abstract particular relations from the totality of relations ontologically present. This abstraction always from some exclusive, therefore excluding, perspective, obscures the totality:

> The definition of the environment is exactly what is omitted from special abstraction. Such definition... requires an understanding of the infinitude of things. It is therefore impossible. All that we can do is to make an abstraction, to presuppose that it is relevant, and to push ahead within that presupposition. (MT 77).

In sum, all thought must start from some selection of ones own experience, and this experience is itself an abstraction from the totality of actual events and things presently available to, but not experienced by, the individual. This totality, finally, is itself an abstraction in time due to the actual limits of any particular cosmic epoch.

Section B. Perspectival Limitations of Knowledge

Thus certainty in knowledge is not available to men, being incompatible with the facts and consequences of finitude and process, as Whitehead sees them. Every theory is, at best, a useful working hypothesis, the most useful of which will be (or should be) superceded. In Whitehead's statement, "In its turn every philosophy will suffer a deposition" (PR 11),

ideally by inclusion in some broader, although not necessarily more complex, perspective. This latter perspective however is itself never broad enough. It follows that "the chief error in philosophy is overstatement" (PR 11) as respects the scope of application of the insight. Philosophical judgment is alterable, because it is perspectival, that is interpretative and based on unprovable presuppositions. It thus has the contingent status of all conventions. (That conventions are contingent does not imply that some are not more valuable than others or that all are equally valueless and arbitrary.)

Consequent upon the recognition of the interpretative and tentative nature of judgment, Whitehead, in line with his rationalism, recommends to philosophy the task of correcting the excesses of individuality in its preceding characterizations of the world: "The correction is in proportion to the rationality of the insight." (PR 23). But the correction is never total. Any judgment has some perspectival limitation, what Whitehead calls "perspective elimination." (AI 201).

Nonetheless, when it is noticed that some philosopher structures the world from a particular conceptual perspective, it would be a great error to go on critically to reject his views on this ground alone, as if the use of a perspectival judgment were his own particular mistake. (If what is necessary is a mistake, then everything is a mistake.) Rather we ought to legislate a redefinition of the notions of judgment and truth in accordance with the actual situation of human possibilities. Analogically, it may well be true that a man would have a greater perceptual understanding if he had more than two eyes, but this does not mean that his having two eyes is a mistake. And would having four eyes be less of a mistake? Then how much less?

The ineradicable nonsense of these questions may indicate the similar type of fundamental error present in the traditional attitude to the discovery that there are inevitable perspectival limitations to judgment. The attitude mutely implies that there exists some standard of comparison, some type of finite judgment that is not limited nor interpretative. Usually there is an uncritical appeal to the traditional paradigm of the scientific perspective as affording non-interpretative "objective" judgments through "direct perception." [3] The scientific paradigm however is a pseudo-paradigm; its frame of reference is itself simply one possible perspective among others, that is, one exclusive set of presuppositions. Its generality of acceptance, verging on piety in the Western world, has however almost totally obscured this fact to common sense as well as to some philosophers. But as is particularly obvious in regard to contemporary physics, the perspective of science simply cannot be identified with the perspective of common sense.

These critical assertions are in general philosophical acceptance. Whitehead, however, extends the discussion in a relatively original manner by his refusal to consider the scientific perspective to be the most useful as a model for philosophy, in either content or method. As will be seen below, it is the analogy with aesthetic phenomena that functions as Whitehead's initial philosophical model, producing the highly original character of his philosophical content, method and language.

For various reasons, Whitehead is convinced that description of experience is not the straightforward operation it had been commonly (although

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[3] See Whitehead's criticisms of rigid empiricism, probability, and the inductive method, PR 309-16.

not contemporarily) assumed to be. Since the natural world is not divided up into discrete things available for direct perception, all observation is interpreted in terms of theoretical presuppositions which are, at ground, metaphysical. There is a dialectical relation between the characterization of events or things and the underlying theory guiding observation, a relation of interpretation that is inevitable. Thus Whitehead states: "We concentrate by reason of a sense of importance. And when we concentrate we attend to matter-of-fact." (MT 5). He further notes: "All classification [of facts] depends on the current character of importance," (MT 21-22), and any initial judgment of importance is basically a metaphysical (as against an empirical) judgment.[4]

The location of importance, that is, of selected relevance, then suggests which methods of observation can be used (there is never only one possible method) and further prescribes what is or is not to count as evidence. As Whitehead puts it, "theory dictates method" (perhaps "suggests" would be more accurate) so that the "close relation of theory to method partly arises from the fact that the relevance of evidence depends on the theory which is dominating the discussion." (AI 221). It is in this sense, for example, that one might say, although I am not aware that Whitehead does so, that all scientific cosmologies rest at bottom on some theoretical premises, possibly unannounced. Thus, they, as all human products, have perspectival limits. The limits of applicability of Newton's cosmology are known; Einstein's are still to be discovered. Science does not transcend

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[4]This applies <u>even</u> to the pervasive common sense classification of reality as being the state of wakefulness rather than the state of dreaming, which is why, for example, Descartes' argument in his Sixth Meditation is a circular argument. "To call anything unreal is merely to define 'real' in such a way as to exclude the thing defined," Whitehead has said.

the need for interpretative (and therefore limited) judgment any more than philosophy initiates it. Both aim simply at making interpretation more systematic and conscious.

As implied in the above discussion, there is a sense in which the metaphysical judgments of philosophy are more foundational than other judgments. In regard to philosophy, taken as one discipline among others, it is always a mistake to make dogmatic claims concerning the total explanatory insight of any particular metaphysical system. However this conclusion should not be confused with a quite different, and I think valid, notion implied in Whitehead's works. He suggests that metaphysical judgments can legitimately claim to be the foundational and, in this sense final, judgments for approaching a general characterization of the experienced world because some metaphysical beliefs underlie the assertions of the descriptive sciences such as the physical and social sciences and psychology. The more obvious claim that in one of its functions philosophy is a critique of certain abstractions presupposed in any more specialized theory follows directly from the initial assertion of the foundational status of metaphysics;"one aim of philosophy is to challenge the half-truths constituting the scientific first principles. ...The determination of this status requires a generality transcending any special subject-matter." (PR 15).

To take these noted ideas of Whitehead as an endorsement of subjectivism or skepticism in philosophy would be a complete mistake, for they provide, in effect, perhaps the only reliable basis for avoiding these positions. This claim is at least initially obvious from a simple observation of the careful and astonishingly fertile analysis he gives of many suggested criteria by which to evaluate philosophical claims. One criterion however is <u>not</u> one's own critically subjective response of approval or disapproval. Just in so far as any perspective is theoretically shareable,

philosophical judgment, as well as all judgment, can allow of critical communication. And this is possible precisely because the total perspectives are not in fact identical, for in identity there is no sharing.[5]

By this recognition of the nature of human communication, critical and otherwise, and the further recognition that no human judgment can transcend the natural condition of perspectival experience, the subjectivist and skeptical reductionisms can be avoided. This occurs simply because one will not be misled into looking for what cannot be found, namely, non-interpretative judgment, and thus cannot give the misplaced disappointment various names, e.g., skepticism, subjectivism, solipsism or Absolute Idealism.

Moreover, one can avoid dogmatic attributions of philosophical "meaninglessness" in so far as these often arise from an individual reaction of disappointment due to one's particular interest being unfilled, without the recognition that the interest was itself of a limited perspectival, and occasionally eccentric, origin, as for example, the demand for "total objectivity." Criticism from such a point of view can only complicate an issue, producing useless and rhetorical obscurity.

Although it may be unnecessarily cautious, I here add the further insistence that Whitehead's intentional stress on the necessary interpretative element in all human judgment, a needed counterpart to the coercive influence of radical empiricism, should not lead to the equally mistaken exaggeration that nothing at all is given. To interpret is to interpret something; to react is to react to something. There is a primordial

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[5] These and further remarks on the analysis of 'perspectives' are suggested by Professor Buchler's important chapter 'Perspective', in Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment (New York and London, Columbia University Press, 2nd ed., 1961).

experiential encounter with the brute necessity of something given; what Whitehead calls prehension (grasping). This is the vector character of experience--that is, inheritance of one's actual world by prehension. Whatever this primordial domain is at any given time, its assimilation may be what is meant by the designation "common sense belief."

That the content of common sense convictions changes at different times is completely irrelevant to the necessary minimal agreement that there is always some compulsive content. One does not theorize or philosophize in spite of this content, but, so-to-speak, on top of it. In general, philosophical naturalists have been most aware of this fact, Absolute Idealists completely denying or ignoring it. But is it a genuine problem to wonder whether something is given as the datum for experience? Is it not rather that all real philosophical problems are more special than this? Thus Whitehead's Reformed Subjectivist Principle must be seen as a description of the experiential situation and not an argument that such a situation exists. It records his attempt to balance Descartes' "discovery" of the primacy of the subject by an objectivist notion as to the datum for experience, the actual experience being the transformation of this datum by the subjective form ("feelings") of the experiencing subject. Such interpretative judgment Whitehead takes as a basic fact of experience and applies to all levels and to all types of actual things. (The justice of this latter extension may be disputed--but this is a separate point.)

Perspectives can be foundational or peripheral. The former refers to the initial decision of importance which underlies and unifies all other judgments within an order of some more or less identifiable sort. Whitehead's own philosophy clearly illustrates the assertion as to the necessary existence of some ultimate unifying perspective. One can discover that his

particular foundational perspective has reflections on all levels of his philosophy.

Section C. Criteria of Philosophical Value: Appearance and Reality

As one way of organizing the discussion of Whitehead's concept of philosophy and philosophical method, I shall critically analyze the various criteria Whitehead suggests for reaching philosophical value and shall attempt to show how each follows from his underlying commitment to, and interest in, rationalism. This in turn will be shown to be based on certain foundational ontological commitments. Whitehead's clear recognition that in any philosophical endeavor, one's method is suggested by his theoretical commitments rather than conversely, makes such double ascription possible, indeed inevitable. In this manner Whitehead's ultimate notions regarding philosophy and philosophical method can be identified and, I believe, significantly related into a coherent structure of implication that he may intuitively have intended them to exhibit. There are justifying metaphysical reasons why Whitehead might have had such an intention, just as there are metaphysical reasons, why, for example, Spinoza's Ethics has the structure it does have. That the comparison of Whitehead and Spinoza in this regard is not an arbitrary one will be elaborated below.

Whitehead's fundamental rationalistic criterion for progress in philosophy is found in the aim to approach greater inclusiveness of interpretation. This is done by an attempted synthesis of various perspectives of limited and partial scope within a larger conceptual framework: "the bundle of philosophical systems expresses a variety of general truths about the universe, awaiting assignment of their various spheres of validity." (PR 11). Such a notion of rationality is, in general, as well as in its particular application to philosophy, morally and methodologically just.

Professor Buchler persuasively states this claim: "Rationality could be defined as the willingness to discover other perspectives, to attain community of perspective, and to reconcile community with conviction."[6]

Thus philosophy is perhaps aptly characterized on Whitehead's view as a rational effort toward the discovery of perspectives of greater extension or inclusiveness. And this characterization would be agreeable did it not tend to obscure the fact that although each philosophical system is not a final truth in regard to its cognitive claims, it is a conclusive existential product. Each system exhibits itself as a final judgment through the structural relations of the categories and definitions in the philosophical scheme. Through this dimension, the philosophy has a real status in a real world and exhibits a final, although not a cognitively absolute, comment on the world. This point seems to have eluded Whitehead, producing severe consequences for his view of philosophy.[7]

Whitehead's failure to recognize the exhibitive dimension of philosophy can be seen as one result of his occasional, although certainly not dominant, anti-rationalistic and anti-intellectualistic strains. This is manifest for example in his various references to the superior evocatory power of aesthetic feeling to reach reality, and his judgment that intellect distorts reality into appearance. Truth at its best, Whitehead holds, serves

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[6] Buchler, op. cit., p. 116.

[7] See Professor Buchler's chapter, "Judgment", in Nature and Judgment (New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1955), for the origin of the above mentioned concept of the 'exhibitive dimension' and his chapter XII in The Concept of Method (New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1961), for criticisms of Whitehead's conception of method arising from his neglect of the consequences of philosophy's possession of an exhibitive dimension.

the promotions of Beauty: "The Truth that for [the] extremity of Beauty is wanted is that truth-relation whereby Appearance summons up new resources of feeling from the depths of Reality. It is a Truth of feeling and not a Truth of verbalization. The relata in Reality must lie below the stale presuppositions of verbal thought." (AI 266).[8]

Whitehead's intentions behind preempting the traditional and philosophically suspicious distinction between Appearance and Reality, and the meaning of these terms to him, must be questioned. In his own statement, we understand that the distinction has not at all the traditional meanings:

> This difference between the objective content of the initial phase of the physical pole and the objective content of the final phase, after the integration of physical and mental poles, constitutes 'appearance' for that occasion. In other words, 'appearance is the effect of the activity of the mental pole, whereby the qualities and coordinations of the given physical world undergo transformation. (AI 212).

It may be suggested that here and in the immediately preceding quote, Whitehead is referring to the fact that because any finite individual judges the world from within some particular perspectival limits, The Reformed Subjectivist Principle emphasizes that whatever he cognitively possesses of the world ("the objective content of the final phase"--Appearance) always falls short of total knowledge. No finite being can grasp the indeterminate total number of existing actual relations (namely Reality). Experience of Appearance, in this imputed sense of the term, is the natural and inevitable situation since there is always "distortion" by the "mental pole" ("subjective form", "feelings") and although no <u>particular</u> element of the totality (Reality) is intrinsically unavailable to individual insight,

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[8]See also the chapters on "Beauty" and "Truth and Beauty" in AI.

some elements will always be individually unpossessed. Reality is "there" but we are finite.[9]

The relation of Appearance to Reality is then the relation of part to whole. There are no metaphysically good reasons and many historically bad reasons for Whitehead's use of the traditional terminology of Appearance and Reality for, traditionally, it has suggested that the experienced world is the world of Appearance in the sense of "mere appearance", that is devoid of reality. Whitehead does not mean this. Precisely because Appearance is experienced it is fully real, and not metaphysically inferior to any so-called Reality traditionally meant as some "thing-in-itself": "It is a real fact of nature that the world has appeared thus from the standpoint of these antecedent occasions of the personal life." (AI 213). It is therefore suggested that the only minimally legitimate, because intelligible, reason for Whitehead's use of the terminology is to evoke the traditional <u>value</u> connotations, and I shall henceforth suppose that this is his intention.

This supposition is important because such an intention suggests that Whitehead has some idea of a being to whom Reality is in fact knowable, a being who has the power to view the world from all of the indeterminate number of possible perspectives. This being is therefore omniscient, namely God, the Ideal Knower. Because God's experience is not finite, it follows that "we are unable to conceive the experience of the Supreme Unity of Existence." (ESP 102). In recognizing with an awe of reverence and of moral humility, the disparity between the two types of experience, the one infinite

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[9]The use of the word 'depths' in the above quoted phrase 'depths of Reality', implying that somehow or other Reality is 'behind' or 'beneath' the Appearances rather than, as here suggested, the totality of the Appearances, cannot be defended. At best it is a linguistic error, an unintentional use of a prevalent colloquialism.

with total knowledge, the other finite with partial insight, a philosopher may indeed be led to employ two different terms to clearly distinguish them, namely Reality and Appearance, respectively.[10]

Concluding this discussion, one may recommend that Whitehead, working within his own methodological recommendations of coherence and extensive application of first principles, avoid the Appearance-Reality terminology, which suggests assumptions which it is here held can be neither supported nor refuted, and, in deference to the economy of predication, characterize our knowledge as real but limited, God's real and total.

To continue with the main discussion, it must be noted that whatever point Whitehead is trying to make in regard to the "distortion" of Reality by intellect must, as he well knows, be applied to all levels of human activity and judgment, including aesthetic feeling. In so far as all human perspectives, and not only the verbal perspective, are limited and selective from the totality they all inevitably produce incomplete interpretations of that totality, albeit different ones. However, what Whitehead may intend to

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[10]However, and on Whitehead's own showing, the validity of making a distinction between the finite experience and the infinite experience that implies that there exists a qualitative difference (as using two terms implies) cannot be evidentially supported since we can have no understanding of the infinite Divine experience. In short, since there is no evidence to appeal to on the side of the infinite, analogical implication regarding content cannot function between the finite and the infinite with any evidential compulsion. (This is for example one account of why any attempt at some cosmological proof of God's existence is illegitimate, although of course, it is emotionally and morally suggestive.) Thus, although we certainly can have the idea that God's experience and man's experience are of different types, we cannot presume to know that the difference is a qualitative one, or that any intended qualitative distinction could apply. But to say this should not lead to the opposite error of asserting that there is in fact no qualitative distinction, the two types of experience being only quantitatively different, that is, a difference in degree of completeness. For the exact problem is whether a difference in degree which goes from a finite level to infinity is or is not a difference in quality.

stress by this passage concerning Reality and Appearance is that verbal thought is involved with "stale presuppositions". On such a reading though the intended evaluative comparison between feeling and verbal thought loses any final importance in view of Whitehead's own recognition that intellect itself can imaginatively transcend such static presuppositions, (his analysis of speculative reason), although admittedly this is rare. But all transcendence is rare.

As noted above, Whitehead does not observe that although philosophy is certainly verbal expression, it is confined to the level of verbalization only in its assertive dimension. Thus Whitehead's stress on the value of art as a final and unique product[11] can also be applied to philosophical products. We do not require a transfer to the activity of art per se to exhibit individual judgment of reality in some unique and final manner. In its exhibitive dimension philosophy can itself function as intentionally artistic products do. However because that is not all philosophy can do, this fact has been obscured.

Section D. Specific Criteria

After this attempt to explain several of Whitehead's apparent departures from what is assumed to be his ultimate commitment to rationalism, we may continue with a positive analysis of further consequences of this rationalism for his concept of philosophical method. There will be two central stipulations about which the discussion will turn, namely, that no individual propositions in any philosophical scheme be capable of isolation from the general foundational scheme and secondly that philosophy aims at a total characterization of the universe by developing generic principles that apply to all facts.

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[11] See especially the chapter on "Truth and Beauty" in AI.

These basic stipulations derive from certain ontological notions reflected on to the methodological level.

Whitehead states that "it is presupposed that no entity can be conceived in complete abstraction from the system of the universe, and that it is the business of speculative philosophy to exhibit this truth", and further, "every proposition proposing a fact must, in its complete analysis, propose the general character of the universe required for that fact." (PR 5 and 17). These methodological recommendations reflect Whitehead's metaphysical commitment to a doctrine of internal relations.[12] In this application however they must be modalized in practice. As Whitehead himself notes, "It is the ideal of speculative philosophy that its fundamental notions shall not seem capable of abstraction from each other," (PR 5, italics mine) and for various reasons of a metaphysical nature the ideal is never reached. (See below). Thus derivative and practicable criteria for philosophical value would have to be, and indeed are, devised by Whitehead.

Upon analyzing the doctrine of internal relations, it appears that Whitehead may intend either of two exclusive views. Sometimes he seems to mean that each being is internally related to every item in its universe, that is, within its felt experience. However, alternatively he sometimes implies that even those items "eliminated from feeling" do relationally constitute the entity by adding to the "emotional complex" of the subject although not to the objective data. (PR 35 and 66).

The latter interpretation of the doctrine is implied by Whitehead's

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[12]Expressed by the Principle of Relativity, PR 33.

notions of "negative prehension" and "negligible relevance." It is quite wrong and indeed paradoxical, if meant to assert that every object or event has an actual influence on (or is in active relation to) the experience of a subject even if it is not felt by that subject. As an ontological doctrine this idea may be intelligible but it is metaphysically useless if the task of metaphysics is taken to be an analysis of actual experience, as Whitehead does in fact take it to be.

The validity of the former interpretation is metaphysically defensible and can, I think, be adequately supported by various doctrines Whitehead holds, namely the objectification of antecedent occasions, the prehension of causal feelings and the Reformed Subjectivist Principle, among other notions.

But even on this modified interpretation of the doctrine of internal relations, the ideal of speculative philosophy to arrive at generic principles that apply to all facts and that are incapable of isolation from each other cannot, I suggest, be reached. Even if we are obligated to define an entity only by its actual (i.e., experienced) relations, human judgment as to what these relations are is necessarily selective. "A single fact in isolation is the primary myth required for finite thought, that is to say, for thought unable to embrace totality." (MT 12, italics mine); to know that some requirement is a myth has certain value, but this does not make it less of a requirement.

The goals of total coherence and logical perfection, it is suggested, can only be taken as heuristic (as surely, in slightly different interpretation, they must also be to various Idealists). Relations of any particular thing lie in the future as well as in the present so that even if all the presently existent relations could be known, which they cannot be, the future is, in Whitehead's perspective, epistemologically unavailable by definition.

Thus, on the level of philosophical formation, in order to say anything at all, selective choice of some exclusive principles of explanation is necessary. Within the framework of the selection however, these important internal criteria of logical perfection and coherence can, and must, be applied. In addition, the two criteria can initially serve the function of suggesting the greater value of one choice of first principles over another, thus guiding theory-formation as well as testing its results. (However, either choice would be based on some exclusive metaphysical presuppositions and these ultimately based on one's location of importance.)

If the universe is ontologically as Whitehead says it is, these two fundamental criteria clearly are a necessary condition for achieving philosophical value. But they are not a sufficient condition. There are no conditions both necessary and sufficient within the reach of the philosopher: that is to say, there is no practicable criterion of perfection. "Every construction of human intelligence is more special, more limited, than was its original aim." (FR 87).

Thus although Whitehead does suggest that a philosophical scheme aims at being "necessary" and "self-evident" in the sense that it has evidential compulsion by virtue of the generality and coherence of principles capable of interpreting experience in their terms, it is here maintained that this goal of philosophical perfection is a purely heuristic goal which is never reached. At best, a philosophical scheme compels from some particular perspective of large scope that goes beyond the conventionally stipulated limits of the time. This should not however be taken to imply that the notion of philosophical perfection is meaningless or that it is not a goal, Dewey's criticism in this regard notwithstanding.

Given Whitehead's notion that rationalism is the search for principles that have absolute generality and therefore have no rational alternative, and

his recognition that this search will never conclude, it seems necessary to provide a new interpretation of the notions of necessity, self-evidence and perfection.

It is in this revisionary perspective that the following somewhat misleading remarks of Whitehead concerning the epistemological status of philosophical claims may be best taken: "philosophy, in any proper sense of the term, cannot be proved. For proof is based upon abstraction. Philosophy is either self-evident, or it is not philosophy. The attempt of any philosophic discourse should be to produce self-evidence." Whitehead however continues with a brief conclusion of liberating decisiveness: "Of course it is impossible to achieve any such aim." (MT 67).

Whitehead recognizes that any theory must contain some ultimate principles, that is "given" elements, which form the basis of the theory and which are themselves incapable of being explained by the theory within which they function. This notion of the "given" elements however should be distinguished from the quite different, and mistaken, claim that some sorts of things, so-called simple and irreducible things, are unanalyzable from <u>any</u> perspective. The "given" elements Whitehead refers to are only inexplicable within the particular theory wherein they function as such ultimate principles, but are quite explicable from other perspectives. In regard to such elements, he concludes that "The sole appeal is to intuition." (PR 32).

I suggest that "intuition" is not here meant to imply infallibility (a mistake which Whitehead critically notes in traditional rationalists) but rather instinctive acceptance of some primordial and foundational notion. Its possession is a kind of faith, but faith itself is not evidence. In short, there is no evidence, for all evidence derives from the perspective set up by these "given" elements and any argument on their behalf would

therefore be circular. This recognition has eluded some philosophers in their traditional concern with the search for cognitive certainty. This latter has, traditionally, precipitated a suspect appeal to some "faculty" of intuition or to the notion of direct perception. Philosophies based on this appeal can be harmful to critical discussion, being dognatically alleged to have been privately verified and therefore inviolable.

It is necessary to attend now to the various derivative criteria Whitehead recommends by which to judge the relative compulsion of various philosophical doctrines that approach the heuristic aim of total characterization of the universe but which can never be finally successful.

Primary among these derivative tests of philosophical value is that each first principle should, at very least, be given the widest possible extension of which it is justly capable. Some "synoptic vision" will have been gained thereby. This is Whitehead's meaning of the notion of "adequacy", which is itself the heuristic extension of the notion of "applicability". This latter demands that the principles have some application to an explanation of experience which suggests therefore that, at best, they have an extensive application--that is, they are adequate to interpret multifarious experiences by deduction of true propositions from the general matrix. Successful deduction of this sort is one mode of verification of a philosophy's value since, rightly or wrongly, Whitehead holds that in principle an adequate philosophical scheme will apply to all types of experience. This reflects his metaphysical doctrine that no things are capable of isolation from their general environment: the notion of organic interrelations.

Within each philosophy's perspective, something will count as evidence, with the power of weakening or of strengthening the theoretical

claims. Given certain of the metaphysical ideas of Whitehead, it is consistent to expect him to have a broad, empirically based notion of what is the final evidence to which a philosophy must appeal for verification. Whitehead is himself an excellent empiricist. His work reveals close attention to the multifariousness of experience, including illuminating notations of its oddities and eccentricities. The evidential appeal is to the facts of language, social institutions, actions, general experience and religious experience and the findings of the special sciences. Philosophy must, in addition, have the support of common sense, which does not however mean that the systematic formulation of the philosophy will be directly understandable to common sense. The linguistic novelty of expression in Whitehead's own philosophy certainly is not. This just recognition of the importance of satisfying the convictions of common sense whenever plausible is another account of how Whitehead's rationalism differs from that of the classical rationalists.

Consequent upon the broad empirical confrontation, the scheme of categories and definitions may require reorganization by rejection of particular principles. Those, ideally, will be discovered to be incoherent in relation to the other, acceptable, principles. Or the scheme may require complete abandonment if it is discovered to be ultimately inapplicable to the total variety of presented experience. However, even if a scheme is judged to be acceptable, it should, again, be held to be so only provisionally. No particular system can rightly claim that it has totally and finally satisfied these pragmatic tests because all the justifactory evidence is never available.

Section E. Speculative Reason and Philosophical Progress

Since Whitehead holds that there are no permanent set limits to what can or cannot become available to individual imaginative insight, he has

proposed his method of imaginative generalization for arrival at such insights as are beyond the accepted conventional limits of the intellectual epoch. Whitehead eulogistically links this method with the notions of imagination, adventure and love, the remedies to the deadening closure of dogmatism, "the anti-Christ of learning."

The products of the genuine genius, it may be suggested, often appear to be at least a generation ahead of the receptivity of his time. Such philosophical practice, which avoids provincialism of any sort, is aptly described by Whitehead's notion of philosophical discovery. Expressed in his famous metaphor, an aeroplane flight starts "from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation." (PR 7). In the "thin air" may be discovered anything, or nothing.

An analysis of the meaning and use of this method of imaginative generalization is fundamental to an understanding of Whitehead's conception of philosophy and philosophical method; (the method is also intended by Whitehead to apply to other uses of reason.) The analysis however is accompanied by difficulties: Whitehead does the concept little justice in many of his most extended discussions of it.

In its negative function to dispute dogmatic claims to the possession of clear, distinct and incorrigible first principles, Whitehead's analysis of the method of speculative reason can serve as the unhappily necessary warning. Against the traditionalist's reverence for system and rigid stability which ignores the fact that the universe is evolving, Whitehead claims that:

> Order is not sufficient, What is required is something much more complex. It is order entering upon novelty; so that the massiveness of order does not degenerate into mere repetition; and so that the novelty is always reflected upon a background of system. (PR 515).

In this guise, Whitehead can rightly emphasize speculative reason's superior flexibility and openness to the novelty inherent in the testimony of experience whatever it may reveal. He contrasts this to the narrowness of what he calls "practical reason" which intends only to solidify old habits by static repetition aimed at survival rather than at increase in satisfaction through creative inquiry aimed at "the good life".

The ultimate bases of the methodological recommendations, mainly set forth in The Function of Reason are, again, not independent of philosophical theory. Here they are based on Whitehead's cosmological doctrine which emphasizes novelty, growth, process and aim at satisfaction as foundational notions characterizing the ultimately real things. Whitehead characterizes the fatigue of an organism as "the operation of excluding the impulse toward novelty" so that there is "a relapse into mere repetitive life." (FR 23). However, despite the intentions of practical reason to keep both itself and the world unchanging and stable, "This stage of static life never truly attains stability." (FR 24). Nothing actual can do so, process being inherent in actuality. Thus because some change is always occurring, repetition represents not only lack of progress but essentially is "a slow prolonged decay." The teleology of the universe, the final causation in terms of which all living things must ultimately be explained, aims "upward" toward novelty, that is, toward life: "the primary meaning of 'life' is the origination of conceptual novelty--novelty of appetition." (PR 156). Thus "an organism is 'Alive' when in some measure its reactions are inexplicable by any tradition of pure physical inheritance." (PR 159).

The existence of such novelty is dependent (analytically) on the existence of freedom, a notion discussed at length in Chapter II, Section D. [13]

In reference to Whitehead's notion that "Reason is the organ of emphasis upon novelty," Professor Buchler asks whether here "reason" is perhaps "to be understood as that which keeps pace with a trend in the universe, a trend toward desirable change?" [14] It will be later argued that the answer to this probing question is an affirmative one, that is to say, there is, according to Whitehead, such a trend in the universe and this trend is a moral one, ultimately of religious origin. ("The passionate demand for freedom of thought is a tribute to the deep connection of the speculative Reason with religious intuitions.") (FR 66). If this were not the case, the indisputable valuational emphasis Whitehead places on novelty would suggest that he made an amazing mistake in not noting, as Buchler points out, that novelty in itself is ethically ambiguous, capable of issuing in either good or evil. To maintain that the introduction of novelty is the condition of value can only be justifiable as a conclusion, not as a premise. Whitehead's exclusive stress

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[13] These difficult and fundamental doctrines, characteristically, are meant by Whitehead to apply to all levels of analysis so that, for example, on the social level he suggests that new types of civilization "are only possible when thought has run ahead of realization," (AI 278) since, again, "The prolongation of outworn forms of life means a slow decadence in which there is repetition without any fruit in the reaping of value. ...the values of life are slowly ebbing." (AI 277). It is at such historical times that the last manifestation of originality is expressed by satire which one might as well call an ontological slap in the face. Whitehead's valuational emphasis on the introduction of novelty and freedom of expression is also explicitly intended by him to guide the choice of educational aims, religious doctrines, symbol formation on the social level and, lastly, to the necessities of the individual linguistic reformulation in creative, especially philosophical, theory. Each of these analyzed situations suggest a real moral emphasis, which it is below maintained, is not at all accidental but is, rather, significantly intentional.

[14] Buchler, op. cit., The Concept of Method, p. 159.

on the positive value of change, growth and novelty appears to rest on an appeal to the notion of a Divine Eros in the universe which is, as with Plato, the guarantee of the teleological and ethical final causation, this Divine Eros being "the active entertainment of all ideals, with the urge to their finite realization, each in its due season. Thus a process must be inherent in God's nature, whereby his infinity is acquiring realization." (AI 276 and see Chaps. III and IV).

When applying the recommendations of novelty and freedom of expression on the level of philosophical method, Whitehead goes on mistakenly and arbitrarily to suppose that the distinction of the two types of reason, namely speculative and practical reason, is effectively a split between them. He thus concludes that there can be no useful interplay between the two, an exaggeration which is opposite to and as equally mistaken as Dewey's belief that there is no legitimate separation between the two. In various other exclusive and exaggerated ways, Whitehead's characterization of speculative reason suggests the dangerous belief that the certainly valuable procedure of free inquiry is similar to the quite valueless activity of anar chic license. In such discussions Whitehead distorts his own important intentions. Surely a necessarily responsible and complex activity such as philosophical endeavor cannot make requisite good sense by using speculative reason if the essence of such reason is to be "untrammelled by method" or to transcend all method. (FR 65). What Whitehead must mean, and in fact does say, (FR 66-67) is that the essence of speculative reason is to transcend any particular set method. Its admirable flexibility is dedicated to truth where ever that may be discovered to be and however that may best be reached.

Section F. The Notion of the Ideal Limit

Notwithstanding Whitehead's recognition of the factual impossibility of achieving philosophical perfection in terms of a complete and final characterization of reality, the aim at perfection is nonetheless consistently held to be philosophy's correct aim. Since there are no essential reasons why this conclusion should or should not be reached it may be that Whitehead's not altogether explicit reasons have fundamental importance. On analysis, the attempt will be made to show that the reasons are basically religious and ethical in origin.

Whitehead's classical statements of the notion of philosophical progress, metaphorically expressed by analogies with certain mathematical concepts, are as follows: "deficiency in imaginative penetration forbids progress in any form other than that of an asymptotic approach to a scheme of principles, only definable in terms of the ideal which they should satisfy." (PR 6). And secondly: "Our exact conceptual experience is a mode of emphasis.... It is the transformation of the real experience into its ideal limit." (ESP 113). Taking these two statements to have a fundamental intuitive connection, we can explicate Whitehead's notion of philosophical progress as involving everlasting movement which approaches more closely to a final ideal completion. The goal, however, is of infinite distance, therefore unreachable, but somehow necessarily existent if the very notion of progress is to have meaning. One must be after something and although it is an indeterminate goal, it is nonetheless a goal. And the fact that it is never reached in any finite amount of steps does not mean that it is nothing; this is the fundamental mathematical insight expressed by limit concepts (such as the function of the differential or the notion of the asymptote in calculus). The limit concept deserves and requires strong emphasis in its analogical application to philosophy just in so far as Whitehead's observation

that "The superstitious awe of infinitude has been the bane of philosophy." (ESP 114), is a just observation.

In a sense to be clarified below, to Whitehead, all importance is derived from the immanence of the infinite in the finite. The assertion of everlasting progress toward a unified and infinite ideal of final completion is therefore (and first) held as an ontological truth as well as being held to be a methodological necessity by Whitehead. (And this, of course, is not astonishing. For if one claims, with Whitehead, that in any original theoretical endeavor, theory suggests method, he is not claiming that this ought to be so but that it is in fact so. It is necessary plainly because there is nothing else to do without making some kind of fundamental logical error that is philosophically innocuous. The notion is not so much a recommendation as a description of what happens.)

It is Whitehead's metaphysical vision of the world as a creative process of internally related individualities ultimately grounded in, and everlasting moving toward, a final total unity of value and order that has led him to the faith of rationalism. For this is a faith in the existence of philosophical progress toward an unreachable ideal; a final intelligible characterization of the individualities of the world by coherently related general principles that apply to all facts. There is underlying the rationalistic claims an intuition of infinity, expressed as the ideal limit toward which the world progresses and, therefore, toward which philosophical description aims.

On all levels Whitehead's rationalism clearly reflects his notion of the ontological situation. It is the basis of his rejection of Dewey's important opposition to the various metaphysical and methodological commitments which lead him beyond a genetic-functional interpretation of metaphysical first principles. On the level of the finite world of process,

Whitehead's methodological interpretation could be similar to Dewey's and other superior naturalists. But to Whitehead, explanation in terms of finitude alone is not intelligible and Whitehead's deeply rooted rationalistic faith demands that the world be exhibited as intelligible.[15] "The historic process of the world, which requires the genetic-functional interpretation, also requires for its understanding some insight into those ultimate principles of existence which express the necessary connections within the flux." (ESP 132). At ground, it is herein held, the intuition of the ultimate principles, in terms both of their existence and content, has a religious basis, with fundamentally ethical intentions in genesis and in consequent implications.[16]

It is desirable to indicate the methodological consequences of Whitehead's rejection of the sufficiency of a purely functional account to describe the universe. The rejection is sophisticated and important because Whitehead, like Dewey, recognizes that all meaning is abstracted from experiential meaning (the Reformed Subjectivist Principle based on the rejection of "vacuous actuality"); that knowledge is a product of the whole man and not only of the mind (Whitehead's criticism of Absolute Idealism); that,

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[15] See below for Whitehead's criteria of intelligibility.

[16] It will be one contention of this essay that Whitehead's philosophy cannot be adequately understood apart from a recognition of its fundamentally religious perspective and that, lacking this agreement, Whitehead's philosophical intentions will escape the critic. For example, he may, as critics have, deny that Whitehead, or anyone else, can produce a coherent philosophy that will allegedly be "a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a realistic basis." (PR viii) or that the basic concrete reality, in Whitehead's systematic terminology, the concrescence of an actual entity by development of a subjective aim can be "nothing else than the Hegelian development of an idea." (PR 254). The philosophical importance of taking seriously these and various related assertions of Whitehead will undergo attempted justification in subsequent chapters.

in short, since "I am in the world and the world is in my experience," philosophy, like all knowledge, has its origin in experience of all types and finds there its ultimate evidential appeal. But Whitehead differs from Dewey in what it is that he finds revealed in the multifarious contents of human experience. Of fundamental importance in this immediate context is Whitehead's claim to the experience of infinity which issues into the notion of two worlds, the finite world of fact, (actual occasions), systematically characterized as creative process, and the infinite world of value (eternal objects), systematically characterized as permanent potentials for realization. The latter provide the structural basis for the "mathematical-formal" interpretation of reality criticized by Dewey as invalid.

It would not be surprising to find such a distinction between two worlds totally unacceptable to Dewey since, with characteristic exaggeration, he would maintain that any such philosophical distinction inevitably effects a radical dualism. The difficulty would arise regardless of where one locates the so-called worlds of appearance and of reality since it concerns the more fundamental problem of how any dualisms can be coherent. Whitehead, however, clearly with Plato's philosophy in his mind, notes his intentional departure from any type of dualistic metaphysics: "The ultimate character of the Universe...has two sides--one side is the mortal world of transitory fact acquiring the immortality of realized value; and the other side is the timeless world of mere possibility acquiring temporal realization. The bridge between the two is the 'Idea' with its two sides." (ESP 92). [17]

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[17] The philosophical meaning of this quote is, of course, presently ambiguous. It will be suggested below that this "Idea" with its two sides is God, a notion that Plato showed signs of intuiting without, however, having the historical opportunity to name the intuition.

Thus we have identified Whitehead's fundamental methodological commitment to be the rationalistic recommendation to judge philosophical value as an approach to greater inclusiveness through a synthesis of only apparently exclusive perspectives. This recommendation appeared to be ultimately based on his principal metaphysical commitment to the existence of some ideal limit. It is accordingly requisite that an analysis of the central notion of "ideal limit" be undertaken in content.

Preliminary to this however; it must be noted that in any regard whatsoever the activity of synthesizing is, in itself, ethically neutral. Thus there would be no warranted reason to name the approached limit an ideal limit unless one is either using the word "ideal" in a purely abstract and non-evaluative sense to indicate some kind of total completion or one is putting value connotation on the word and therefore accepts the existence of some principle of value in the universe. In philosophy, if one intends the former alternative, perhaps arriving at the notion by a thoroughgoing analogy with the notion of limit in mathematical analysis, he has, I think indefensibly, lapsed into a view of philosophy as being some particular type of abstract intellecutal discipline. In this attitude the philosopher has totally divorced himself from the traditional idea that philosophy is at least concerned with an analysis of some aspects of the experienced world, whatever else it may be also concerned with.

That such a notion is not held by Whitehead is perhaps initially obvious enough. Thus the following will not in any real sense be an attempt to discourage attributions of this astonishing estimate of philosophy to Whitehead, for such attributions could never conceivably arise. It is, rather, an attempt to show that Whitehead did mean the other alternative, namely that the use of the word ideal in the phrase "ideal limit" characterizes some existent thing which has value characteristics and is that toward

which all movement progresses, both on the level of nature and the level of thought. It will further be argued that this ideal limit is God. Thus the rationalistic recommendation that philosophy should approach an ideal limit would rest on the belief that something is to be accomplished. Thus "morality of outlook is inseparably conjoined with generality of outlook" (PR 23) precisely because God is the all inclusive absolute, the infinite and the finite, the final complete fact, the ideal limit. Rationalistic inclusiveness is the ideal to be satisfied and God, as the ideal limit, guarantees that the direction is good. There may be other guarantees but, it is maintained, Whitehead suggests no others.

Section G. The Philosophical Absolute: God or Creativity

Professor Lowe notes that Whitehead distinguishes "between a metaphysics which founds itself upon general experience and further metaphysical notions whose source is religious experience."[18] The first, ultimately based on an analogy of aesthetic experience, is explanatory of our immediate experience of creative process issuing in individual feelings of satisfaction on fulfillment of some subjective aim; the second is explanatory of our apprehension of a character of rightness and a unity of value in the universe, a craving that, according to Whitehead, requires satisfaction. The religious basis has its roots in the experience of God as the ground of value and order in the universe and is, I suggest, the ultimate foundation of the categoreal structure of Whitehead's metaphysics. "Apart from the intervention of God, there could be nothing new in the world, and no order in the world." (PR 377).

Whitehead maintains that the religious absolute can also function as

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[18] "The Approach to Metaphysics" in The Relevance of Whitehead, Ivor Leclerc, ed., London, Allan & Unwin, 1961, p. 202.

a philosophical absolute. (See PR 315-16). Whitehead's God, I suggest, does so. In his function as the religious absolute God is the transcendant ethical ideal, the ideal limit, whereas in his function as the philosophical absolute God is immanent in the world as the provider of the metaphysical conditions (categories) applicable to analysis of reality, of which he is the structural foundation. Both aspects of God may be identified in the following statements:

> There cannot be value without antecedent standards of value...Thus there is an antecedent limitation among values...as a further element in the metaphysical situation...God is the ultimate limitation...it stands in His very nature to divide the Good from the Evil, and to establish Reason 'within her dominions supreme.' (SMW 178-80, italics mine).

It will be the central concern of later chapters to substantiate the claim that there exists a real and important ethical function of God, conceived mainly as the religious absolute. But I am here concerned with God in his second function as the philosophical absolute.

The claim to be analyzed relates three central assertions: (1) from an initial belief in the rationality of God (God's role "lies in the patient operation of the over-powering rationality of his conceptual harmonization." PR 526); (2) Whitehead derives his own rationalistic faith ("The preservation of such faith must depend on an ultimate moral intuition into the nature of intellectual action...Such an intuition marks the point where metaphysics... gains assurance from religion and passes over into religion." PR 67); (3) He relates the meaning of truth to God as the principle of truth, the Ideal Knower ("The truth itself is nothing else than how the composite natures of the organic actualities of the world obtain adequate representation in the divine nature." PR 18-19). Therefore, I suggest, Whitehead must structure the categories of his philosophical system by analogical relation to God's structural differentiations of the world, as far as man can know these: In Whitehead's own statement: "His [God's] conceptual actuality at once exemplifies and establishes the categoreal conditions." (PR 522).

This last claim can be tested for accuracy by comparison with the exhibited nature of Whitehead's actual philosophical writings. And since it is the consequence of the previous three doctrines, the comparison may tend to throw doubt on the truth of the above analysis in so far as even in Process and Reality there is no clear and initial disclosure of such a systematic connectedness among the principles and categories as there is, for example, in Spinoza's Ethics. It can at present, therefore, only be stated that I assume this to be true of Whitehead's philosophy just in so far as one can discover clues to such an implicitly evolving structural system through various analyses of particular notions in his writings. For this reason attention had been called to the relation of various analyzed ideas to God as the foundation of all of Whitehead's metaphysical categories. For reason of obtaining further indirect rationalization of the claim that Whitehead's categoreal system is structured in the way Whitehead feels God has structured the world, it can be noted that such a methodological procedure is not unusual among philosophers who have strong religious commitments. And indeed, to such philosophers, what other procedure could present a more morally compulsive testimony to the truth of their philosophy? Spinoza: "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things." Hegel: "Logic [in the sense of logos] describes the thought of God before the creation of the world." Royce: "God distinguishes what it pleases Him to distinguish. The logical as well as the moral problem is, Does my will accord with God's will?"

Consequent upon the suggestion that God functions as the ultimate principle in Whitehead's philosophy, it is necessary to grapple with his own alternating assertions that the foundational elements functioning in his system as the 'given' are creativity (novel concrete togetherness, the analogy

of aesthetic experience) and God. An explanation of why this duplicity occurs in Whitehead's claims must be attempted although certainly such a thing could occur without an available explanation.

In the Category of the Ultimate, Whitehead identifies creativity as the ultimate notion characterizing actual things (actual entities), analytically requiring the inclusion of the further ultimate notions of "many" and "one". Thus according to Whitehead, creativity, 'the universal of universals' is that "ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion which is the universe conjunctively. It lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex unity." (PR 31). Creativity, the "ultimate metaphysical ground", is however always found under particular conditions and is "without a character of its own in exactly the same sense in which the Aristotlian 'matter' is without a character of its own." (PR 47). Thus it is in itself only a potency (all universals, i.e., eternal objects, are systematically defined as potentials) requiring, Whitehead claims, both God and the world to achieve its task of transforming multiplicity into a complex unity.

It seems therefore that creativity is considered the ultimate principle in the sense that it is the ultimate metaphysical condition of all actuality. Thus referring to God's reconciliation of the "incorrigible opposites" of the universe into a complex unity, (the task for which creativity is the necessary condition), Whitehead states that "the concept of God is how we understand the incredible fact—that what cannot be, yet is." (PR531). There is a relation of reciprocal explanation between this notion and the idea that "No reason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality. ...God is the ultimate limitation and his existence is the ultimate irrationality." (SMW 179). The latter

remarks can be taken to express Whitehead's previously noted recognition that in every theory there is some ultimate given element that forms the basis of the theory but cannot itself be explained within the theory without circularity.

But nothing has been proved and it will only now be tentatively suggested that the alternatively alleged ultimacy of God and of creativity refer to ultimacy in two different ontological senses. God, as that from which the self-creative activity of the universe originates and toward which creation moves, that is, God taken in the abstraction of his primordial and his consequent natures respectively, is the ultimate metaphysical actuality. Creativity, by contrast, is the necessary metaphysical condition of all actuality, (including the actuality of God), and in this sense, and in this sense alone, is the ultimate metaphysical principle. The use of the necessarily exclusive and uniquely applicable term 'ultimate' is unfortunate since it obscures Whitehead's apparent conviction that the ultimacy of creativity and the ultimacy of God obtain on different ontological levels. Creativity is ultimate on the level of potency, which to Whitehead is purely conceptual, whereas God is ultimate on the level of concrete actuality.

However, it may be imagined that when Whitehead speaks of the ultimacy of creativity he does not refer to it as a potentiality but in its manifestation as the essence of the actual entities involved in the pervasive creative process of the universe. But against this analysis, we have Whitehead's given statement that God is more ultimate than the temporal actual entities, involved in actualized creativity. The explanation is in terms of God's supreme power to offer intelligible reasons of an absolute finality; and if anything is to count as ultimate to Whitehead, qua rationalist, then God does so: "the reasons for things are always to be found in the composite nature of definite actual entities--in the nature of God for reasons of the

highest absoluteness, and in the nature of definite temporal actual entities for reasons which refer to a particular environment." (PR 28).

In brief summary, I have suggested that if one argues the question of ultimacy by comparison of the different ontological statuses of God and of creativity, God has metaphysical priority over creativity. God can be experienced both concretely, i.e., as actual, and conceptually, creativity only conceptually. Argued on the level of manifested creativity, it is also clear from the above that creativity is in an epistemological sense less ultimate than God in that creativity apart from God can explain only the "particular environment", God the totality. However, one might say that this is an argument of degree where the absolutistic claim inherent in the nature of ultimacy possibly could not be settled in application to either God or creativity. To settle the question one could then revert to the initial discussion of creativity as a potential. But here creativity can explain absolutely nothing, and the argument based on appeal to Whitehead's rationalistic commitment has not even begun before it is again ended.

There remains a further plausible explanation of this problem of duplicity regarding the ultimate in Whitehead's system. It may well be that Whitehead intends the claim that both creativity, the factor of multiplicity, and God, the factor of unity, are <u>equally fundamental</u> for analysis of reality. He would then only need to avoid the linguistic error of predicating ultimacy to both in order to show his actual intentions unambiguously. Such a dual location of the final principles of explanation may well be what Whitehead <u>intended</u> to assert. Without entering into the discussion of whether or not such a thing can be legitimately done, we must here attempt to understand whether Whitehead did in fact do this in his developed philosophy. Any answer would have fundamental and different consequences for an analysis of his philosophical method, and ultimately, for the ethical analysis given

below. However because of the encountered difficulties in regard to Whitehead's direct statements regarding the ultimacy of both God and of creativity, it is requisite to analyze associated notions and to use their implications in deciding the original query.

To begin this indirect approach we may recall Whitehead's notion that the various opposites experienced as incorrigible in the nature of things are yet dialectically synthesized by God, "the incredible fact". It would therefore seem that the reciprocal relation of requirement of each of the opposites for the other is ultimately explained by the fact that God's nature is the synthesis of these opposites. In this manner the original dualisms are absorbed into the complex unity of God: in Whitehead's terminology the eternal objects, permanent potentials for process, constitute his primordial nature and the actual entities, the actual world of self-created actualities in constant and everlasting flux, become objectively immortal in his consequent nature. Moreover, since these actualities ingress the eternal objects, there is in the consequent nature a unity with the primordial nature as actualized. God is thus one and many, permanent and in flux, infinite and finite.

In such a dialectical unity, this God has a very special similarity to Hegel's Absolute Idea and very little similarity to the God of traditional theology. Whitehead is quite correct to note that we cannot understand this "incredible fact", this unity of the incorrigible opposites, but this, of course, does not imply that its existence is impossible. Again God is the limit of rationality and the notion of a limit requires that there be two sides; here the farther side, God, is the irrational--it can be known to be there but that is all. The metaphysically disputable presupposition is that a limit does exist. Once this is accepted, the existence of the two sides is analytic, as Hegel knew.

Whitehead's claim that God is a unity of opposites is based on the alleged experiential evidence of the interweaving of the opposites (change and permanence, individuality and community, plurality and unity, the many and the one, the finite and the infinite, freedom and necessity.) (PR 518). Consequently process (creativity) is not "mere appearance, [i.e., illusion], devoid of significance for ultimate reality." (MT 73), ("the final Platonic problem"), and yet process is not itself the complete explanation of that reality. Whitehead has, in a relatively original manner, attempted to allow equal significance to the two fundamental philosophical perspectives that tradition has generally held to be in irreconcilable opposition, namely the notion of the world as permanent or in flux, or, alternatively stated, the opposition of the one and the many.

In such a manner Whitehead has indeed rid philosophy of the unintelligible notion of independent permanent beings ("vacuous actuality") and at the same time avoided the absolutizing of process or flux as Bergson did not avoid it. But it is at this point that one must ask, is not a unity of opposites, this complex unity, nonetheless a unity? Thus on the final showing creativity (flux, finitude and multiplicity) would be superseded and transmuted by dynamic absorption with the eternal objects (permanence, infinity) into the unity of God's nature. Because that nature unites all that there is, is it not itself permanent and one, even though to be so requires inclusion of all opposites in order that the claimed totality is not limited by exclusion of anything from its content? To be sure, from the finite point of view this completed totality is not immediately experienced, but to God perhaps the totality is given. To say this however is in effect to suggest that Whitehead's God is ultimately complete and unchanging (the ideal limit) and that permanence is actual rather than merely abstract and conceptual as it is in

the analysis of the permanent eternal objects. (See Chapter IV).

If the above is a just analysis of Whitehead's judgments of God and the world and the relation between them, it would bring him very close to certain Idealists, especially Hegel and the neo-Hegelians. They, as Whitehead may, find God immanent in the world, conscious of eternity working itself out in time and therefore being the unchanging and ultimate structure and essence of the world. Each of these notions is reflected in their philosophical structures and doctrines of truth and are notions which are here tenuously imputed to Whitehead. This claim requires elaborate justification and will at present be only minimally supported by exhibiting the (alleged) similarities of some of Whitehead's statements with the following statement of Royce: "The Temporal Order [Whitehead's World of Appearance, see above], taken in its wholeness, is for us identical with the Eternal Order [Whitehead's World of Reality]... These two realms of Being are merely the same realm, viewed in one aspect as a temporal succession,...so that fulfilment never at one present instant is to be found; while, in the other aspect, this same realm is to be viewed, in its entirety, as one life-process completely present to the Absolute consciousness."[19] As is clear in Royce's philosophy, it is below argued that Whitehead's notion that God synthesizes the various opposites into unity arises from a fundamentally ethical motivation, God providing the final and given ethical structure--which is not to say that God exists <u>in order to</u> fill this role but that, in fact, he does so.

Even if the above particular suggestions as to the functions of God and the ultimacy and permanence of God in Whitehead's philosophy do not attain

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[19]J. Royce, <u>The World and the Individual,</u> II, New York, Dover Publications, Inc., 1959, pp. 386-87.

final evidential persuasion, a failure to recognize that some basic religious notions underlie Whitehead's metaphysical system can, and indeed did, provoke unwarranted criticisms of the unintelligibility of his system. This is inevitable just in so far as the critic can only find the otherwise plausible consequences of such religious convictions incoherent or unjustifiably arbitrary. But surely this is his mistake and not Whitehead's, for it is total nonsense to ignore the seriousness of Whitehead's often announced religious belief or the necessary relevance of it to his categoreal formulations. To do so has given rise to the distressingly common and entirely misapplied criticism that Whitehead has, somehow or other, brought God into his metaphysics in the pseudo function of a deus ex machina with the duty of saving the coherence of the system. Whitehead however characterizes God as the principle of unity and value in the universe, the ideal completion transforming all inconsistencies, for example, transforming chaos into order. This certainly must be granted as acceptable functions to attribute to God--as is traditional, they include basically ethical functions. Admittedly, the nature of Whitehead's God, which combines permanence with flux, the infinite with the finite, is not within the Western theological tradition. But this is a different and separate point, for Whitehead, characteristically, does not accept the tradition's claim to have reached final truth.

Section H. Logical Method: Whitehead and Hegel

The critical analysis of Whitehead's philosophical method by H. K. Wells[20] seems ultimately to be based on several misunderstandings of the function and legitimacy of Whitehead's God and will be given somewhat

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[20] Process and Unreality, New York, King's Crown Press, 1950.

detailed discussion here. His ideas are considered symptomatic and his particular presentation is noteworthy for its extensiveness and for its persuasive force. Moreover, and perhaps more justifiably, I expect that such a discussion could reveal significant and hitherto unanalyzed aspects of Whitehead's concept of philosophical method.

Wells' basic complaint against Whitehead, if I understand him correctly, is that because Whitehead used the traditional logical method, which requires the principles of identity and non-contradiction to apply, he was led to posit the entities called eternal objects as the required examples of self-identical beings. This would be necessary inso far as the physical temporal world of actual entities, characterized by flux and opposition, lacks logical harmony. It is therefore not explicable by the traditional method without appeal to some permanent beings. Wells holds that Whitehead accepted the traditional method but rejected the mechanistic content of previous philosophical views, and thus set up an absolute opposition between method and content, leading him to posit a dualism of two worlds, (the one changing, finite and in everlasting flux, the other unchanging and eternal). This dualism could in turn only be coordinated by use of a deus ex machina with a dual nature (the primordial as unchanging, eternal and static; the consequent as changing, everlasting and dynamic). This difficulty Wells attributes to Whitehead's failure to employ a method adequate to deal with process in its own terms as, he suggests, the Hegelian dialectical method does by locating identity in internal opposition rather than in logical or ontological harmony.

I argue against Wells that, in general, a philosopher does not first accept a method (traditional or otherwise) and then go on to use it in order to discover what the world must be like should one use the method consistently. As Whitehead explicitly notes, one's initial metaphysical commitments,

that is, one's theoretical perspective, suggests what method one will use. This method may itself develop as the theory progresses and not the other way around. Since it is the entire man complete with feelings as well as mind that philosophizes, it is a complete mistake to imagine that Whitehead's metaphysical and religious commitments to some unifying theistic principle could arise simply because he has accepted the traditional method which requires that some self-identical beings exist. To imply that any philosopher could introduce the notion of God as an arbitrary addition to his system, as if such a philosopher imagined that it was more important that he secure his own system than that he attend to the convictions of his conscience, is an astonishing supposition. It is to be noted that the supposition is not attributed to Wells in its entirety but by implication from his various critical statements.

Second ly, even within this supposed criticism of Whitehead, one may note that the eternal objects in God's primordial nature, for which alone the traditional method of internal logical harmony is used, are not fully actual. They are not concrete entities, which, according to Whitehead, are the ultimately real things, but are pure potentials which are only conceptual and lack physical feelings. Thus according to Whitehead's decision that the criteria of final actuality are concreteness and individuality, the eternal objects have a totally different ontological status than the finite fully actual physical world. The bifurcation of the two worlds cannot be an ontological bifurcation in Wells' imputed sense simply and adequately because the two realms have a different ontological status, the one potential and deficiently actual, the other concrete and fully actual. Moreover, (against Plato), neither of the realms can exist without the other. Every actuality is dipolar, God's primordial nature providing the initial data for the mental pole, the physical world providing the data for God's

physical pole, his consequent nature.

Now it may be finally suggested that much that Hegel implies regarding the entities he calls "essences" could follow analysis which is very similar to Whitehead's analysis of the eternal objects.[21] Essences, it is suggested, may be interpreted as abstractions from full reality, being eternal, unchanging and self-identical. Thus they could be, and could only be, described by the traditional method based on the notion of static self-identity, as are Whitehead's eternal objects. And Hegel, like Whitehead, posits a self-identical Absolute, the Absolute Idea, which, like Whitehead's God, synthesizes all oppositions and is the union of the essential and the actual, (Whitehead: the eternal objects and the actual entities, respectively).

The perhaps belabored and indeed very simple points being made here are that if Wells' arguments have proved anything at all, they have proved too much, for if the criticisms apply to Whitehead they, and for similar reasons, apply also to Hegel. But essentially, it is maintained, they nowhere apply. Wells, I suggest, is mistaken in his appraisal of the genesis of philosophical discovery as regards content and method. Secondly, he is mistaken in ignoring the characterization of the ontological status of the eternal objects as potential and merely conceptual (parallel to Hegel's essences). Here the traditional method does apply, whereas its notion of

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[21]The following remarks regarding the essences are regrettably speculative. Hegel does not himself give any direct analysis of what these essences are intended to be since such an analysis would be on an abstract level--essences being abstractions from concrete reality--and Hegel never writes on this level but only on the ontological level to which dialectical analysis will apply, namely the level of reality.

a self-identical enduring substance does not apply on the level of finitude which is, and which alone is, the fully actual ontological level (and this is the similar claim of both Whitehead and Hegel.) "The simple notion of an enduring substance sustaining persistent qualities, either essentially or accidentally, expresses a useful abstract for many purposes of life. But whenever we try to use it as a fundamental statement of the nature of things, it proves itself mistaken." (PR 122). Thirdly, the ideal limit of logical harmony, God, (or Hegel's Absolute Idea) is never reached by these actual finite beings in the temporal world which actualities are everlasting in process but forever incomplete, i.e., forever in internal opposition. Assuredly this is why God is held to be infinite. And more forcibly, against Wells, this is why God must also include the finite (as did Hegel's Absolute) if he is not to undergo the absurd limitation of being deficiently actual, as for example, Aristotle's Unmoved Mover does (if Aristotle is to be interpreted as a consistent naturalist).

It may be however that Wells' given criticisms of Whitehead in fact reflect a fundamental disagreement with Whitehead's particular claim that eternal objects are not final actualities but are "deficiently actual". If this is Wells' implication, there is indeed some real justice in the criticism for Whitehead's notion of "deficient actuality" is not, at least to this writer, philosophically intelligible. It is, of course, a notion involved in thorough-going relation with other of Whitehead's metaphysical doctrines--in particular his predilection toward a monistic view of all actuality as being describable by generic categories--and to this extent becomes intellectually comprehensible. But the supposition is a disputable decision and requires support as to its alleged adequacy and significance. It is entirely possible by contrast, that something existing conceptually is as "actual" as something that exists physically and conceptually, although

to be sure, actual as different ontological modes of being. Whitehead's notion of degrees of actuality is equally as obscure as the traditional notion of degrees of reality. Certainly something may be actual or real in one perspective and not in another, say as here, physical or conceptual perspectives. But to imply that some perspective is more actual than another is philosophically suspicious and unwarranted. Of course, one perspective may be more useful than another for a particular purpose, and some may be altogether useless for any rational purpose. But they are all actual.

However, it must be repeated that Wells' criticisms as stated are, I think, unjust. There is available verbal evidence that Whitehead holds classical logic's doctrine of self-identity and its subject-predicate mode of expression to be inapplicable for descriptions of concrete actuality. In several of many similar passages, Whitehead records his conviction that "Aristotelian Logic...deals with propositional forms only adapted for the expression of high abstractions, the sort of abstractions usual in current conversation where the presupposed background is ignored." (AI 157). Or again: "The subject-predicate form of proposition is concerned with high abstractions", that is, with eternal objects in conceptual abstraction, not ever with the concrete actual entities and therefore not with eternal objects when they are actually ingressed by concrete entities. "An actual entity cannot be described, even inadequately, by universals [eternal objects]." (PR 76).

If one applies the classical logic on the cosmological level it issues into the notion that things are to be classified by the substance-attribute description. This notion Whitehead repudiated as what he derisively named The Fallacy of Simple Location, the supposition of independently existing, externally related actual things, the Newtonian notion of occupancy: "The notion of self-sufficient isolation is not exemplified in modern physics. In the place of the Aristotelian notion of the procession of forms,

it has substituted the notion of the forms of process." (MT 191-92). In short, the ultimately real things, the actual entities, are activities or agencies in process of becoming and perpetually perishing in the creative advance, and can be, and can only be, interpreted through the genetic-functional method. The eternal objects in their status as conceptual abstractions are the only entities to which Whitehead applies the traditional logic, what he calls the mathematical-formal interpretation, which describes the infinite. (See above).

The only legitimate use of the traditional logic is to describe the eternal objects as conceptual abstractions; it cannot apply on the metaphysical level wherein eternal objects are concretely actualized through their ingression into actual entities. The confusion of levels of analysis must be avoided, for <u>any</u> philosopher can employ the traditional logic on <u>some</u> level of abstraction so that this discovery represents no particular criticism of anybody. The only relevant question is whether or not this logic is taken as descriptive of the level of actuality and this is the question that Wells, I suggest, answered incorrectly in respect to Whitehead's philosophy. However, as noted above, Wells may perhaps have fundamentally intended his criticism as a more basic criticism of Whitehead's notion of degrees of actuality and of the eternal objects as "deficiently actual". This is a different, and I think just, criticism.

There is an assumption intentionally implicit in the above discussion, namely, that had Whitehead in fact studied the Hegelian dialectic, he <u>could</u> have applied it in his philosophy as it stands, at least as far as Hegel did in his own--that is, on the level of the finite actual world. And he could not and <u>should not</u> have applied it within the same limits--on the abstract conceptual level of deficiently actual eternal objects (Hegel's essences) or to God (Hegel's Absolute Idea). This assumption cannot be directly

supported for it demands detailed comparison of various metaphysical notions of both Whitehead and Hegel with the intention of showing that certain metaphysical similarities enforce the conjecture that methodological similarities would be entirely admissible and, indeed, not arbitrarily so.

Hegel's logic, which is so-to-speak, a dynamic 'time-centered' logic, is based on the metaphysical conviction that any notion of inevitable final opposition in reality (the Law of Contradiction in logic) is an abstraction from the durational and relational essence of real things. It contains many central ideas that could be more acceptable to Whitehead than the ideas of the static 'space-thing centered' logic of Aristotle. The following statements of Whitehead show an astonishing parellelism to certain Hegelian notions on both the logical and ontological levels:

> In the nature of things there are no ultimate exclusions, expressive in logical terms. For if we extend the stretch of our attention throughout the passage of time, two entities which are inconsistent for occurance on this planet during a certain day in the long past and are inconsistent during another day in the more recent past--these two entities may be consistent when we embrace the whole period involved, one entity occurring during the earlier day, and the other during the later day. Thus inconsistency is relative to the abstraction involved. (MT 76, italics mine).

Section I. Criterion of Intelligibility and Philosophical Language

The assertion of the philosophical accessibility of the Hegelian logic in application to Whitehead's metaphysics remains, however, a conjecture. Since a decision is of some importance for later analysis, a further, albeit necessarily oblique, illustration of this supposition may be attempted. Although no new method is formalized by Whitehead, if it can be shown that his analysis of actual entities (the fundamental metaphysical analysis) does not, and can not, use traditional logical categories or

traditional philosophical language, and if there are only two relevant horns to the dilemma, namely traditional method or Hegelian method, then by indirection we may give support to the initial suggestion. This explanation will begin by applying critical attention to the radical novelty of Whitehead's metaphysical categories and systematic language in an attempt to discover the underlying reasons for the novelty. Apart from this specific intention the analysis is in itself essential for an adequate understanding of Whitehead's philosophical method.

In the abstraction of his primordial nature, God is the lure for feeling. This nature is presupposed by the particularities of the actual world and establishes the initial phase of every subjective aim. To Whitehead, all actual self-created things have value inherent in themselves: "To be an actual entity is to have a self-interest. This self-interest is a feeling of self-valuation; it is emotional tone." (RM 97). Thus rational explanation in intelligible terms can only be given in terms of value, that is, in terms of final as well as efficient causation. Such explanation involves an ultimate appeal to God as the principle of value, the object of desire, He actualizes creative movement, (the essential characteristic of life) and renders the universe intelligible: "a dead nature [e.g., Newtonian cosmology of self-identical static bits of matter] can give no reasons. All ultimate reasons are in terms of aim at value. A dead nature aims at nothing." (MT 184). And further: "Each occasion of actuality...arises as an effect facing its past and ends as a cause facing its future. In between there lies the teleology of the Universe." (AI 195-96).

Whitehead's presupposition, namely that a teleology based on the pervasive existence of the aim at value of every actuality is necessary as the minimal grounds for intelligible explanation of any actual entity, is not in

favor among contemporary philosophers. Thus, there are, as Whitehead recognized, inherent difficulties in giving it philosophical expression. These difficulties will continue just as long as the presupposition of a "dead nature", the mechanical model of the universe, remains the primary presupposition for most modern thought (although it is not the presupposition of contemporary science, particularly biology). As Whitehead puts it: "Any endeavor to go behind it is, in philosophical discussion, almost angrily rejected as unintelligible." (MT185). Indeed, the various critical reactions still being aimed against the intelligibility of Whitehead's categoreal scheme sadly justifies the prophetic nature of this recognition.

The formation of a scheme in terms of the notions of pervasive value, feeling and creativity must, however, remain a basic stipulation for guaranteeing rational explanation and philosophical intelligibility to Whitehead. His rationalistic faith requires that all actualities be explicable by some pervasive general principles and his cosmological and religious commitments require that any actuality be described ultimately as a process of self-creativity aimed at value. To Whitehead, any mechanistic characterization of an entity must indicate a high abstraction from concrete actuality. [22]

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[22] That these convictions show real similarities to certain Idealist notions, for example, Plato's Eros and Hegel's Geist, can perhaps be most clearly shown in the statement of the neo-Hegelian, Josiah Royce: "every natural process, if rightly viewed from within, would be the pursuit of an ideal. There would be no dead Nature at all,--nothing really inorganic or unconscious,--only life, striving, onflow, ideality, significance, rationality," and further, "we have no right whatever to speak of really unconscious Nature, but only of uncommunicative Nature." (Royce, op. cit., II pp. 231 and 225, respectively). Whitehead does not, as is usual with Idealists, claim that in order to have intelligible explanation the cosmic teleology must be based on the pervasiveness of mind. Rather, the basis is in feeling aimed at value. Nonetheless, even on the level of feeling, the claim is clearly more in the spirit of Idealism than of Naturalism. The latter, traditionally, avoid pervasive allocations to all of nature of what are ordinarily considered as specifically human, possibly animal, characteristics. And perhaps for good reasons; but this is not the present issue.

To obtain a characterization of his novel interpretation of reality, Whitehead required what he calls a "redesigning of language" in order to translate this new vision of a world of process (although not only of process) aimed at value. Thus he systematically assigns various new meanings to certain terms of ordinary language, e.g., subject, feelings, mentality; gives new implicit meanings to various traditional philosophical terms, e.g., universals, appearance, reality; and with a rare, but just, innovatory spirit occasionally invents new terms, e.g., appetition, concrescence, superject, ingression. In view of Wells' criticisms of Whitehead's methodological 'traditionalism', it is ironically noteworthy that many other critics attribute fundamental recalcitrancy to Whitehead's categoreal expression precisely because he did have to rework traditional philosophical language and classifications to better express his novel metaphysical perspective. This redesigning, I have suggested, is not dissimilar in intention and necessity to Hegel's redesigning of the static categories of traditional logic. And, indeed, it does incur similar (and major) attendant difficulties to communication.

But this is perhaps as it should be, for communication in the languages of men must be both more difficult and less compulsively evident than in a perfect language, if there could be such. The human intellect and its linguistic modes progress through a variety of habitual mistakes. None, however, are necessarily final. In Whitehead's statement here pertinent, "On the whole, the history of philosophy supports Bergson's charge that the intellect 'spatializes the universe'; that is to say, that it tends to ignore the fluency and to analyze the world in terms of static categories." But Whitehead does not accept the claim that such errors are incorrigible or final; "Indeed Bergson went further and conceived this tendency as an inherent necessity of the intellect. I do not believe this accusation, but I do hold that 'spatialization' is the shortest route to a clear-cut philosophy expressed in

reasonably familiar language." (PR 319).

Certainly Whitehead's philosophy is not 'clear-cut' and the language not 'reasonably familiar'. His analysis of the world had to abandon traditional 'spatializing' categories in order to explicate the various novel and fundamental intuitions of process, pervasive feeling aimed at value, and a God which is both infinite and finite. Bergson's denial that the intellect could reach absolute truth is simply one way of saying that process (what he means by reality) cannot be intellectually expressed. Whitehead thinks it can. He attempted the expression, as did Hegel. Both required and employed radically novel and unconventional usage; both recognized that traditional usage is neither sacrosant nor incorrigible.

Whitehead holds that in order to formulate metaphysical principles, which aim at optimum inclusiveness, "Words and phrases must be stretched toward a generality foreign to their ordinary usage; and however such elements of language be stabilized as technicalities, they remain metaphors, mutely appealing for an imaginative leap." (PR 6). This occurs mainly because "Language is thoroughly indeterminate by reason of the fact that every occurrence presupposes some systematic type of environment." (PR 18). Definition is therefore always alterable because incomplete.

Whitehead's view of the ontological situation stresses the indeterminate number of relations actually associated with each entity all of which are requisite to produce its ultimate characterization. Classification and stipulation of definitions are pragmatically justifiable but are always an abstraction from the totality and therefore are never metaphysically adequate. Something or other is always being taken for granted without acknowledgement or justification. "There is not a sentence which adequately states its own meaning. There is always a background of presupposition which

defies analysis by reason of its infinitude." (ESP 103). There must consequently exist a dialectical relation between language and the metaphysical system, indeed, a relation of reciprocal causation. Thus, Whitehead asserts, "A precise language must await a completed metaphysical knowledge," (PR 18), but as above discussed, there is no such knowledge available to finite beings "unable to embrace totality".

Thus to Whitehead the traditional demand for exactness and finality in philosophical language (as well as assertion) is both misleading and impossible to effect. And, of course, he is correct. As is particularly obvious in any importantly creative system, every philosophy requires new analogical and metaphorical uses of words to evoke its fundamental insights. Even if some words have a traditionally stipulated and fairly exact meaning, such a meaning would be inadequate to express radical creative thought. Exactness must be conceived of as being, at best, a goal. It cannot be a necessary requirement for creative philosophy to begin, as even a cursory study of the history of philosophy will testify. Indeed if clarity and manageableness of first principles had been an <u>effective</u> criteria, there would be no history of philosophy. In Whitehead's statement:

> all men enjoy flashes of insight beyond meanings already stabilized in etymology and grammar. Hence the role of literature, the role of the special sciences, and the role of philosophy:--in their various ways engaged in finding linguistic expressions for meanings as yet unexpressed. (AI 228).

Moreover, as noted above, Whitehead does not believe that words of ordinary language do in fact have a literal meaning when employed in <u>any</u> philosophy (and yet some must be employed if philosophy is to communicate). The necessary generality of any genuine philosophical concept excludes the use of assigned univocal meanings, even meanings assigned from a previous philosophical perspective. The "imaginative leap" is entirely necessary.

Thus to get on with the serious task of philosophy, it is necessary to recognize and accept the fact that novel insights must be expressed by new terms and categories. These will be analogically derived from some form of individual relationship to experience which the philosopher, perhaps uniquely, judges to be important and capable of extension to explain more than its origin. And as Whitehead recognizes, some analogical mode of expression will always be necessary in philosophy. In so far as all knowledge is ultimately derived from human experience, discussions describing more than the nature of man or man's mind can do so only in an analogical manner. The world that is experienced in some sense or other always transcends the subject. Language in its extended use can not therefore be incorrigibly direct but must be intentionally analogical, indeed sometimes directly metaphorical, as great poets continuously and paradigmatically testify. In a Whiteheadian illustration: "The key notion from which such construction [of a cosmology] should start is that the energetic activity considered in physics is the emotional intensity entertained in life." (MT 231-32).

The philosophers recommendation to purify language so that words have precise meanings is a contemporary hoax because it is an impossible task. Language, as an existential product, transcends any initially stipulated boundaries of meaning by new relationships of continual interpretation.

Since philosophical terms do aim at extensive analogical applicability, perhaps it is sometimes inevitable that a philosopher will aim at the ideal extension, namely applicability to the entire world. Philosophical concepts however can be exaggerated into falsity by too great an analogical generality and thereby can in fact cease to serve the discriminatory function of analysis. This, I suggest, has occurred in several of Whitehead's concepts, notably feelings, mentality, satisfaction and subjective aim,

ambiguously applied to all levels of actual things. However, in a narrower application the ideas may be just and very fertile. And the confinement of concepts need not destroy Whitehead's rationalistic faith that there exist ubiquitously applicable generic principles, since he nowhere has claimed that he has in fact discovered these. Indeed, they are not discoverable by finite minds.

Whitehead rightly recognizes that since the use of philosophical concepts on various levels of being is analogical, there is never an exact repetition of meaning on the different levels. There is a 'rhythm' of structural or material repetition but there is also novelty in meaning. However because many of the terms Whitehead employs are derived from ordinary usage and there function to characterize only human experience, when they are systematically redefined to characterize all experience, human and otherwise, the fact of this redefinition can be easily forgotten, both by Whitehead and by his critics. Many otherwise possible intentions then appear either to be unintelligible or mistaken. This for example, does happen with many of Whitehead's terms based on an initial experience of aesthetic relation to the world, e.g., creativity, feeling, and aim at value.

In his criticism, one of many similar critiques, Urban[23] judges that in general Whitehead's language demands too much of an imaginative leap and becomes unintelligible. The generality of attribution occurs mainly because the vision of the world which Whitehead attempts to express is itself judged

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[23] Wilbur M. Urban, "Whitehead's Philosophy of Language and Its Relation to His Metaphysics," in P. A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, 2nd ed., New York, Tudor Publishing Company, 1961, pp. 301-329.

unintelligible by Urban, among others. There is no reason to assume that they are not being straightforward in these critical reactions. However, because every human assertion is corrigible, is there not a moral requirement of individual willingness to entertain novelty of vision? Philosophical progress is otherwise impossible, although certainly the novelty alone does not guarantee the value of the vision.

Chapter II. The Foundation of Whitehead's Ethics

Section A. Procedure and Justification

If it can be agreed that any metaphysics whatsoever implies particular, and unique, consequences for ethical theory, (including, for example, the indeed axiologically significant consequence that any ethics is impossible), then any such particular derivation may in fact produce results of little importance for the development of philosophical ethics. If the subsequent intended derivation of the ethical implications of Whitehead's metaphysics is to be philosophically important, demonstration of more than the fact of its possibility is therefore requisite. The ethical doctrines to be developed must however follow a structure which I have constructed and assume useful, Whitehead's own ethical remarks being philosophically informal and devoid of any noticeable pattern.

In intended evaluation using Whitehead's given criteria of philosophical progress, or in general, of philosophical significance, (see Chapter I, Section E), it will be argued that the ethical theory compatible with, and in some respects commanded by, Whitehead's metaphysics has definite philosophical value. The theory appears to be capable of synthesizing various genuine insights of different ethical perspectives into a more just, balanced, comprehensive, and adequate total description of ethical phenomena by assigning each of them to its individual, and partial, sphere of explanatory relevance. By contrast, each theory had previously been exaggerated into falsity and final opposition by the claim that its particular central concepts were adequate to explain all ethical phenomena. None of these different positions can be restated in their entirety in the projected Whiteheadian ethics in as much as the ethics will be derived from his particular and unique

metaphysics. It therefore logically cannot accord exactly with any ethical theory having a different metaphysical ground. In this synthesis all that appears sensible and valid in previous views is retained but its application is reassigned. In this new perspective each theory, to be sure, will be essentially changed, both in its theoretical and in its practical consequences. Thus the fundamental and single claim here intended is that the real positive value of each of these positions can be retained while the tendency to exaggerate the extent of its applicability will be tempered.

It is further believed that this projected study can satisfy the main logical criterion Whitehead has stated for philosophical validity, namely the requirement that one's entire philosophical system be logically coherent. By implication, any ethics Whitehead would possibly have written would have the minimal requirement of being coherent with his given metaphysical structure. Thus it would seem that if one did develop such an ethical theory he could attribute it to Whitehead in a sense of possibility that is stronger than attribution of any other ethical theory to him. That certain elements of ambiguity may arise as respects the choice of different explanations of a particular ethical notion is an initial fair objection and will be confronted in particular discussions below, both by direct statement and by indirection. A further point of qualification is necessary: it is possible that when a philosopher develops an ethics from his pre-existing metaphysics, he may discover that the ethical implications of that metaphysics are not agreeable to him. If he has a sense of philosophical justice, he may consequently be led to modify those aspects of his metaphysics that imply the undesired ethical assertions. However since many of the central ethical ideas to be derived from Whitehead's metaphysics appear to concur with a number of philosophically informal remarks of ethical import that he has made, the theoretical

possibility of a metaphysical revision will not concern us again.

Whitehead's second major criterion of philosophical validity is the empirical requirement of applicability, that is, the requirement that a theory be descriptively adequate to, and explanatory of, a wide variety of experiences and beliefs present in general, and in special, experience. (See Chapter I, Section D). The primary data of ethics are the normative judgments men do make, whether formalized or simply implied by their actions. Thus, according to Whitehead, one task of an ethical theory is to be just to as many varieties of such claims as are logically compatible, rather than to confine itself to evidence from the actual, but partial, ethical experience or judgments of any particular person who, in this respect, is merely one individual. As Whitehead states this point: "An actual individual...has attained its individual depth of being by a selective emphasis limited to its own purposes. The task of philosophy is to recover the totality obscured by the selection." (PR 22 and see Chapter I, Section B).

Section B. That the Ethics Is Not a Private Interest Theory

In attempting to attach persuasiveness to the possibility of deriving a philosophically tenable ethics from Whitehead's metaphysics, it will first be necessary to discuss critically various published conclusions that Whitehead's metaphysics does not suggest any values which are specifically ethical values. The critics claim that in Whitehead's philosophy ethical categories are reduced to aesthetic categories, issuing in some type of private interest theory. It is here believed that a private interest theory is wrongly classified as a type of ethical thesis. It is, in effect, a denial of the convictions of ethical common sense. In the immediately following discussion I will argue that the attribution of a private interest theory to Whitehead is a complete mistake, arising through insufficient

analysis of various metaphysical concepts, through direct misinterpretation of individual non-contextual statements, or through inattention to Whitehead's methodological intentions.

As a first point of contention, I will briefly note that it is not an argument in favor of these positions to indicate that Whitehead did not specify any values peculiar to ethics nor, indeed, write an ethical theory. Ethical values would be a specific case of the generic type and Whitehead was philosophically interested in the analysis of generic principles that apply to all actualities (See Chapter I, Section A). Consequently he would not find it of preliminary importance to discuss ethical values for clearly this would require a separate categoreal analysis of man. But again, it would be sophistical to argue that not having an intention implies that the intention could not be fulfilled.

The major part of the dispute against those who hold that Whitehead's metaphysics can imply a no more philosophically legitimate ethics than that given in the private interest theories must confront these interpretations on the substantive basis, namely, their alleged origin from what is stated in Whitehead's relevant metaphysical principles. Of central importance is Whitehead's "theory of feelings". The analysis of feelings given therein is meant to apply to, and be generically descriptive of, all actuality. The suspect doctrine is Whitehead's claim that all feelings are rooted in aesthetic experience: "an actual fact is a fact of aesthetic experience. All aesthetic experience is feeling arising out of the realization of contrast under identity." (PR 427). A feeling is a component in the concrescence of every actual entity, productive of the process toward completed unity of operation, (the "satisfaction"). The constitution of the particular satisfaction is determined by the subjective aim of the unique

creative urge.

Thus feelings aimed at value contribute to the generic and fundamental meanings of every actual entity. (See Chapter I, Section I). The primary characteristic of this generic valuation is that it is determined by what that individual takes to be important in actualizing its subjective aim. Valuation is dependent upon the individual's subjective interest. Satisfaction is analyzed as being primarily dependent upon the achievement of harmony, including achievement of a definite and unique qualitative pattern, and the quantitative intensity of this pattern. It is easily observed, and it has been observed by various critics referred to above, that Whitehead's doctrine of feeling has an aesthetic base. Whitehead is indeed using the language and concepts of aesthetics to describe this generic experience of valuation by all actualities, for example, the concepts of interest, importance, satisfaction, feeling, unity and pattern.

As Whitehead does in fact say: "Philosophic thought has to start from some limited section of our experience...My own belief is that at present the most fruitful, because the most neglected, starting point is that section of value theory that we term aesthetics." (ESP 138). However, what is not philosophically legitimate or methodologically necessary, although it has been done, is to judge that Whitehead's starting point imposes a literal limitation on his philosophical scope. By contrast, it is indeed possible, and moreover an announced awareness of Whitehead, that philosophical language can be, and often must be, intentionally metaphorical. (See Chapter I, Section I). I will hold that the aesthetic language is so as respects Whitehead's unsystematic use of it when referring to ethical concepts; the fact may have been obscured for the reason that aesthetics as a model is relatively rare in philosophy, as the scientific paradigm, for example, is not. (See Chapter I, Section B).

In attempting to dispute the notion that Whitehead's God has no moral structure, (a criticism which rests on errors of literalism and reductionism similar to those noted here regarding the alleged non-existence of specifically moral values), Lawrence states the supporting conviction that the aesthetic language is intentionally metaphorical in Whitehead's discussion of religious experience. Whitehead, according to Lawrence, does not intend that God's vision is aesthetic and lacking in ethical values.[1] It is of direct importance for this ethical analysis to agree with Lawrence's claim since Whitehead has linked God to his theory of feeling by asserting that the initial conceptual aim of every actual entity derives from God's conceptual valuation, his primordial nature; God in this aspect is the principle of concretion. Thus if the initial subjective aim of an actual entity can, as claimed below, include ethical values, God must first so include them. (And, of course, regardless of this particular consequence for moral theory, the original question Lawrence considers, namely, whether or not God includes ethical valuations in his primordial nature, is in itself significant.)

Lawrence goes on to offer an interesting and sensible reason for Whitehead's choice of the aesthetic metaphor: "the aesthetic metaphor is not only as good as any but perhaps better than any...it displays a deep and continuous current of value sensibility..." offering "excitement, allurement, inspiration." [2] The use of the aesthetic metaphor is then due to Whitehead's conviction that its literal meaning is more suggestive of those aspects of experience that he wishes to emphasize than is probable from any other vocabulary. And indeed, Whitehead's announced reason for using the concepts of

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[1] N. Lawrence, "The Vision of Beauty and the Temporality of Deity in Whitehead's Philosophy", Journal of Philosophy, LVIII, # 19, pp. 543-53.

[2] Ibid., p. 553.

aesthetics as the starting point in his philosophy is that he believes the approach to be "more fruitful" because "most neglected", a reason that is not metaphysically but, one might say, functionally or practically determined.

The metaphor of aesthetic concepts is indeed fruitful if one wishes to emphasize, as Whitehead does, the depth, novelty and particularity of the feelings and the creative experience that constitute all actuality seeking qualitative unity of intensity within pattern. "An intense experience is an aesthetic fact, and its categoreal conditions are to be generalized from aesthetic laws in particular arts." (PR 426-27). However, although all adaptation for an end is, in its generic metaphysical analysis, aesthetic adaptation, it is here held that it is an error to conclude that what has metaphysical primacy forces axiological reduction. Any ethics would require a basis in some metaphysics but, as Hartmann has pointed out, it can introduce new categories of analysis through its own specific determinations.[3] And Whitehead does explicitly state this same recognition: "The moral element is derivative from the other factors in experience...the primary factors in experience are first the animal passions...and secondly, the more distinctly human experiences..." (AI 180).

And, moreover, as Whitehead also notes, the aesthetic basis provides the notion of the ultimate particularity of feelings as self-caused and self determined which is important as the basis of moral responsibility. (PR 339). This does not mean that moral responsibility refers to aesthetic values as its content, but, rather, that to have moral responsibility, one requires the original basis as it exists in aesthetics of freedom and self

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[3] N. Hartmann, Ethics, Vol. I, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1932, pp. 290-92.

creativity among other things. Thus the vocabulary of aesthetics would when used on any level of experience, stress a type of structural or formal similarity. But it does not follow that there is any intended reduction in content of aesthetic experience as literally used to apply to artistic phenomena. Although the traditional love poem declares that one's lover is like a red rose, it does not mean to imply that she possesses no ethical qualities but rather that on all levels of experience she responds with delicacy and grace.

Furthermore Whitehead does clearly state his intention to differentiate the principles of morality from the canons of art: "The canons of art are merely the expression, in specialized forms, of the requisites for depth of experience. The principles of morality are allied to the canons of art, in that they also express, in another connection, the same requisites." (PR 483). Why therefore should the fact that Whitehead nowhere systematically discusses the "principles of morality" be taken as an indication that he did not recognize their separate and important existence? When Whitehead does discuss ethical or religious experience, his philosophical intention is to relate them to experience generally, since they begin there. But, it is claimed, they need not necessarily be confined or reduced to this beginning. Indeed Whitehead's own refuting statement regarding religious experience shows that they are not so intended:

> The moment of religious consciousness starts from self-valuation, but it broadens into the concept of the world as a realm of adjusted values, mutually intensifying or mutually destructive. The intuition into the actual world gives a <u>particular definite content</u> to the bare notion of a principle determining the grading of values. It also exhibits emotions, purposes, and physical conditions, as <u>subservient factors</u> in the emergence of value. (RM 58-59, italics mine).

Consequently, I suggest that the apparent identity of ethical concepts with the basic aesthetic analysis is only apparent, Whitehead being

intentionally metaphorical when using the language of aesthetics to apply to ethical phenomena, except in the justifiable case when he is discussing the generic origin of moral experience. In this respect the aesthetic language can literally apply; but in this use it is innocuous for conclusions regarding the content of ethical values in Whiteheadian ethics. The specific doctrines regarding ethics which may have been the cause of the reductionist misunderstanding here under discussion will be attended to below when a more detailed analysis of the existence of ethical values is given.

Section C. Minimal Requirements for an Ethical Theory

It is now requisite to discuss in a positive manner the basis in Whitehead's metaphysics for an ethics of some philosophical importance. For, as suggested above, any metaphysics implies an ethics in some general and minimal sense, either by simple affirmation or denial of the possibility of value phenomena. What must first be attempted then is a demonstration that Whitehead's metaphysics can support an ethics according with the minimal traditional or common sense requirements for any ethical theory. In order to see what is to be accounted for, one may say with common sense, in Bradley's succinct statement of its claims, that morality implies that there "is not only something to be done, but something to be done by me---."[4] Moreover, and this is the paradox inherent in morality, there must "remain a perpetual contradiction in myself no less than in the world, between the 'is to be' and the 'is', a contradiction that cannot be got rid of without getting rid of morality... "[5] Singling out the basic notions of

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[4] F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, New York, The Liberal Arts Press, 1951, p. 10.

[5] Ibid., p. 112.

philosophical importance presupposed in these assertions is one method of determining what notions any ethical theory must be adequate to give an account of, as a minimal requirement.

The existence and knowability of values actualizable in the natural world, (the something that is to be done), are clearly necessary. To be available for ethical acts to take place in it, the world must itself have no pervasive cosmic teleological determination. In such a world there would be no axiological resistance, no ethical tension or possible progress, in short, nothing for any individual to accomplish because all values are already accomplished and "what is to be" would already be identical with "what is". Thus, secondly, an ethical theory would require the existence of freedom in the universe in order to allow the possibility of ethical action, the universe being such that ethical action is possible. Lastly, it is required that the philosopher have some metaphysically acceptable account of individual self identity, (that something is to be done by me), without which one could not affirm the existence of moral responsibility, at least not in its usual intended application to human individuals. This complex concept of "responsibility" inevitably presupposes consciousness of one's own self identity, among other things.

Because ethical activity requires that there is something that is to be done, it is certain that such action is ethically meaningful only if men are in fact able to relate to each other and affect each other's lives, (for better or for worse). As Royce puts this point:

> what gives the moral life its whole positive significance is the fact that individuals can and do suffer, and undeservedly suffer, and, in a measure, helplessly suffer, for the wrong-doing of other individuals, while for the very same reason, moral agents can do positive good in and for the lives of other moral agents. [6]

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[6] Royce, op. cit., II, p. 402.

Royce is indeed correct, and common sense knows this. Thus it might be thought that a metaphysical account of the real relationship of men is a further necessary minimal requirement on which to base an ethical theory and should be discussed in regard to Whitehead's metaphysics. But the analysis will not be given as a direct argument since the opponents of this belief in the real relationship of men do not, I feel, require serious attention.

That the definition of the self as a completely self contained and enclosed entity devoid of all effective relation, namely the solipsist definition of the self, is a naive and senseless theoretical pretence which is unavailable for intelligent discussion is here simply taken for granted. The dogma has been adequately refuted as long ago as Locke in his Essay. Because the available criticisms of the solipsistic dogma appear to be in general acceptance among contemporary thinkers, there would appear to be no philosophical value in giving to the doctrine the power of demanding another refutation. Consequently, no discussion or "proof" of the fact that Whitehead's metaphysics can give an account of the existence of effective relations among men will be undertaken, (although attention will later be given to his particular account of the relations). The simple conclusions such a discussion would provide are generally accepted as grounds from which one begins to philosophize and do not constitute a particular theoretical doctrine which requires original and individual justification each time it is assumed. In philosophical discussion, some convictions must be taken for granted, being the general property of the philosophical community. To oppose this recommendation is to assume that the history of philosophy has no cumulative force---or ought to have none. This is, surely, academic and mistaken. The attitude is, moreover, destructive to progress in philosophy. At its extreme, it advises each philosopher to undertake the impossible task of reconsidering

every assertion in his theory, many of which have however been adequately and persuasively considered by generations of philosophical geniuses before him.[7]

In a modified form of Realism, it is true that the doctrine of the independence of the self from other selves has greater reasonableness than the solipsistic doctrine. The Realists, holding an extreme theory of individualism, do not deny that relations between men do exist but deny, rather, that any relation can change the innermost nature of the self. Thus, for example, if all others were to be annihilated, the essential self would remain the same. Although this notion is somewhat more available for endorsement, I believe that the doctrine is mistaken, being based on a false concept of the self, such as Hobbes, for example, holds. The Realist's doctrine will be criticized in the analysis of Whitehead's opposed theory to be given below. This procedure can alleviate the requirement of giving any direct proof that relations among men exist and are effective in influencing the nature of the self since aside from the senseless solipsistic dogma, it is only the Realist theories of extreme individualism that oppose this claim.

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[7]Admittedly, the recognition of the claims that are at any particular time able to be considered beyond the need of critical attention is more difficult and complex in philosophy than in any other theoretical discipline. This may be, for example, one reason why philosophers, as Whitehead noted, criticize and re-evaluate the history of their subject to a greater extent than scholars in other disciplines. However, within certain contexts of discussion, some notion could be held to have compulsive evidential force, even though philosophy does not possess any primitives which are unchangeable and self-evident. Some notions can serve as functional primitives from some announced general perspective. It may be that the content of such convictions is always of trivial significance for positive philosophical construction. If this is true, however, it would provide further justification, since if the claim is itself of comparatively minor significance for the construction of theories, it hardly deserves repetitive attention.

Section D. An Analysis of Freedom

It is now necessary to discover whether the three basic philosophical concepts declared minimally requisite as a foundation for an ethical theory, namely the existence of ethical values, of freedom and of self-identical individuals, can be explicated from Whitehead's metaphysical doctrines. The conclusion will claim that this can be done and suggest that many aspects of the concepts so explicated have advantageous and important consequences for ethical theory. Although it is unusual to include the concept of the self identity of individuals in the status of a basic requisite for ethical theory, I have done so because various critics have claimed that Whitehead's metaphysics cannot provide an adequate account of self identity, and consequently, cannot provide a basis for moral responsibility. Since the account of self identity here attempted is linked to the interpretation of Whitehead's notion of freedom, the latter will concern us first. The possibility of deriving ethical values from Whitehead's metaphysics will be argued last, since it provides the most fruitful transition to the third chapter, concerned with an analysis in content of the ethical values. In the present chapter the discussion is mainly polemical, postponing positive analysis to the third chapter.

In the Category of Freedom and Determinism, the ninth Categoreal Obligation, Whitehead states that

> The concrescence [production of novel togetherness in an actual entity] of each individual actual entity is internally determined and is externally free. ...in each concrescence whatever is determinable is determined, but...there is always a remainder for the... final decision...the reaction of the unity of the whole to its own internal determination. This reaction is the final modification of emotion, appreciation, and purpose. (PR 41).

In another interpretation, Whitehead explains that however far efficient causation is successful in describing various determinations, there always remains "the final reaction of the self-creative unity of the universe." (PR 75).

There is, thus, a purposive integration of the inherited factors, the efficient causation of the world (including God) by the final causality of its own emotional valuation, called the "subjective form". Consequently, although the past that each actual entity inherits conditions what is available for it to reach to, the subsequent purposive reaction to the given is free. Every entity therefore possesses teleological self-causation. The subjective form determines how the given data are prehended, and this determination is a self-determination. As the ninth Category of Explanation states: "how an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is; so that the two descriptions of an actual entity are not independent. Its 'being' is constituted by its 'becoming'. This is the 'principle of process' ". (PR 34-5).In short, "the perspective imposed ...by subjective form...provides for freedom." (AI 200).

Whitehead also holds that the causal independence of contemporary occasions is another ground for freedom: "There is complete contemporary freedom. It is not true that whatever happens is immediately a condition laid upon everything else. Such a conception of complete mutual determination is an exaggeration of the community of the Universe. " (AI 200). This difficult doctrine is one account of how Whitehead's theory of internal relations differs from classical theories.

Christian has said that Whitehead's reason for holding to this notion of the causal independence of contemporaries is a categoreal reason. for, "If throughout the growth of the concrescence additional data continued to enter the process, the categorial condition of subjective unity could not be met." [8]

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[8] W. A. Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1959, p. 60.

In short, individuality and satisfaction as referrent to the attainment of a complete determination of feelings, could not be achieved if contemporary occasions were not independent.[9]

In accordance with his fundamental metaphysical presupposition that the generic categories ought to apply to all actualities, Whitehead holds that every actual entity is free and self-creative. Indeed, to Whitehead, "the primary meaning of 'life' is the origination of conceptual novelty--novelty of appetition..." (PR 156).

Before it is philosophically legitimate, or methodologically obvious, to transfer these basic conclusions as respects the freedom of actual entities to a discussion of human individuals, systematically defined as respects the soul to be a society of actual entities, remarks of a justificatory nature must be introduced. For in so far as Whitehead has not analyzed societies from all perspectives, it will be necessary to originate some suggestions relevant to this present problem concerning freedom, and to other problems below encountered.

According to Whitehead, the analysis of actual entities is the basic metaphysical analysis, and is meant by him to be generically applicable to all other levels of metaphysical entities. But here one must ask, as Whitehead to my knowledge did not, whether in fact such an analogical approach can be given on the different metaphysical levels, in particular, from the level of actual entities to the level of societies as constituted of actual entities but as having unique emergent properties of their own.

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[9] See below for analysis of individuality and satisfaction and the ethical implications of the doctrines.

Negatively, it would seem that the organic nature of Whitehead's universe would substantiate the belief that the emergent characteristics are unique, being synergistically rather than mechanically formed in response to the unique environmental situation that is self-provided. Otherwise, we shall have in Whitehead a doctrine of novelty only applicable to the level of individual actual entities and this intentionally generic property of uniqueness will only apply within this level and not, extensively, to characterize levels as levels.

Moreover, even if it should be claimed that an analogy between levels is legitimate it would seem that the properties of the actual entities in societies would themselves change to some extent. The property of being in a society is an additional new relation and ought to change the entity since it is in fact defined by its relations. It may be that Whitehead means that analogical interpretation or argument between metaphysical levels can occur only as respects basic structure or formal properties which nonetheless do not have, and need not have, similarity in content. For it is certainly true, and, as is well known, consequently productive of many problems regarding interpretation, that Whitehead's analysis of actual entities is purely formal. It does not give any localization of what the content of their various generic activities may be. Thus, for example, the nature of an actual entity may indeed change as respects significant content when it is in a society, (its objectifications will be different in content), but what it does may be structurally the same as when it is simply in a nexus. And Whitehead would seem to be working with some such unannounced premise.

Thus when here an independent analysis of societies must be undertaken, and specific statements are not available in Whitehead, the interpretation will be given in an analogical manner although no literal transfer is admissible. To deny the legitimacy of such analogical transfer is to undercut

Whitehead's foundational claim that the basic metaphysical categories are generically applicable to all actual things and such denial would require elaborate polemical justification. Such a polemic is not my intention, being, I think, unnecessary. For the claim that there can exist parallelism in terms of structure or form, a type of rhythmic repetition rather than an actual repetition of content, is a modified claim that accords with Whitehead's often announced conviction that the latter, namely factual repetition, is no where present in the (Whitehead's) universe. Everything is unique, but this does not mean that from some perspective it is not legitimate to indicate similarities. For it is grotesque to maintain that similarities must announce identities. This would imply that no thing is unique if it is not absolutely unique (whatever that may mean--see below).

In the discussion of freedom, to be presently applied in analysis of the human soul, (a society of actual entities), it is important to note that according to Whitehead there are degrees of freedom: "Each occasion exhibits its measure of creative emphasis in proportion to its measure of subjective intensity. The absolute standard of such intensity is the primordial nature of God." (PR 75). Whitehead is here showing clarity on the much confused point that an intelligible notion of freedom need not claim that freedom is complete but, on the contrary, must presuppose that there is some determined giveness and some applicability of causal explanation, for otherwise activity would reduce to sheer indeterminism. If such a state of complete indetermination, that is, lawlessness, be what is meant by freedom (it has often been so held), then this type of freedom would imply a complete denial of moral responsibility. In short, since <u>something</u> must determine the will in order for one to act at all, this concept of freedom as indeterminism produces a positive denial of individual responsibility in that what then does determine the will is itself purely accidental, an unself-conscious momentary

impulse. And to chance no one can be accountable. In Hegel's language, this is arbitrariness, and, as he further points out in his discussion of the moral will, "Instead of being the will in its truth, arbitrariness is more like the will as contradiction." [10] Surely then, what is necessary for a concept of freedom that is available for moral responsibility, and what is given by Whitehead, is, as Spinoza taught, freedom defined as self-determination. In Whitehead's statement of this recognition as applicable to men, it is held that "Free men obey the rules which they themselves have made," (S 88), a sentiment that is very similar to the ideal construction of ethical affairs in what Hegel calls "ethical life", and somewhat similar to the Kantian Kingdom of Ends, (although Kant's ethics is difficult to generalize in any respect).

Thus Whitehead concludes, I think rightly, that there is no such fact as absolute freedom characterizing finite beings, analytically meant as conditioned beings: "freedom, giveness, potentiality are notions which presuppose each other and limit each other." (PR 202). As noted above, the notion of absolute or unconditional freedom is not applicable to finite entities, but to God, as respects his primordial nature: "One side of God's nature is constituted by his conceptual experience. This experience is the primordial fact in the world, limited by no actuality which it presupposes." (PR 524). By contrast, the conceptual feelings of a finite actual entity are primarily derivative from its inherited physical feelings which determine the valuation to some degree. "Unfettered conceptual valuation is only possible once in the universe," (PR 378), and is, to repeat, what constitutes God's primordial nature. There is thus a difference in degree between finite

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[10] Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1942, p. 27.

conditioned freedom and the unconditioned freedom of God's primordial nature which may amount to a difference in the kinds of freedom of each, as respects the consequences of their activities. Some of the derived consequences are important for ethical theory and will be discussed from this perspective.

In differentiating two kinds of freedom, S. K. Maitra calls one type the freedom of man, this being the concept of freedom he identifies, for example, in all Indian philosophy, "without any exception"; the second concept is called freedom of the will, this being predominant in the West at present.[11] Freedom of man is taken to hold that only the man who is completely liberated from dependence on, and bondage to, the senses is free, and he alone cannot do evil. In the West it would seem that such a concept of freedom is usually predicated only of God, although it does function as an ideal of a freedom for man, as for example, in the rationalistic strains in Plato and Spinoza. Both however are careful to declare that the ideal is not reached by ordinary means--Spinoza, through intuitive love of God; Plato, by the philosopher's intuition of the Good.

The second kind of freedom, namely the freedom of the will, as freedom to do evil as well as good, falls within, and defines, the realm of ethics. The first named freedom, the freedom of man, wherein the individual cannot do evil, is not in the realm of morality since there "what ought to be" is already identical with "what is". And as Bradley pointed out, "against this ideal self the particular person remains and must remain imperfect. The contradiction remains; and not to feel it demands something lower or something

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[11] S. K. Maitra, "The Gita's Conception of Freedom as Compared with that of Kant", in Radhakrishnan: Comparative Studies in Philosophy, New York, Harper & Brothers, pp. 348-61.

higher than a moral point of view."[12]

It may be suggested that in some sense or other the concept of the free man in Indian philosophy is conceived from a perspective that is "lower" than the moral point of view. In such philosophies, for example in Hindu philosophy, the individual is unable to do evil, not because he has controlled the evil within himself but because evil is not real; all that is real is good, evil being an illusion, not a fact. By contrast, the free man that Plato and Spinoza conceive of as an ideal has achieved perfection by a real subduing of real and evil passions through intellectual control. And this free man, it would seem, is seen from a perspective that is higher than the moral point of view. In the first case, the free man, according to the Indian description and metaphysics, is, so-to-speak, before good and evil, whereas the free man in Plato's and Spinoza's theories is beyond good and evil. Such freedom is absolute and is beyond the realm of morality since the freedom of the will, or moral freedom to choose good or evil, no longer obtains in the individual who is ethically perfected. In the Western tradition the two types of freedom may perhaps be well symbolized by Adam before the fall and by Christ as beyond evil inclination, with finite human individuals between the two; and, with Milton, "Sufficient to have stood, but free to fall".

If absolute freedom were the only type of freedom in the universe, individual ethical activity and evaluation would be impossible, since what ought to be would be identical with what is. Indeed the Indian philosophers do claim this. All appearances of things to the contrary are considered to be a mere appearance, in the sense of illusion: the veil of Maya. Such metaphysical doctrines cannot give an account of moral freedom and cannot support any

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[12]Bradley, op. cit., p. 140.

ethical doctrines. And it can be said that the Indian philosophers do not concern themselves with constructing ethical systems of the type given in the West, and, a fortiori, can give no adequate account of individuality and personality. In this respect, it is important to note that although Plato also holds that "ultimate reality" is perfect and uncorruptible, he refused the (Parmenidian) notion that only what is ultimately real exists, a notion which would imply that evil is an illusion. The temporal world is not, to Plato, an illusion, nor the evil that exists in it, nor the soul that passes from evil to good when wisdom is the goal of eros. There is a value determinism in the transcendent "realm" but there is moral freedom in the temporal world of men. On achievement of moral perfection, a man has therein fulfilled his function, qua man, and is then beyond the human realm, being "very like a god". This discussion must now be related to the concept of freedom in Whitehead's philosophy, it being hopefully of some clarificatory value. In Chapter Three other of its aspects will be relevant, particularly as regards the extended analysis of moral responsibility and the speculation as to whether or not Whitehead's philosophy implies any belief in the possibility that the freedom of man as beyond the moral realm is possible as an ideal or as a fact.

It may be easily seen that Whitehead's metaphysics, on these above grounds at least, can support some concept of the freedom of the will as moral freedom, the necessary basis for an ethical theory. There is an explicit denial of the existence of any cosmic teleological determination in the temporal world: "No reason, internal to history, can be assigned why that flux of forms, rather than another flux, should have been illustrated... The actual flux presents itself with the character of being merely 'given'. It does not disclose any peculiar character of 'perfection'" (PR 74). And Whitehead immediately notes, with remarkably casual intuitive grasp, exactly the consequence for moral theory that has been here linked with the

concept of a cosmic value determinism: as regards human beings, "the final decision of the immediate subject-superject constituting the ultimate modification of subjective aim, is the foundation of our experience of responsibility, of approbation or of disapproval, of self-approval or of self-reproach." (PR 74).

And elsewhere he implies the other consequence for ethics derived in the above discussion, namely that any being who possesses absolute freedom is outside the realm of morality, being either below or above this realm, in some metaphorical sense. Thus Whitehead could be expected to hold that God's primordial nature, which is not determined by anything outside itself which it could choose to respond to in either a moral or immoral way is not in the realm of morality. The evidence for the necessity of such a conclusion increases when one notes that God's primordial nature is unconscious and unchanging, for it would here follow of necessity that it cannot be morally free or ethically accountable. That Whitehead does draw this conclusion is quite clear: God's "necessary goodness expresses the determination of his consequent nature..." (PR 524) which is his judgment on the world, and is conditioned, conscious and changing. Morality, it would seem, has nothing at all to do with his primordial nature, and if the foregoing discussion is correct, it ought not to have such a relation.

The greater part of this ethical analysis will be concerned with Whitehead's analysis of freedom as conditioned freedom. According with Whitehead's insistence that finite actualities have physical as well as conceptual inheritance and are determined by this inheritance to some degree, it is this concept of freedom, and this concept alone, that is applicable to finite actualities, and as here implied, to man as a society of the fundamental actualities. Whitehead does not conceive of an ideal of man which is reachable in the finite world, an ideal wherein man transcends

moral freedom by the possession of ethical perfection, as did Plato and Spinoza. His rationalism does not extend to the ethical level in this respect, for, it will be maintained, Whitehead nowhere suggests or implies that man's reason can totally and finally control his metaphysically original emotional responses. And here, against Plato and Spinoza, it is maintained further that Whitehead is correct. It is one account of why his ethics will involve a recognition of tragedy, which, wherever it appears, and in whatever guise, is an admission of irrationality into the temporal universe.[13]

A final clarification must be given in this discussion of freedom. In the large body of philosophical literature which discusses the concept of freedom, there is often a dangerous confusion of this concept with the very different concept of liberty. In the distinction here intended, it will be claimed that freedom is an internal phenomenon of the will. In Whitehead's terms, it will be dependent on the possession of a subjective form, - "private matters of fact" (PR 32). It is a principle of decision and evaluation determining "how that subject prehends that datum". (PR 35). By contrast, the concept of liberty will refer to the external environment, that is, to the particular data which the entity prehends. Liberty concerns what it is that is externally available for an actuality to react to by the general and inclusive attitudes of acceptance or rejection (positive or negative prehension) within the general limitations imposed by its internal situation.

Consequently, there will always be limitations to one's liberty if one is finite, since each finite entity is at liberty to do only a small number of things that it may be abstractly possible to do. However, this

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[13] See Chaps. III and IV for an analysis of this situation and its transcendence in the religious dimension.

does not mean that the individual is not free in such cases, and to think that it does mean this is to have confused liberty and freedom and to have assumed that to be free means that one is able to do anything he may please to do. But this is quite mistaken--a monstrous simplification and reduction of the two separate concepts. All that is necessary for freedom of the will to obtain is that it is open to an individual to choose which evaluative response of several he will take in his particular limited situation--what Whitehead calls "the final modification of emotion, appreciation and purpose." (PR 41). What one is able to react to, that is, what data are present in his actual situation, is always limited but this is, again, a limitation of liberty and does not deny that the individual is free. Within any situation, concretely viewed, some things are better than other things and choice is operative. As Whitehead has suggested these points, from a different perspective: "There is a freedom lying beyond circumstances...This is the freedom...which Stoics and Christians obtained as the gift of Hellenism. In this sense the captive can be free." (AI 75). And here it can be recalled as an inspirational as well as a philosophical lesson, that although Epictetus was a Roman slave, he produced a noteworthy philosophy.

It is true that the inheritance from one's past influences how one is going to react to his particular situation, that is, conditions his desires and interests, thus limiting his scope of response and evaluation (a limitation of one's freedom). However one may still be called free just in so far as more than one evaluation is actually open as a "live option" if one directs his attention to his freedom and not to his inherited fixity.[14]

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[14]Clearly there is an ethical duty operative here--see below. It may be the case that psychosis can make such attention impossible, which is exactly why the condition is abnormal and may border on the loss of self-hood in extreme cases.

If one stipulates that freedom means that any possible response is available to an individual in situations of choice, one is implying that freedom requires complete causal independence from one's past. This position denies that there can be degrees of freedom, (that is, varying powers of self-determination), requiring that all freedom be complete and absolute, devoid of any deterministic influence from one's past. However, on such an account of freedom the intelligibility of the concept of self-identity becomes difficult, if not impossible, to explicate. Moreover, the consequences for ethics are disastrous, for if one cannot assert the existence of a certain degree of actual continuity of the self through inheritance of one's past, it is by no means clear how one could make sense of the notion of moral responsibility, either in regard to one's past acts or in regard to the future consequences of one's present acts.

It is to the credit of the existential philosophers, among others, to have stressed freedom as essential to, and definitional of, man. But because of the mistaken demand of certain of them, for example Sartre, that such freedom be completely independent of conditioning by one's past, the original insight has been exaggerated into falsity. Whitehead's implied account of freedom includes the recognition that although human freedom of the will is not, and cannot be, completely unconditioned, this does not mean that man is not free. There will always be some limitations to one's individual and fundamental perspective, for this among other reasons, forcing exclusion of other possible perspectives, albeit not irrevocably. (See Chapter I, Section B). Limitations to one's scope of attention will always to some degree limit one's liberty of choice and may influence the degree of freedom that the individual does achieve. But some freedom is always present, according to Whitehead, "in proportion to [the individual's] measure of subjective intensity." (PR 75). Whitehead's claim that finite freedom is conditioned and

not absolutely independent of causal influence appears to be a just and intelligible type of account, which is, moreover, available for interpretation on the ethical level to a degree that the other mentioned doctrines are not.

Whitehead's own statements will conclude this discussion in summary fashion:

> ...the actual entity, in a state of process during which it is not fully definite, determines its own ultimate definiteness. This is the whole point of moral responsibility. Such responsibility is conditioned by the limits of the data [a limitation of liberty] and by the categoreal conditions of concrescence [the limitation of freedom by influence of one's past structure and valuations]. (PR 390).

Freedom here means self-determination or self-creativity, and as quoted above, "however far the sphere of efficient causation be pushed...there always remains the final reaction of the self-creative unity of the universe." (PR 75).

Section E. An Analysis of Self-Identity

It must now be recalled that although freedom as self-determination or self-creativity is a necessary condition for ethical activity, it is not a sufficient condition. Clearly the existence of ethical values on which to act is also necessary. And less obviously, but equally requisite, is the existence of individual self-identity so that what is (ethically) to be done can be done by a free and ethically accountable individual. This latter discussion is particularly important in regard to Whitehead's metaphysics in that, as above noted, an insufficiency to account for self-identity has often been attributed to it. The central problem rests on the fact that most Western accounts of self-identity depend on the notion that the self is some sort of continuous entity whereas it is at once clear that Whitehead's metaphysical claim that process is the final actuality of finite entities does not permit this type of analysis. As a general observation, one may note that because Whitehead has discarded the traditional notion of the self or subject

as presupposed by its feelings or experiences, the self as substance, "the unchanging subject of change", he must account for the notion of the self in some non-traditional manner. And as Whitehead himself recognizes:

> In some sense there is a unity in the life of each man from birth to death. The two modern philosophers who most consistently reject the notion of a self identical Soul-Substance are Hume and William James. But the problem remains for them, as it does for the philosophy of organism, to provide an adequate account of this undoubted personal unity, maintaining itself amidst the welter of circumstance. (AI 189).

Before beginning the analysis of the criteria of self identity in Whitehead's philosophy, it seems advisable to state my belief that it is philosophically necessary that one announce the particular perspective from which he is approaching such an analysis. If this is done, many alleged oppositions among philosophical accounts can be seen to be merely apparent oppositions arising because the individuals are not discussing the problem from the same perspective but assume that they are. By "perspective" in this usage, I refer to, for example, a metaphysical analysis, an ethical analysis, or an epistemological analysis.

If one, for example, for whatever reason is here irrelevant, defends the metaphysical idea that there is a continuity of the person's past life experiences with his present state of being, (the common sense conviction) this may indeed be a necessary metaphysical condition of self identity and a true fact about persons. However, epistemologically, for example, it does claim too much, for any finite person, (as against God, in the traditional accounts), has had experiences which are not presently available to his recollection; the common experience of the impossibility of total recall. Nonetheless, in the metaphysical sense it may still be claimed that the various experiences influence an individual's present state whether he knows it or not; the metaphysical position of psychological determinism, strongly supported by Freudian

psychology and a materialist metaphysics.

Thus knowledge of total past experiences cannot be a criterion of self identity from the epistemological perspective, although the existence of this continuity may be supported on the metaphysical level. And, moreover, from the practical perspective, in particular, in a legal perspective, this assumption is often tacitly made. For example, it is not ordinarily accepted as favorable evidence that a criminal cannot recall his act of violence. It is, all other evidence being unfavorable, nonetheless, his act. Furthermore, and this is important for our central discussion, from the ethical perspective it does seem that the question of self identity as defined in terms of the continuity of past experiences has different and complex consequences.

It can be granted that in some sense or other the feelings of moral responsibility and moral guilt derive from one's ability to hold his past acts as his own and to feel accountable for them. This existential response illustrates one's implicit trust in the metaphysics of the continuous self. However, ethics can, and I think must, suggest that there exists an ability to rechoose one's self in that aspect which involves one's goals and evaluations. And this is, ethically, equivalent to an intentional choice to deny that one's present ethical self is wholly continuous with his past self's evaluations and purposes.

If such an achievement of intentional discontinuity on the ethical level could not be included in an account of self identity, we would, for example, have to conclude that no evil man could ever become good, or vice versa; and surely they do. Since from the ethical perspective, the characteristics of good and evil are the essential defining characteristics, in order to make sense of the notion of moral development, and further, to justify the activity of moral education and explain its occasional success,

one must note that a man once evil can become good. This is a common sense observation which the metaphysical insistence on the thorough-going temporal continuity of a causally determined self could not explain. And, moreover, it could not with consistency attempt to do so. This however is productive of serious and unfortunate consequences in ethical theory, as the Calvinists, for example, if not Calvin himself, did discover. It is therefore suggested that discussions of self identity require an announcement of the perspective from which the discussion is given, for in each case the important properties of the self are quite different, and therefore productive of different conclusions as regards the criteria of self identity. It may be that an individual philosopher will wish to go on to suggest that one or another of the different analyses is the most fundamental description of man (as did Royce, for example, in showing that his concept of the self ultimately reflects his decision that the self is an ethical self). But this is a different question, and is here irrelevant, albeit otherwise important.

It will be accepted as an initially suggestive hypothesis that some of the confusions in the discussions of self identity, such as those noted above, could be clarified by a simple announcement of the perspective from which the criteria are given. The present task will be to analyze Whitehead's concept of self identity, first as he has given it from the metaphysical perspective, and then from the ethical perspective that is derivable from the metaphysical analysis and from other relevant statements Whitehead has made. Acceptance of the possibility of this latter type of discussion is important. The original claim that Whitehead's metaphysics can imply a defensible ethical theory is partially dependent on the adequacy of the analysis of the concept of the self from the ethical perspective as against the conclusions of the generic (aesthetic) analysis of the self as developed from the metaphysical analysis.

Since Whitehead holds that the actual entities are the ultimate metaphysical actualities, it will be necessary to discuss the self identity of these entities before the analysis of the self identity of the human soul (a society of actual entities) can be given. This latter analysis will be considered from the metaphysical perspective and then from the ethical perspective. In so far as possible, it will be an independent analysis, not referring to the analysis of actual entities but rather to Whitehead's particular notions as stated in respect to societies. However where specific statements are not available, the analysis must be derived from the analysis of actual entities by use of analogical implications. Whether such a procedure is legitimate has been above considered with the conclusion that there can be no literal transfer but that analogical argument, when known to be such, can have clarificatory value and a minimum of methodological justification in that no other procedure is in fact available. Whitehead's philosophical method enforces this fact.

It will be argued that the derived ethical analysis of self identity, analogically based on Whitehead's metaphysical analysis but transcending it by application of particular categories, has significant and novel consequences for ethical theory as against the several unfortunate consequences of the traditional analyses based on the notion of the self as some kind of substance. As Whitehead states his repudiation of such a doctrine, in one typical expression:

> Life is a bid for freedom...[so that] The doctrine of the enduring soul with its permanent characteristics is exactly the irrelevant answer to the problem which life presents. That problem is, How can there be originality? And the answer explains how the soul need be no more original than a stone. (PR 159).

It will be obvious that Whitehead's generic account of personal identity, as indeed of self identity on any level, is ultimately referrent to the individual's relation to values, that is, to the eternal objects. As

Whitehead himself does say: "The problem of 'personal identity' in a changing world of occasions is the key example for understanding the essential fusion of the World of Activity with the World of Value." And further, clearly linking identity with value theory, aesthetic and ethical, Whitehead concludes that, "This achievement is the essence of art and of moral purpose." (ESP 93).

Whitehead holds that "An actual entity is a process in the course of which many operations with incomplete subjective unity terminate in a completed unity of operation termed the 'satisfaction'", (PR 335). And in the twenty-second Category of Explanation he had previously stated that

> ...an actual entity by functioning in respect to itself plays diverse roles in self-formation without losing its self identity. It is self-creative; and in its process of creation transforms its diversity of roles into one coherent role. Thus 'becoming' is the transformation of incoherence into coherence, and in each particular instance ceases with this attainment. (PR 38).

In this process of reaching coherence, the actual entity is a creative process, purposively transforming the diverse experiences towards satisfaction of its subjective aim. As the Category of Subjective Unity states, "The many feelings which belong to an incomplete phase in the process of an actual entity, though unintegrated by reason of the incompleteness of the phase, are compatible for integration by reason of the unity of the subject." (PR 39).

Upon attainment of the satisfaction, the entity loses all subjective immediacy and is completely determined. In this aspect as a superject, the actual entity is objectively immortal and functions as a "ground of obligation", supplying itself as data for objectification by future actual entities. As a superject, the actual entity is completely determined and unchanging. Thus it would seem that the self identity of the actual entity must arise during the integrative creative process. If it is not present here, it will not be obtainable since nothing of subjective importance occurs in the phase of

superject. And Whitehead does note that the self.identity is primarily attributable to the continuity of the subjective form, the purposive integrating force in the actual entity as subject:

> There is a continuity between the subjective form of the immediate past occasion and the subjective form of its primary prehension in the origination of the new occasion. In the process of synthesis of the many basic prehensions modifications enter. But the subjective forms of the immediate past are continuous with those of the present. I will term this doctrine of continuity, the Doctrine of Conformation of Feeling. (AI 185).

This subjective form, the purposive and unique response of evaluation which arises from the mental pole and is determined by the individual subjective aim, functions to obtain the satisfaction of the completed subject.

Now it must be noted that the individuality of an event, as against that of a substance, is increased by its relations. Thus individuality, what Whitehead refers to as "atomism", "does not exclude complexity, and universal relativity", but rather "Each atom is a system of all things." (PR 53). In Whitehead's systematic language, this "system of all things" is achieved at the completion of the process of concrescence, wherein the entity relates to every item in the universe according to its particular purposive response, (its subjective form). Thus Whitehead states, the "insistent concrescence into unity is the outcome of the ultimate self identity of each entity... Self identity requires that every entity have one conjoined, self-consistent function, whatever be the complexity of that function." (PR 89).

Thus every entity is also necessarily unique. Each is a particular individual, purposively systematizing the universe from its original perspective. However, no entity is absolutely unique if this notion is taken to mean that no items in the entity occur in any other actualities, for this would imply that the entity is not in relation with any other actuality. And as above noted, this is clearly not Whitehead's belief, being directly

opposed to his general, metaphysical doctrine that all actuality is essentially relational--again, "atomism" does not exclude "universal relativity". To Whitehead, individuality is achieved by relationship, no entity being self contained or absolutely unique in the sense alluded to above wherein it would have to be unrelated to other entities and share nothing with them. Relations are necessarily reciprocal, implying that there exists something that is being mutually shared. However, there can be and indeed is uniqueness which obtains because there can be a unique interpretation of what it is that is being shared, in particular, the unique interpretation of value in the total individual purposive situation.

Any analysis of community and relationality is dependent on some notion of mutual sharing and reciprocal influence. It is only God's primordial nature which is, in this account, absolutely unique, and, as noted above, absolutely free. The two notions are related attributions and cannot apply to finite actualities since these are constituted by relations. And this is one account of why God's primordial nature, as absolutely unique and free, is eternally permanent. It is not influenced by anything since it is totally non-relational, (although it can be related to).

Thus it must be that the subject, or self, is not what finally emerges from the feelings or experiences of the actual entity, as Gentry critically supposed [15] for this is what Whitehead calls the superject. On the contrary, the subject arises in the fundamental process of becoming aimed at satisfaction and achievement of unity. Thus according to Whitehead, the subject is not already given and presupposed by its experiences, as it is

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[15] Gentry, "The Subject in Whitehead's Philosophy", Philosophy of Science, XI, pp. 222-26.

in the traditional notion of the subject or self as a self-contained static substance, but is itself the process of these experiences. This difference is exactly an outcome of Whitehead's rejection of the substance-attribute metaphysical expression of the classical subject-predicate logic.

The self, then, is not given as a datum to which experiences are superadded as "accidental adventures" (PR 120 and see Chapter I, Sections H and I) but, in some sense or other, to be clarified below, is an achievement, identifiable in the continuity of the subjective form attained in the process toward fulfilling its individual subjective aim or purpose. On achievement of this satisfaction of the fulfilled aim, the reaching of its own "absolute self-attainment" (PR 94), the subject is transcended and the actual entity is now described in its guise as superject. Each actual entity embodies individual and unique value on completion of its subjective aim. Here its subjective immediacy ceases and it becomes available as a superject for influence in the future. Thus, as Morgan notes [16] every act of experience is a final value, (final self-attainment) and a condition for value for future occasions, (as a superject, functioning as the ground of obligation).

If the above interpretation of Whitehead's metaphysical intentions is correct, the "subject" will be the actual entity in the process of achieving satisfaction, which when reached, will be the transition between the actual entity as subject and the actual entity as superject. It is not the satisfaction or completion of the subjective aim of the entity that characterizes the subject but rather, the process toward achievement of this aim. In its guise as superject, the actual entity will serve as data for the prehensions

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[16] G. Morgan, Jr., "Whitehead's Theory of Value", J. Phil Studies, VI, pp. 281-94.

of future actual entities and will, in this function, be objectively immortal and unchanging. It will be maintained below that these notions have important implications for ethical theory.

On this analysis of the subject in Whitehead's metaphysics one can plausibly interpret his following rather ambiguous and important statements concerning actual entities. Actual entities, according to Whitehead, "'perpetually perish' subjectively, but are immortal objectively" (PR 44). According to the analysis of the subject given above, it is said here that when the actual entity concludes its striving and process toward satisfaction, its character as a subject perishes and it becomes the objectively immortal superject. Thus it would further be intelligible to claim as Whitehead does, that actual entities "in their 'formal' internal constitutions are devoid of all indetermination. Potentiality has passed into realization." (PR 44). The fully determined and formal constitution would be characteristic of the actual entity in its final phase as superject. However, in the first phase of itself as subject the actual entity is a creative process which, as maintained above in the discussion of freedom, is indeed free and self creative. Thus the following important statements are also intelligible: "Actuality in perishing acquires objectivity, while it loses subjective immediacy." (PR 44), so that "Completion is the perishing of immediacy: 'It never really is'", and "the 'satisfaction' is the 'superject' rather than the 'substance' or the 'subject'" PR 129). On the above analysis, it would follow that when satisfaction, that is, complete determination, is reached, the actual entity as subject is transcended to the actual entity as superject. Here it has become a permanently completed "being" (PR 71). Therefore, there is loss of subjective immediacy, since this, in Whitehead's analysis, means that the subjective actuality in creative development has been completed. The conclusion derives from Whitehead's Reformed Subjectivist Principle which is a repudiation of what he calls

"vacuous actuality". In this doctrine, Whitehead claims that to be fully actual an entity must have subjective immediacy. Thus no actual entity "ever really is" because when it is immediate, it is a process of becoming, in constant decision. When it has completed its becoming, it is also not possible to say that it "really is", or is fully actual, since its immediacy is transcended.

It is instructive to note that Whitehead believes that the traditional notion of vacuous actuality is "very closely allied to the notion of the 'inherence of quality in substance'" (PR 43). Thus it would follow that an actual entity, the final actuality, cannot be the "unchanging subject of change", that is, cannot be a subject to which experiences are added as qualities to a thing. As Whitehead states this doctrine, "An actual entity is...the subject experiencing", which on completion of its satisfaction loses its aspect as subject and is then "the superject of its experiences." (PR 43). In this aspect as superject, the actual entity is, as the actual entity as subject is not, completely determined within itself, "devoid of all indecision" and process.

As suggested by the last statement, the term "actual entity" is meant to refer to the actual entity in both its aspects as subject and as superject. To discuss it in either of these aspects as subject or as superject alone is a conceptual abstraction. Since Whitehead does not ordinarily identify which aspect of the entity his statement refers to, certain of such statements can be misleading unless one supplies the intended differentiation. Whitehead claims, for example, that an actual entity cannot become; "Every actual entity is what it is, and is, with its definite status in the universe, determined by its internal relations to other actual entities." (PR 92), and would seem to be denying that actual entities have the creative freedom he elsewhere says they do, (see above). Here the term "actual entity" is being used to describe the

entity in its total nature as subject and superject, wherein it is indeed completed, having achieved completion. But it must be realized that this completion is achieved by an initial self-creative process of the actual entity in its aspect as subject.

The analysis of the identity of "societies" is now requisite since the category of "society" includes animals, and, with further specific qualifications, man. Societies are a special kind of grouping of actual entities. Thus societies are not the ultimate facts of actuality, being further analyzable into the more metaphysically ultimate level of the actual entities. But it is important to note that in some other sense societies are final realities in so far as they constitute the familiar enduring objects in experienced reality. And Whitehead does recognize this fact: "The real actual things that endure are all societies. They are not actual occasions." (AI 205). And here it may be again remarked that it is unfortunate and disputable to speak of the actual entities as being the only fully actual things, implying a doctrine of degrees of actuality. (See Chapter I, Section H). Indeed Whitehead would in the above quote seem to have himself recognized that the designation of "actuality" or "reality" is entirely dependent upon the perspective from which one is judging the metaphysical candidates, and all perspectives are equally real albeit some may be relatively unimportant.

Analysis of societies is a central task since it is here that the adequacy of Whitehead's theory of self identity can be tested by determining whether or not it can explain our experience of the enduring objects, all of which are classified as societies. Since it is the ethical availability of the doctrine that is our original interest, the ethical implications will be critically discussed as respects their adequacy to explain ethical phenomena, as Whitehead would indeed find legitimate.

The notion of "society" is systematically defined as a nexus,(an ultimate fact of the togetherness of actual entities), which has a particular property, called the "defining characteristic" or "common form":

> A nexus enjoys 'social order' where (i) there is a common element of form illustrated in the definiteness of each of its included actual entities, and (ii) this common element of form arises in each member of the nexus by reason of the conditions imposed upon it by its prehensions of some other members of the nexus, and (iii) these prehensions impose that condition of reproduction by reason of their inclusion of positive feelings of that common form. (PR 50-51).

The special type of society which is called a "personal society" or a "person" is a society in which the realized nexus is "purely temporal and continuous..." (AI 206), and in which "the nexus forms a single line of inheritance of its defining characteristic." (PR 51).

Man is given as an example of a personal society as respects that aspect of man which Whitehead identifies as "the soul of which Plato spoke" (AI 209). As regards the self defined as a person, Whitehead holds that there can be a sense of unity with the immediate past by a type of prehension by the mental pole. This prehension is "the palmary instance of non-sensuous perception..." (AI 184). In the systematic language of Process and Reality Whitehead calls this intuitive perception "the inheritance of vector feeling tone." (PR 182).[17]

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[17] Immediately following a discussion of the self defined as a "person", Whitehead notes that the concept of man as meant in ordinary usage rightly holds that a man has a body, a spatial society, which influences the soul. Although the body is not included in the definition of a person as systematically meant, Whitehead claims that intuitive, non-sensuous perception by the mental pole can be of physical as well as mental inheritance. (See AI 191-92). Although the temporally ordered inheritance of the past by intuitive conceptual prehensions is definitial of the society as a personal society, "mentality is always a reaction from, and integration with, physical experience..." (PR 165). Thus Whitehead insists that the body and its physical experiences are always included among the data of the mental prehensions that constitute a personal society. On this analysis the doctrine of the personal immortality of a soul devoid of integration with some type of body becomes problematical if not impossible (although some other notion of immortality is not denied by these doctrines alone: see below).

As noted above, the existence of a personal society is dependent upon the presence of a defining characteristic. This concept is identified as "a certain element of 'form' which is a contributory component to the individual satisfaction of each member of the society." (PR 137). The "form" is, in Whiteheadian terminology, an eternal object. (See PR 70 for his identification of the two). A nexus which is a society forms "a single line of inheritance of its defining characteristic...[It] 'sustains a character' [which] arises out of the special genetic relations among the members of the nexus." (PR 51-2). It appears then that the non-sensuous serial inheritance of the particular, and unique, defining characteristic is the cause of the continuity that exists in the society. It is productive of the self identity of the society, a claim that clearly parallels the above noted doctrine that the identity of an actual entity arises from the continuity of its subjective aim.

Thus the self identity of a living society is not dependent upon the existence of some soul substance which has an unchanging content, as traditionally held in Western metaphysical Realism and various religious doctrines. Whitehead succinctly states these observations as follows:

> The self identity of a society is founded upon the self identity of its defining characteristic, and upon the mutual immanence of its occasions. But there is no definite nexus which is the nexus underlying that society, except when the society belongs wholly to the past. For the realized nexus which underlies the society is always adding to itself, with the creative advance into the future...until the death of the man and the destruction of the earth, there is no determinate nexus which in an unqualified sense is either the man or the earth. (AI 205-6).

According to this doctrine, the soul of the individual is never fully determinate in content until the death of the individual. Personal identity then is not due to the possession of a particular unchanging content but, as Hartshorne puts it, to "a principle of sequence of actualities. The

principle is the personality or character of the individual, [the ordinary language equivalent of 'defining characteristic'], the actualities are states, experiences, or acts of expressing that character." [18]

This defining characteristic, the locus of self identity, is an eternal object in common ingression by all the member actual entities of the society. Thus it would indeed follow that the individual character cannot have any predictably determinate content since the defining characteristic, as all eternal objects, has a certain neutrality with respect to alternative possible experiences which can each express this form. Consequently the individual person, like the individual actual entities, possesses freedom or self-creativity. The freedom, however, is again not absolute, being confined within that area of experience which can express or fulfill the particular purpose inherent in the defining characteristic, (in the case of actual entities, the subjective form).

And, further, it would also seem that the self identity of the personal society is not a given datum but a task, as it is in actual entities. Whitehead substantiates this claim in the following judgment:

> It is not a mere question of having a soul or of not having a soul. The question is, How much, if any? Any tendency to a high-grade multiple personality would be self-destructive by the antagonism of divergent aims. In other words, such multiple personality is destructive of the very essence of life, which is conformation of purpose. (AI 209).

The continuity of the defining characteristic or personality is, then, an achievement which may vary in degree of attainment. Since in all cases "central personal dominance is only partial", Whitehead is able to make

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[18] Hartshorne, Lowe, Johnson; Whitehead and the Modern World, Boston, Beacon Press, p. 31, 1950.

the certainly true observation that "in pathological cases [it] is apt to vanish". (PR 167). But whatever the degree of self identity obtained, it always will be due to the presence of some defining characteristic, (a form which defines the purpose of that society), in each member of the society. The presence of this defining form, Whitehead further holds, provides satisfaction to each actual entity that is a member of the society; that is, there are "positive feelings of that common form". (PR 51). This link with value parallels the notion that the self identity of an actual entity is dependent upon the continuity of its subjective form---the principle of purposive evaluation and emotional response.

Now, since a nexus constitutes a society when "the presence of the defining characteristic [is] due to the environment provided by the society itself..." (PR 137), the defining characteristic also provides each society with the guarantee of its uniqueness and the uniqueness of every individual entity within it: "Each individual occasion within a special form of society includes features which do not occur in analogous occasions in the external environment." (PR 152 and see above).

And as implied by Whitehead's doctrine of relation, no society can survive in independent isolation from other actualities. Therefore, in order to endure, each society requires that its wider social environment contributes "those general characteristics which the more special character of the society presupposes for its members." (PR 138). The particular society shares some more general defining character with this social background, "the defining characteristic becoming wider and more general as we widen the background." (PR 138). A highly complex and structured society will be highly specialized in the sense that it requires a very special sort of environment. Although such a society will afford intensity of satisfaction for its members, it will, in general, be less proficient in

survival value than an unspecialized society is.

In attempts to survive one of two methods can be used, both of which require enhancement of the mental pole. The society may employ the inferior method of blocking out the "unwelcome detail" by eliminating the particular diversities of its members which are in conflict with this detail. Or the society can receive the novel elements in the environment and coordinate them into the experiences of the members by an initiative in appetition which originates conceptual novelty. (See PR 154-5). This latter activity is given the appellation "originative freedom", and societies with such activity are termed "living" societies. Whitehead further stipulates that "In the case of the higher organisms this conceptual initiative amounts to thinking about the diverse experiences; in the case of lower organisms this conceptual initiative merely amounts to thoughtless adjustment of aesthetic emphasis in obedience to an ideal of harmony." (PR 155). Although the effort is not always successful, this origination of novel response, if effective, will produce greater harmony between the society and its social background.

Since the essential condition for depth of satisfaction is "the dominance of societies, harmoniously requiring each other..." (PR 142), these attempts, when successful, are important. Order, therefore, is a social product. But, as Whitehead notes, "there is not any perfect attainment of an ideal order whereby the indefinite endurance of a society is secured." (PR 139). Although "The immanence of God gives reason for the belief that pure chaos is intrinsically impossible, ... the immensity of the world negates the belief that any state of order can be so established that beyond it there can be no progress." (PR 169). And here it may be pertinent to recall that even Plato's magnificant prophecy that a perfect social order could be actualized in this world was tempered with a wise, and sadly justifiable, doubt.

Section F. The Existence of Ethical Values

It is now requisite to analyze the concept of self identity from an ethical perspective that could plausibly be attributed to Whitehead, in the attempt to show that Whitehead 's doctrine that all actuality is an aim at individual satisfaction need not force the conclusion that his ethical theory would be a private interest theory. The critical claims referred to above held that Whitehead could be expected to subscribe to the notion that anything which provides satisfaction to any individual is ethically valuable since he has stated that value arises whenever any individual interest has been satisfied. But the preliminary critical discussion against the attribution of a type of private interest theory to Whitehead was only introductory and did not elaborate the argument in regard to the specific and important problem posed by the suspect doctrine that all actuality is an aim at individual satisfaction and that, furthermore, it is through the continuity of such an aim that the self identity of the entity, or society, is achieved.

The implied claim that Whitehead's metaphysics cannot support any specifically ethical values is considered mistaken and quite preliminary in its conclusions. If any just criticism is to be offered, it can only be based on an analysis of the content of the satisfaction of the individual from an ethical perspective attributable to Whitehead. The general claim that the self is an aim at satisfaction is not enough to enforce the complex assertion that the doctrine implies a private interest theory, until it is further shown that the content of this satisfaction merely regards one's selfish or private interests. It will be here concluded that this is not what is implied by Whitehead's metaphysics or by his philosophically informal statements that introduce ethical notions. In short, an analysis of the identity of the self and the content of the satisfaction of the self from the

ethical perspective will produce an ethically profound description of an individual's true self-interest and true satisfaction---a description that is in direct opposition to the claims of any private interest theory. The sole similarity which will remain is the agreement that all action arises from some individual interest, and, as argued below, any theory of human motivation must rest on this claim, because the claim is a truism, when analyzed.

As above concluded, the self identity of a man as a personal society is attributable to the continuity and the uniqueness of his defining characteristic, that is, his character. The identity of the personal society may be retained even upon the appearance of novelty in the environment. The purpose of such responses is, typically, to retain the satisfaction obtained by stability. It must be here noted that Whitehead employs the notion of the achievement of satisfaction to characterize actual entities and does not employ it in regard to societies per se. Thus in its use here as respects societies, it is always to be understood that the satisfaction is referrent to the member actual entities constituting the society and not to the society as an entity. The latter attribution would be, to Whitehead, an example of The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness, societies not being on the same level of concrete actuality as the activity of achieving satisfaction is held to be.

A discussion of the content of what it is that fulfills the criteria productive of the satisfaction of individual self interest, namely the generic conditions of achieving intensity and harmony, will now be given. The discussion will be done first briefly, and preparatively, in regard to individual actual entities, then extensively in regard to societies of actual entities, specifically to man. The discussion has been postponed to this section on the grounds that it functions most importantly in respect to

the final discussion of the satisfaction of the individual given from the ethical perspective. It will be there used to further dispute the claims that Whitehead's doctrine of satisfaction issues in a private interest theory.

The satisfaction of the actual entity as subject, productive of and effecting its complete self determination and self identity as a superject, occurs when

> The actual entity terminates its becoming in one complex feeling involving a completely determinate bond with every item in the universe...[It is] intolerant of any addition...Indetermination has evaporated from 'satisfaction', so that there is a complete determination of 'feeling' or of 'negation of feeling', [positive or negative prehensions, respectively], respecting the universe. (PR 71).

It is believed that the above noted conditions for the achievement of satisfaction will be understood without expository comment.

The satisfaction of an actual entity that is within a society is obtained when the society has achieved stability with its environment by virtue of its possession of a defining characteristic which is compatible with its surrounding social background. This effects social stability and an internal harmony of the actual entities constituting the society. As the defining characteristic increases in complexity, becoming wider and more comprehensive, the intensity of satisfaction of the entities sharing this characteristic can increase. For as noted above, the defining characteristic has arisen out of the genetic relations among the member actual entities and can be a contributory component in the satisfaction of each.

The attempts to achieve social order or pattern are however never indefinitely successful. Due to the complexity of the universe, novel and disorienting events inevitably arise as it creatively develops. Thus, as against an actual entity, no temporal society endures indefinitely. All actual entities as individuals do achieve final satisfaction--the point

is, to Whitehead, analytic. But this satisfaction cannot be dependent upon the fact that they are members of a society since satisfaction is attainable apart from social occupancy and since no temporal society itself endures indefinitely while each actual entity is objectively immortal. In this respect, among others, the analysis of the satisfaction of actual entities cannot be applied on the level of societies, even with a minimum of analogical force. If this conclusion is valid, its implications for ethical theory are important. On the assumption of its validity, the implications will be now expounded through an analysis of the meaning of personal self identity and personal satisfaction from the ethical perspective. The central question is whether the general doctrine of the conditions of achieving stability and harmony, as productive of satisfaction and self identity, does, or does not, allow of an interpretation on the human level of experience. In particular I shall be concerned to interpret the concept of the individual as respects what may be called its ethical dimension and here the question for consideration will be whether or not such an interpretation is ethically defensible.

In regard to the ethical aspects, it seems that the satisfaction of an individual would be achieved if the prehensions of individual processes (actual entities) contributing to these valuations harmonize to form a completed and enduring order or pattern of approval or disapproval, (positive or negative prehensions as respects ethical values). From the generic analysis we can infer that in order to retain stability of ethical evaluations, an individual must respond to the relevant novel elements arising in the environment in such manner that the evaluations can be harmoniously incorporated within the individual character structure. Failure results in disorientation of the personality, with implications of what one might, in regard to ethical processes, call ethical indecision or, with the existentialists, ethical ambiguity.

It is important to recall in this connection that although Whitehead holds that "There is a natural affinity between Order and Goodness" (MT 103), he also recognizes that there are limitations: "Life degenerates when enclosed within the shackles of mere conformation. Transcendence of mere clarity and order is necessary for dealing with the unforeseen, for progress, for excitement." (MT 109). Referring to, and extending the above remarks, it is believed possible to dispense with one alleged problem which Schilpp [19] claims arises in Whitehead's ethics from certain of his metaphysical doctrines. At the same time, the claim will be made that if one is so able to dispense with the criticism it is because these suspect doctrines have been there given a particular interpretation which has the additional value of showing that Whitehead's metaphysics does not imply a private interest theory. That Schilpp also holds this latter criticism of Whitehead suggests that the immediate point to be discussed does have relevance to the central discussion of this section.

Basing his remarks on Whitehead's metaphysical claim that order and pattern are essential to the attainment of satisfaction and value, Schilpp claims that if "the good life" must have some specific kind of pattern, then on achieving it, the life would cease to be the dynamic creative process that all life, according to Whitehead, is supposed to be. [20] It may be observed that on the metaphysical level, Schilpp's conclusion is correct as regards the actual entities since, when the entity attains satisfaction and completed order it

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[19] Paul A. Schilpp, "Whitehead's Moral Philosophy", in P.A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, 2nd ed., New York, Tudor Publishing Company, 1961, pp. 561-619.

[20] Ibid., p. 615.

becomes the objectively immortal superject, devoid of creativity and subjective immediacy. It will now be argued however that on the ethical level true satisfaction is never reached, even temporarily, because it cannot be reached in the finite world. The discussion will be aided by reference to the ethical theories of Hegel, Bradley and Royce which, I believe, are in many respects singularly similar to the ethics here attributed to Whitehead. That Whitehead would endorse the particular conclusions to be given cannot, of course, be proved. But, nor could any other claims be proved in this respect. By citing various statements Whitehead has made that are suggestive of, or at very least, compatible with, the conclusions, perhaps they will thereby gain some degree of plausibility, at best, a high degree.

As discussed above, the existence of self identity and its consequent satisfaction is an achievement and not an initial given fact, dependent upon achieving some stability with the surrounding environment as respects a harmony of valuations. The question for the ethical analysis of self identity then must be, Is it in fact possible for an individual to achieve absolute stability in the ethical dimension of his experience and avoid evil? To do this, it is also clear that the individual would have to possess a determinate attitude of valuation toward every element in his ethical experience. It is also clear that such determination, as all determination, enforces an intentional limitation of one's perspective by requiring exclusion of conflicting possible valuations and attitudes, (relegation to negative relevance): "to be definite always means that all the elements of a complex whole contribute to some one effect, to the exclusion of others." (RM 109). This activity of exclusion is provoked by the individual's own free decision and has obvious ethical import.

Since Whitehead holds that process and the introduction of novelty are real facts of actuality, it would seem to follow, short of some special

reasons that are not announced by Whitehead, that new ethical situations are among the novel elements that do arise. In line with the general metaphysical analysis of novel situations, in the ethical dimension, an individual may exhibit openness to the novel element, having a willingness to broaden his ethical perspective by widening the pattern of ethical data and thus increasing the complexity of his character as ethically constituted. Or he may reduce the element to irrelevance by "blocking it out". This latter is the essence of conservatism which is a metaphysically misguided and, it will be argued, an ethically evil sentiment. Singularly compatible with this claim is Whitehead's statement that "Morality of outlook is inseparably conjoined with generality of outlook". (PR 23).[21] And again, in an often quoted and important passage:

> Good people of narrow sympathies are apt to be unfeeling and unprogressive, enjoying their egotistical goodness. Their case, on a higher level, is analogous to that of a man completely degraded to a hog. They have reached a state of stable goodness, so far as their own interior life is concerned. This type of moral correctitude is, on a larger view, so like evil that the distinction is trivial. (RM 95).

In an earlier passage Whitehead has stated that"evil is exhibited in physical suffering, mental suffering, and loss of the higher experience in favor of the lower experience." (RM 92), It is apparent that the evil arising from narrowness of ethical outlook is of the latter sort, namely, the loss of a higher experience, the experience of broadening one's outlook by willingness to sympathetically respond to a larger variety of elements in the ethical dimension. Thus, although in this narrow outlook one can reach a state of "stable goodness" in one's interior life, and although

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[21] See Chap. I, Sec. E for application on the level of philosophical activity.

stability is the condition for satisfaction to be achieved in the processes within a personal society, the degree of goodness and satisfaction reached is a low one in comparison with what might have been. Thus, on the larger view of what might have been, such inferior achievements are not "the good life" but are called, by Whitehead, evil. As he states elsewhere, there is "destructive evil, purely self regarding" (PR 525), of which this type of life would be an example. Thus although some degree of private satisfaction is reached in this stability, it would seem as if it is a feeling arising from something fundamentally evil and is not true satisfaction from the ethical perspective. Consequently, on the ethical level of evaluation, any such alleged satisfaction achieved by narrowing of one's ethical outlook cannot be condoned: "In Discord there is always a frustration. But even Discord may be preferable to a feeling of slow relapse into general anaesthesia, or into tameness which is its prelude. Perfection at a low level ranks below Imperfection with higher aim." (AI 263). Moreover although intensity, achieved through fulfillment of some interest, is also a condition of satisfaction, Whitehead has also clearly suggested that genuine satisfaction of the ethical will cannot be reached in individual isolation of interest:

> The antithesis between the general good and the individual interest can be abolished only when the individual is such that its interest is the general good, thus exemplifying the loss of the minor intensities in order to find them again with finer composition in a wider sweep of interest. (PR 23).

It does appear then as if Schilpp is unaware of the special consequences of the notions of satisfaction and pattern as they could be developed on the ethical level. For if an individual believes that he has reached a static completion in his patterning of values, what Schilpp calls "the good life", he has, paradoxically, plunged himself into ethical evil. "The good life" could not be, against Schilpp, one that has the closure obtained by a static

pattern of valuation. On the contrary, it is the life that contains openness to receive novelty and change as it occurs in the surrounding ethical situation, together with the willingness to respond creatively to this novelty. If one consciously chooses the lower experience of closure against one's own knowledge of its inferiority, this would seem to be the very meaning of "sin". This is a category which Whitehead does not use; the categoreal analysis here suggested, is, I believe, implied by Whitehead's notion of "evil" and the general differentia of evil and sin derivable from Aristotle. Royce states a remarkably similar analysis: "To sin is consciously to choose to forget, through a narrowing of the field of attention, an Ought that one already recognizes.[22]

It is however true that the attainment of stability and patterning of valuation is, in the metaphysical perspective, productive of satisfaction and of individual self identity. It may be that a confusion of the two perspectives, namely the ethical and the metaphysical perspective, has been one cause of Schilpp's critical conclusion that Whitehead's ethics would be some sort of private interest theory. And if achievement of satisfaction of any individual interest were the only criterion of value that Whitehead gives, the implication would be a just one. However, from the above discussion, it is possible to conclude that Whitehead does not reduce ethical evaluation to individual subjective feelings of satisfaction, for if he did do this, it would make no sense at all to state that an experience of satisfaction can be evil because it is a "lower" experience. For it would make no sense to speak of experiences as being "higher" or "finer" as it, for example, made no logical sense in Mill's ethics, within the ethically limited conceptual apparatus of his particular

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[22] Royce, op. cit., II, p. 359.

type of private interest theory.

The question must now be approached of whether or not, from the ethical perspective, it is possible to achieve individual satisfaction as respects the component ethical processes in a society without producing evil. This is in reference to the evil that is consequent upon the achievement of personal stability through a closure or narrowing of one's ethical vision, which, if consciously effected, was called sin. It appears that the conclusion must be negative. For it would seem that one has the constant obligation to incorporate new responses and valuations into his character by being constantly receptive to the novel and complex data continuously arising in his ethical situation. Although this would have the desirable result of increasing intensity of feeling by increasing the complexity of the character, it would make any achievement of satisfaction in the referrent ethical processes impossible since stability is never final. For to achieve stability and consequent satisfaction one must have a completely determinate attitude to every item of ethical relevance and this would clearly require that one ignore new elements that may be incompatible with the achieved stability of valuations.

Moreover, and this fact is more fundamental, one would have to relegate to negative relevance various co-existing value elements which appear to be presently incompatible with each other but which may become compatible if a wider perspective were to be achieved, as Hegel also taught. (See Chapter I, Section H). Thus to achieve a satisfaction that is not ethically evil would require awareness of every present value as well as future novel ethical values to be introduced into process. Only in this manner could one's achieved stability of character be genuinely ethical. But, as discussed extensively in Chapter I, a finite self has limitations of experience and perspective on two levels, that is, as regards both the present and the future, since with all finite

beings attention is necessarily selective. One is inevitably limited in his understanding of the present and the future. Because one cannot therefore fully know the meaning or the consequences of any action, ambiguity enters, appealing to the ethical individual for recognition rather than avoidance (negative prehension). However, some exclusion from relevance is unavoidable in finite, that is, limited beings. God as infinite has, by contrast, no negative prehensions, that is, God excludes nothing from the totality of his experience. (See Chapters III and IV).

Thus the ethical ideal, in truth, the Socratic ideal of total ethical self-knowledge, cannot be reached. Some degree of tension and ethical ambiguity will always exist because, ethically, it must. It would therefore seem that for Whitehead, as for Royce, from the ethical perspective, "all finite and temporal processes of will must inevitably involve dissatisfaction...our own lives...not only are, but in the temporal order, must be, and I may add, ought to be unsatisfactory, just because our ideals are so much vaster than our present form of experience..." [23]

If the above discussion is valid, it can be concluded with some force that Whitehead's metaphysics cannot be taken to imply a private interest theory. On the contrary, it would enforce the conclusion that, ethically, no true satisfaction to the finite will is possible in time. Any achievement of stability involves the sin of intentionally narrowing one's vision. Thus the alleged satisfaction reached is not true satisfaction or final self realization as respects the ethical processes. Rather than suggesting any recommendation to achieve stability of the narrow self, the theory has definite and profound tragic implications. As will be further discussed below, the tragic consequences of ethical life can only be overcome by a transition from the temporal order to the eternal order, the transition from morality to religion. It is noteworthy that a parallel type of problem arises in the ethics of Hegel, Bradley and Royce and that the

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[23] Ibid., p. 385.

transition to their respective philosophies of religion is remarkably similar in origin and consequences.

Section G. Self Identity from the Ethical Perspective

The remaining and final problem that will concern us in this discussion is a detailed determination of the meaning of self identity from the ethical perspective here attributed to Whitehead. The solution to this problem is not simple for it is immediately ascertainable that the metaphysical account of the self identity of societies cannot apply in the ethical account. Metaphysically, self identity occurs on the achievement of a continuous temporal inheritance of some particular and unique defining characteristic that announces the individual's purposes and guiding aim. However, the ethical self does not, because it ought not, achieve any permanence of its character (defining characteristic), since by necessity of responding to the changing ethical environment, the valuations must be continuously open to expansion. This would cause a continuous change and broadening in the individual's outlook, sympathies and ethical aims. It is clear that from the ethical perspective, as indeed, from the metaphysical perspective, self identity is not a given fact but is, rather, an achievement. But, and this is an essential difference, from the ethical perspective as against the metaphysical perspective, the achievement is one which cannot be completed, even temporarily, in time, It would appear then that ethical self identity is never achieved. The conclusion seems warranted but is not yet sufficiently important since it is essentially a formal conclusion. The question of the content of the truly ethical self, which is unreachable in time, must be confronted. It will be argued that the truly moral life does itself have some sort of pattern and identity and that although it is not one that can ever be fully actualized in time, it is nonetheless real as an ideal toward which one approaches.

Returning again to Whitehead's remarks about the "good people of narrow sympathies", we recall that these people have achieved a state of stability in respect to their own interior life. This was, however, on a larger view, evil. The stability achieved is not the stability required for ethical self identity and thus must be stability of what may be aptly called, with Royce, the narrow self as against the larger, truly ethical self. The question developing before us is, What, according to Whitehead, would be the content of this truly ethical self, the content that contains more than valuations that refer to its own interior life?

One may begin with basic metaphysical assertions. Every entity, according to Whitehead, is essentially social, its individuality being constituted by its particular relations with the elements in its social environment. Thus complete and determinate individuality or self identity would, as we have seen above, be achieved when the entity acquires a determinate bond of positive or negative valuation with every item in the universe, since "the society for each entity, actual or ideal, is the all-inclusive universe, including its ideal forms, [eternal objects]." (RM 104). And, as also noted above, the achievement of these determinate bonds, coincident with the achievement of satisfaction, occurs in actual entities by exclusion to negative relevance of all elements incompatible with its particular aim. This may occur in the case of societies by a similar type exclusion from relevance as respects the defining characteristic. However, from the ethical perspective, which requires that the self remain open to continuous revision of character and moral outlook, such determinate bonds with every item in the universe could arise only by the (unethical) behavior of asserting fixity of character, again, the narrowing of sympathies.

It seems, therefore, that the method of achieving harmony by evocation of novelty to match the novelty of every element in the environment is requisite

on the ethical level. However since satisfaction of the individual processes in the society is dependent on fixity of character, it is obvious that such satisfaction and completion cannot be achieved on the ethical level. It would require a valuational relationship to everything in the universe. But such decisions could never be finally fixed since new ethical insights can always be achieved and new ethical situations continuously arise, requiring a possible revision of valuations or, at very least, the entertainment of the possibility of revision.

The completed self then, as an ethical individual, must remain an unreachable ideal in the temporal world, because ethically it can not be reached. The essential reason for this situation is, as noted above in Bradley's succinct phraseology, in the ethical world "what is to be" is never identical with "what is" so that there are always new ethical evaluations to be made and new ethical deeds to be done. As Royce went on to show, "A consciously last moral task is a contradiction in terms...It is of the essence of the moral law to demand...that whenever a new deed of service is possible, I should undertake to do it. But a new deed is possible whenever my world is in a new situation." [24] The claim in regard to Whitehead's ethics also rests on a similar notion of the continuous existence of novel moral deeds arising in new ethical situations. And what is implied but not stated in the above quotes is that new moral deeds do require new moral evaluations. Consequently they may require a revision of one's ethical character.

Thus it appears that the self cannot ethically be identified with the narrow self, purely self regarding, with a stability attained only in regard to its own interior life. For, as has been shown, the activities of

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[24] Ibid., p. 444.

this narrow self are productive of evil. It is, in somewhat metaphorical language, a misguided attempt to conceive of the self as a "thing", an unchanging entity, prematurely reduced to stability by identification of the self with some achieved content of internal attitudes and feelings, reducing all possible conflicting values to negative relevance. What is evil, according to the Whiteheadian account suggested here, is not that one attempts to reach ethical stability as a goal, but that one claims to have done this too quickly. In actual fact, eternity would be required for any such claims to be justified. As Royce puts it, "In the narrowest sense, the Self is just your own present imperfectly expressed pulsation of meaning and purpose..."[25] (Whitehead: narrow sympathies, purely self regarding), but that, in truth "the Self is an Ethical Category..[in which] this present moment's life and striving [is] a glimpse of a certain task,"[26] and "in this instant shall begin a work that can be finished only in eternity,"[27]

Now it is clear from the above discussion that Whitehead, as does Bradley, for example, holds that all life is the aim at self-realization of one's self as a whole, that is, total and final realization, ("for it can aim at nothing else": Bradley). And Whitehead could continue, as Bradley does, to state in Hegelian fashion that "the question in morals is to find the true whole, realizing which will practically realize the true self."[28] The evil attributed to the people with narrow sympathies, purely self-regarding,

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[25] Ibid., p. 272.

[26] Ibid., p. 275.

[27] Ibid., p. 277.

[28] Bradley, op. cit., p. 13.

is that indeed they have not realized the self as a whole but act as if they have done so, claiming to have reached a true ethical harmony and stability. In actual fact they have reached this stability at the expense of ignoring their true, larger self.

But again, What is this true whole of which the individual ethical self must be an harmony? And again, recalling the fundamental metaphysical fact that all actuality is constituted by relations, that relations respect every item in the universe, it would follow that the true ethical whole of the individual self must be in a valid ethical relation to the entire world of values. It would therefore have the requirement of internalizing relations with every event. Thus the attempt to achieve stability of attitude merely in regard to one's "own interior life" reveals that one has a mistaken conception of the self and a narrow view of its boundaries. Externality of relations is exclusion, omitting from relevance various elements in the environment, in Whiteheadian language, by negative prehension. And this as noted above, is productive of evil: if the omission is consciously done for the purpose of achieving some private self interest, this is sin. It is equal to an intentional narrowing of the self's span of attention and concern.

The true ethical self, by contrast, aims at achieving greater complexity in its pattern of relations. In the fullest extent this is the aim to achieve a conscious and creative evaluational attitude to every event in the universe. Here one expands his interests beyond his narrow self until his ethical self includes relations of concern (love) with the entire universe. In short the self, as the ethical self, is a particular kind of life purpose, namely the aim to achieve relations of concern beyond his narrow self, ideally, with the entire universe. Such a self achieves uniqueness by the fact that an individual's valuations are determined to some extent by his particular past inheritance, and he thus expresses the ethical

purpose in his own particular manner. There is more than one way of approaching the same absolute ethical perfection, one's own individual "moral exemplar".

Thus the self is defined as a task and a conscious aim at increasing sympathetic relations to the universe by internalizing all relations within one's own purpose. But again, the task is never fulfilled in time, as all finitude has some perspectival limit to vision. And here it would be intellectually disrespectful not to announce that Hegel's ideas are consciously and intentionally influential in the foregoing discussion, in particular, the notion that development of individuality is the process by which otherness is internalized and overcome. As Bradley states this point, in close connection with various unidentified quotes from Hegel:

> In morality the existence of my mere private self, as such, is something which ought not to be, and which, so far as I am moral, has already ceased. I am morally realized, not until my personal self has utterly ceased to be, my exclusive self, is no more a will which is outside others' wills, but finds in the world of others nothing but self. [29]

And Hegel, it is well known, holds that there exists, and logically can exist, only one concrete complete individual who is not within some larger external environment that it has not yet internalized. This individual, the concrete universal, is Hegel's Absolute. Below it will be further argued that this is also a just characterization of Whitehead's God and that consequently God can, ethically, achieve final ethical satisfaction (as Whitehead claims he does). But human individuals cannot achieve such completion in this world, never having total positive prehension of all things. Thus the finite will is never to reach satisfaction as respects its ethical processes. Since in

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[29] Ibid., p. 24.

time the finite will cannot internalize all relations, the ethical self can be defined as an asymptotic approach toward an unreachable ideal, (Hegel's "bad infinity") a postulate (Royce) not ever reachable in time. To fulfill this ideal, one would require consciousness of eternity, the inclusive universe of relations, which is a power attributable only to God, and as variously suggested, does fit Whitehead's God. (See Chapters I and IV).

H. Final Dismissal of the Alleged Private Interest Theory

If the above discussion plausibly shows that Whitehead's metaphysics can support an ethical theory that need not be a type of private interest theory, it now remains to consider the various opposing interpretations from a different, and more general, perspective. The analysis is considered necessary because these criticisms, all somewhat premature and seemingly lacking in carefulness, appear to be based on a fundamental and philosophically common error in general ethical criticism, having as one of its familiar consequences this attribution of a private interest theory. If the discussion is not given, Whitehead's ethical theory as developed below will remain suspect in a manner which I consider unjust and noxious. Although the discussion will be mainly theoretical, it will provide useful arguments for the detailed analysis of Whitehead's ethical theory to be later derived. The analysis will concern the concepts of self interest, happiness and duty.

If it can be granted as having been philosophically accepted as long ago as Aristotle that all men desire happiness, it follows that the criterion for ethical evaluation of any individual cannot be whether or not he desires his own happiness. Since all men do so, if this desire would, for example, be called selfish or egotistical, then one must conclude that all men are selfish. But the argument proves too much and, paradoxically, would annihilate ethical evaluation since all evaluations would be a priori, and negative.

The standards of ethical evaluation then, must concern the content of that which makes a man happy. If it occurs that this content refers only to his own narrow interests or pleasures, then egoism or hedonism is proved against him. However, if his happiness (altruistically) includes and requires the happiness or pleasure of others, these particular ethical criticisms do not apply, (although others still may).

There is an assumption implied in this statement which cannot however be claimed as a truism in philosophical theory, being, for example, explicitly anti-Kantian. Whitehead, I believe, does support this assumption, namely the claim that men can have desires which are not merely hedonistic desires for pleasure. The opposition holds that if men follow their natural desires uncontrolled by reason, they must always will their own private and selfish interests.

Holding the latter notion, the philosopher may further decide that men cannot in fact control their selfish natural desires by reason, as Hobbes decided, so that any true ethical sense in man becomes an impossibility. This conclusion however is manifestly disputed by the testimony of human behavior, often based on a real sense of duty, or in some other positive ethical motivation. Or one can suggest that natural desires, always evil, can be rationally controlled by adherence to an ethics of duty, as Kant held.

However, it is clear that to be efficacious, this Kantian type thesis requires, paradoxically, that which it defines as evil, namely decision based on desire. As Nowell-Smith points out,[30] an ethics based on duty presupposes that individuals have desires and likes for doing a duty, since otherwise

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[30] P. M. Nowell-Smith, Ethics, New York, The Philosophical Library, 1957.

the idea of exhortation would never arise. And any ethics depends upon the efficacy of exhortation, for it is not only a theory, but an attempt to influence actions. To attend to ethical recommendations, we must be motivated to desire to attend to them, for if we had no desire, we could have no motive for changing our actions and beliefs. In short, if one has no desire to do something, he has no motive, and a fortiori, he could not do anything. If he does effect something, this would be by chance or accident, which is the very antithesis of the rationality that Kant, for example, recommended. This entire discussion is very simple from the perspective of a critic but significantly difficult for the individual ethical philosopher in so far as his recommendations for moral behavior will be so compellingly evident to him in a factual sense that the recommendatory quality attaching to any such assertions will be obscured.

It may be concluded then that the problem in ethics is not as simple, as, on the one hand, deciding that all natural desires are selfish and uncontrollable by reason, or, on the other, that desires are selfish but can be controlled by reason independently of any desire to dutifully do so. Because men act by desires for happiness, the content of which may be good or evil, the problem in ethics is, as Aristotle taught, to discover what the virtuous life is and to educate men to desire to be virtuous in order thereby to work towards achieving true happiness and self-realization.

This conclusion is important for on Whitehead's naturalistic analysis of activity it does follow that all acts arise from some subjective interest or desire, and if all desires could only be selfish, consequently morally evil, Whitehead's aesthetic basis for ethical activity is insufficient, (as has indeed been claimed by critics). But then ironically enough, considering the power and magnificence of his insight, Spinoza's moral theory would also be suspect, and for very similar reasons:

> Since reason demands nothing which is opposed to nature, it demands, therefore, that every person should love himself, should seek his own profit,--- what is truly profitable to him--- should desire everything that really leads man to greater perfection, and absolutely that every one should endeavor...to preserve his own being.

Now although it is true that desire is an emotional judgment, it does not, I feel, follow that as Schilpp for one states, against Whitehead, "the founding of real morality upon the quicksand of largely emotional reactions provides a treacherously thin foundation for morals." [31] There is no other foundation possible, given the acceptance of the claims that men can only be motivated to act by desires and that these desires are, at ground, emotional and based on individual interest. For the fact that one cannot act against what most interests him is a thorough truism and the necessary ground of the acceptance of any recommendation, ethical or otherwise. Criticisms of this sort are not only logically misplaced ethical criticisms but are moreover completely unnecessary in that men <u>can be</u> interested in, and consequently desire, the well being of others. It is further suggested that on an adequate analysis of the self and its <u>true</u> self interest, such as Whitehead implies, such desires are not only possible but are, in fact in accord with one's own deepest demands and interests. (Spinoza: "what is truly profitable to him"). In short, it was concluded that the desire for satisfaction or happiness is the desire for <u>true</u> self realization which can be, and can only be, actualized when the well being of others is understood to be a part of one's own happiness, and consequently desirable. And if this is to be considered a basically selfish and morally suspicious reason for the existence of good will toward others, then <u>either</u> there would be nothing called "good" in the world of men, <u>or</u> all men do not desire their own happiness; but, indeed, all men do. Bradley is

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[31] Schilpp, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 611.

well worth attending to here: "what we do is, perfectly or imperfectly, to realize ourselves, and that we cannot possibly do anything else; that all we can realize is (accident apart) our ends, or the objects we desire; and that all we can desire is, in a word, self." [32]

The fundamental problem for moral theory then, is to analyze what the true self is, and, in particular, to discover whether it is inclusive of others or purely self enclosed and self related. And if the former is the true account, as Whitehead suggests, the criteria for moral evaluation is to discover whether a man does develop his true self as a whole in social relation, or willfully disregards this true self interest and acts toward narrow, and misplaced, self interest, led by a desire for immediate but comparatively trivial satisfaction: (what Royce means by "wilfully acquired naivete", which he called evil; what Whitehead means by "people of narrow sympathies, purely self regarding" above claimed as his illustration of evil).

The fundamental difference between the theories that can make ethical sense starting from the naturalistic notion of motivation as arising from a desire for happiness, and those that cannot, is precisely dependent upon the analysis of the nature of the self. In the first case, the self is considered as an activity which is constituted and enriched by relationships. In such an analysis of the self one could easily conclude, for example, that true self interest or self love is not identical with selfishness and not at all incompatible with love of other men, as Fromm, among others is concerned to urge on the psychological level and various Idealists characteristically imply on the

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[32] Bradley, op. cit., p. 11.

metaphysical level. In the second analysis, the self is taken as some type of exclusive entity or substance. The self is purely static and enclosed and therefore would necessarily be depleted by relation, in some crudely quantitative sense, as Freud would appear to imply on the psychological level, Hobbes on the metaphysical..

It has been argued above that Whitehead's metaphysics provides an excellent basis for the first type of analysis of the self as a relational activity, the true self interest of which is accomplished by increasing and internalizing relations with others, ultimately the entire universe. If this claim is correct, it would therefore protect his metaphysics from implying any sort of private interest theory in ethics which holds the egotistical analysis of the self as some sort of substance or thing with only external relations to other beings. To repeat and summarize, one always acts according to his own purposes and self interest so that the relevant question in ethics is what the philosopher considers to be the content of the individual's true self interest, namely whether it is purely self regarding, attending to the interests of the narrow self, or is involved with concern for others as conducive to one's own well being and purpose. The latter account has been attributed to Whitehead.

Ideally, on this latter analysis of the self any increase in another's well being, which would be an increase in the other's self development and realization, would be instrumental in increasing one's own well being and development. And indeed, in Plato's Ideal State or in Bradley's substantially Hegelian analysis of the State, such would occur. However, there is here no Ideal State of any sort. Thus the precise problem an ethical theory of the sort attributed to Whitehead must face is to make some recommendation as regards actions wherein acting for another's well being would in actual fact decrease one's own welfare or self development. This situation announces a recognition of

tragedy. As perhaps paradigmatically exemplified in Antigone, tragedy in one aspect relates the necessity of making a choice between two goods. And it must be true that both one's own happiness and another's are indeed goods, and that consequently both ought to be realizable. However, in a world where finitude and injustice exist, they often cannot. To note this point is to enforce the requirement of its further analysis. It will be necessary to discuss this problem in general and in regard to Whitehead in particular, since Whitehead's decision on the question of satisfaction and moral duty has often been considered to be productive of his alleged private interest theory.

As concluded above from a different perspective, it would seem that Whitehead's recommendation as respects such tragic conflicts would be to condone the behavior that may decrease one's own satisfaction and increase another's. The opposite activity would be exemplified by the people with narrow sympathies, who are, according to Whitehead, productive of evil, "the lower experience". The conclusion seems clear to this writer.

Although one may be unable to discover a way to guarantee a relationship between virtue and happiness, it is boldly evil and callous to feel content with the situation. No sensitive philosopher can discount the important ethical consequences of this recognition of tragedy, which recognition is one of the simplest and most understandable causes of a type of "profound atheism" (Berdyaev) unforgettably embodied in the character of Ivan Karamazov. Although the ethician may wish to exhort men to act ethically regardless of the possible tragic effects to their own well being and happiness, he cannot but wish that a greater reciprocity between virtue and happiness was available in human life. Hartmann states this suggestion persuasively:

> To feel no satisfaction at the good fortune of the innocent and highly deserving, no indignation at the triumph of the reprobate, is rightly looked upon as morally perverted. Here is the subjective and in this respect justifiable source of all eudaemonism...the postulate of human happiness is not simply an ordinary utopia; as a vision, it also has a place in critical ethics. [33]

It is clear that in relating the notion of value to individual satisfaction, Whitehead does deeply illustrate such sentiments, as Kant in his own manner may have, postulating the Kingdom of Heaven as that place where virtue is rewarded by happiness. It thus appears that some further confusion in general ethical criticism is responsible for a type of attitude that would attribute a private interest theory to Whitehead on the basis of the fact that he does hold that individual satisfaction and happiness are ethically desirable. It is true that the subjectivists also claim this doctrine; but subjectivism is a complex thesis and claims many other doctrines that Whitehead nowhere does. The single relevant doctrine that they hold in common is the notion that happiness, whether of oneself or others, is a good and its attainment is therefore desirable. But Whitehead need not be taken to imply, as clearly Kant or indeed the Christian apologists did not, that one ought to be virtuous in order to be rewarded by happiness.

Such a reductionism would seem to be based on a confusion of the fact that a man may find happiness, and ought to do so, in accomplishing some good act, with the irrelevant deduction that such deeds are accomplished only for the sake of happiness and would not have been done otherwise. This claim in turn seems to rest on the absurd and perverted assumption that a relation between virtue and happiness should not be desired. Of course, Whitehead holds that it is a desirable relation and that the human situation, ideally, ought to

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[33] Hartmann, op. cit., III, p. 180.

be such that the relation is achieved. In this Whitehead is agreeing with what is, I think, valid in the subjectivist's claim that individual satisfaction is desired and desirable. The further notion, as Hegel states it,

> ...is more than empty, is pernicious if it passes into the assertion that because subjective satisfaction is present, as it always is when any task is brought to completion, it is what the agent intended in essence to secure and the objective end was in his eyes only a means to that... [34]

Ironically, the subjectivists have themselves drawn this self-destructive conclusion. Their basic insight that satisfaction and well being ought to accompany virtue is valuable and defensible; the opposite notion is scandalous and itself evil, perhaps sadistic. But their further exaggerated claim that the satisfaction is what makes the good act good is an unnecessary, and mistaken, inference, their particular notion of "self-interest" having itself been mistaken. Although Whitehead does indeed agree with what is valid in the subjectivist's thesis, he does not it is argued, imply the latter inference which inference would be productive of a private interest theory.

Prichard correctly notes that it has been a general intention in ethics "either to prove that there is a necessary connexion between duty and interest or, in certain cases, even to exhibit the connexion as something self-evident."[35] And he immediately proceeds to criticize these intentions: "we cannot help feeling that somehow they are out of place, so that the real question is not so much whether they are successful, but whether they ought ever to have been made." [36]

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[34] Hegel, op. cit., p. 83.

[35] H. A. Pritchard, "Duty and Interest", in Readings in Ethical Theory, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952, p. 469.

[36] Ibid., p. 469.

The oddity, and apparent irrelevance, of this claim rests, I believe, on an error that is characteristic of the various critics who have concluded that Whitehead's theory is a private interest theory.

As is apparent from the further statements Prichard makes, he has confused two fundamentally different issues, namely, the claim that in an ideally perfect and just society, happiness would necessarily accompany virtue, with the totally unrelated notion that one would therefore do a virtuous act only for the reward of happiness. As remarked above, the inference is a non-sequitur. Prichard's criticisms of Plato concretely illustrate this confusion, for he has failed to discern that although Plato does indeed say that if an act were truly just it would be to the individual's advantage, (as might for example occur in his Ideal State), he is not recommending that we think an act just because it is to our advantage. And he is assuredly not suggesting that we only ought to do such acts as are to our advantage. This estimation is astonishing. In the world of finite beings, a return of suffering for goodness is often the case and one reason for its being the case is the tragic fact that there is here no perfect or absolute justice.

Plato's deep, although ambiguous, refusal of a thoroughgoing intellectualism in ethics (in which doing a good act is itself regarded as producing happiness regardless of fortune and well being) and his recognition of the tragic disparity between virtue and happiness in actual life (permanently exemplified by the execution of Socrates) may have led him to analyze the Ideal State in such a manner that the intended guaranteed relation between virtue and happiness is obtained. And it may have been one cause of his profound and ethically motivated speculations about immortality, whereby one confronts the "true judges" as against the "pretended judges" found in the world--the executioners of Socrates. Certainly the particular solution the philosopher gives to achieve a relation between virtue and happiness may not be convincing. But

this is quite another point and does not detract from the claim, against Prichard, that indeed the question must be considered in ethical theory. Hopefully it has been persuasively shown that the underlying reason for such general suspicions, as here exemplified by Prichard's statements, namely the belief that such a consideration marks the ethics as some sort of private interest theory, is quite false.

The problem that gives rise to such erroneous conclusions, namely the tragic fact that there is no guaranteed relation between virtue and happiness in this world, will have to be considered in regard to Whitehead's ethics. If no solution is possible, the ethics will remain within the description of life as inevitably tragic, as, for example, certain existentialist analyses do. It will be argued however, that a solution is implied by Whitehead and serves to effect the transition between his ethics and his philosophy of religion. (See Chapter III, Section K and Chapter IV).

It is hoped that at least some plausibility has been obtained in this discussion for the claim that Whitehead's metaphysics could imply the existence of specifically ethical values and need not imply any sort of private interest theory. Although it will be an ethics that would claim that satisfaction of individual interest is a value, I have argued that this claim is one that any ethics ought to recognize as valid. Since all men desire happiness and self realization, no ethics that ignores the legitimacy of this demand can be persuasive; again, with Spinoza, "reason demands nothing which is opposed to nature". But if in this world virtue and happiness cannot always, or often be co-extensive, it is then entirely possible that an ethician recommends that one nonetheless act virtuously. And it has been argued that Whitehead does make such a recommendation. The argument will continue in the following chapters.

Section I. Summary

In brief summary of this chapter, it may at last be seen that from Whitehead's metaphysical perspective the free and self creative individual may indeed achieve self identity and real individuality, as against various critics' comments to the contrary. From the ethical perspective the notion of self identity was also indeed intelligible and available by implication from Whitehead's metaphysics. However, it was claimed that ethical self identity could not be reached in time, without the individual being productive of evil. Such an individual would have attempted a too soon narrowing of perspective, and only thereby reached stability of attitude and character and some degree of satisfaction. But he has not reached genuine satisfaction of his true self interest, the "higher experience". Moreover, his behavior is in utter conflict with the ethical requirement for openness and breadth of outlook in response to each novel ethical situation, in which type activity, true human satisfaction and realization can be approached. However, no satisfaction or individual identity of the type achieved through stability and temporally completed self determination is here possible, and the individual as an ethical self remains an ideal, a postulate, not reachable in time.

One may thus conclude, with a certain persuasiveness, that Whitehead's ethical theory could not be any sort of private interest theory since it would imply the tragic consequence that the satisfaction of the self as an ethical self cannot be achieved in time, although it ought to be achievable, and would be so, in an ideal state of existence. The ethical self remains a task, a continuous and creative working out of the ethics of relations and of conduct, and in time neither ethical self identity, requiring total ethical self knowledge, nor ethical satisfaction are achieved.

The consequences of finitude in a continuously changing world are tragic consequences. Perhaps in the depth of self confrontation that morally

sensitive individuals have engaged in, this recognition can be found and the ethical task nonetheless accepted. If one has a deep respect and concern for humanity, perhaps this ethical life can be achieved, as men in their deeper insights know it must be. This is the essential insight of a humanism that is not forgetful of the fact that the ethical consciousness confronts the real suffering of individuals, both good and evil, and does not deal with 'humanity' as an abstraction. For abstractions do not suffer, nor impose obligations. It is believed that such a profound ethical insight is not only theoretically available to Whitehead as an ethical philosopher but is directly implied in his writings.

It is now to some extent possible to substantiate my initial claim that Whitehead's ethics would have the ability to synthesize various insights of other theorists into a broader and more balanced perspective, Whitehead's criterion of philosophical value. As perhaps partly manifest from the above and with continued support below, I suggest that Whitehead's ethics can do justice to the major particular insights of the named ethical perspectives: the pragmatists' stress on the on-going creative development of ethical values; the intuitionists' claim to the absolute nature of some aspects of value theory; the existentialists' stress on the fact of individual moral responsibility and the tragic nature of finitude; the idealists' notion of the pervasiveness of value in the universe; the subjectivists' and emotivists' stress on the relational, situational, and changing nature of ethical judgments and criterion of value, and the appeal to value as according with one's own self interest; the creative evolutionists' emphasis on progress in the internalization and enactment of values, this activity being achieved through education and by social development through custom; the utilitarians' justifiable demand that judgments of moral worth be dependent on the actual social consequences of one's acts; the Christian

liberalists' insistence that the moral worth of each individual be respected in so far as each man is potentially good, even if presently evil; the traditional Christian's stress on the universality of certain duties and the claim of love; and, lastly, the humanists' essential insight that values and duties in regard to individual men are real even if absolute moral perfection is not identifiable or attainable in the finite world.

It will be the central concern of the following chapters to directly substantiate these claims and to indirectly substantiate my conviction that Whitehead's metaphysics implies an ethical theory that has an excellence and profundity among ethical theories that his metaphysics is unanimously acknowledged to have in its own dimension.

Chapter III. The Ethics of Whitehead

Section A. The Moral Order and God

As is well known, the notion of "order" is a central notion in Whitehead's metaphysical cosmology: "There is an actual world because there is an order in nature. If there were no order, there would be no world." (RM 107). The foundation of order is located in God's primordial nature which is his valuation of the eternal objects. Like all creative evaluation, this primordial vision is directed by some particular subjective aim. Thus Whitehead states that "The concrescence is directed by the subjective aim, that the subjective forms of the feelings shall be such as to constitute the eternal objects into relevant lures of feeling severally appropriate for all realizible basic conditions." (PR 134). There is thus a relation issuing from God to the world that is a relation of "interest" influenced by God's decision of "importance", in Whitehead's particular meanings of those terms.

Generically, "interest" and "importance" are referrent to one's subjective aim to fulfill his own being through chosen relation with the specified eternal objects and with other concrete entities. God's interest in the world is directed to "the attainment of value" (RM 97), achieved through "the evocation of intensities" (PR 161), itself productive of the satisfaction of the temporal actualities. According to Whitehead's summary statement, "What is inexorable in God, is valuation as an aim towards 'order'; and 'order' means 'society' permissive of actualities with patterned intensity of feeling arising from adjusted contrasts." (PR 373-76). God's primordial nature is evaluationally ordered

according to this aim. It provides the initial data from which the self-causation of every temporal entity begins and determines the initial gradations of relevance of the various possibilities of actualization for each entity. Thus Whitehead holds that this order in God's primordial nature produces a derivative order in the actual world. For some eternal objects are inherently of greater relevance than others and can function as the objectively determined lures for feeling.

Whitehead further claims that this primordial order is generically an aesthetic order: "The actual world is the outcome of the aesthetic order and the aesthetic order is derived from the concrescence of God." (RM 101). As discussed in Chapter II, this fact should not be taken to imply that there are no eternal objects of ethical significance in the primordial nature or that, derivatively, there can be no moral order in the temporal world. For it is philosophically premature to conclude with no further evidence that the metaphysical primacy of the aesthetic order forces an axiological reduction of all values to aesthetic values. Or it is philosophically unjust, if the further evidence is the evidence of one's own ulterior purposes. Whitehead is careful to point out that there is indeed a moral order in the actual world but that it, like any other order that is specific, arises from "certain aspects of aesthetic order" (RM 101), the generic order. Clearly the moral order must be an outcome of the aesthetic order because, according to Whitehead, if there were no foundational aesthetic order, there would be no world. God's primordial nature, as the order and gradation of all values, including ethical values, functions as the initial object of every subjective aim. In this guise God is the initial data for objectification, the ground of obligation, and consequently, as respects ethical values, will function as the ground of moral obligation.

It is to be recalled that the achievement of individual satisfaction and self value is the aim of every entity. The degree of success is primarily related to the degree of subjective intensity that is attained. In the Eighth Categoreal Condition, The Category of Subjective Intensity, Whitehead states that there are two aspects that must be considered in this aim at intensity--first as regards the immediate subject, secondly as regards the relevant future. This latter aim Whitehead holds to be "comprised of the anticipatory feelings of the transcendent future in its relation to immediate fact." It functions as "one element in the immediate feelings of the concrescent subject...[it] is the feeling of the objective immortality inherent in the nature of actuality. Such anticipatory feelings involve realization of the relevance of eternal objects as decided in the primordial nature of God." And Whitehead concludes, "In so far as these feelings in the higher organisms rise to important intensities there are effective feelings of the more remote alternative possibilities." (PR 424-25). According to Whitehead, in his primordial nature God has graded the eternal objects in such a manner that there is a definite order of relevance for each actual entity. But since each entity is self-creative, it can choose to accept or reject the possibility of actualizing the particular relevant values. The novel uniqueness of each entity arises by its particular judgments of importance as respects the eternal objects, determined by its particular subjective aim.

> The <u>relevance</u> of an eternal object in its role of lure is a fact inherent in the data. In this sense the eternal object is a constituent of the 'objective lure.' But the admission into, or rejection from, reality of conceptual feeling is the originative decision of the actual occasion. (PR 131).

When the actuality is self-conscious, the will to attend to, and

to actualize or to reject, the relevant value as God has given it is indeed a moral decision. For rejection is exclusion, a certain type of destruction of an abstract possibility from being actualized in that immediate situation. If this exclusion was not necessary and indeed, in conflict with the objectively determined relevance of that value, the decision can be evil. This consequence is an important element in the notion of moral responsibility as developed on the higher levels of experience and will be elaborated below. As previously discussed as regards Whitehead's idea of truth, this situation is here, as regards ethics, very similar to Royce's statement that "God distinguishes what it pleases him to distinguish. The logical as well as the moral problem is, Does my will accord with God's will?"[1] The implied Whiteheadian doctrine is further reminiscent of Spinoza's notion of the individual "moral exemplar", as decided by God and functioning as the objective lure for that individual.

According to Whitehead, the aim of all actuality is to achieve subjective intensity, which aim is proportionally successful as the number of eternal objects ingressed is increased in complexity. Balance or order, that is, avoidance of inhibitions among the various possibilities entertained, must also obtain. Increase in satisfaction then is achieved by increasing intensity, the latter arising from ingression of a balanced pattern of contrasted, but compatible, eternal objects. It is important to note for later development that some particular contrasts of eternal objects, that is values, which are incompatible for harmonious ingression from some particular perspective may, as Whitehead puts it,

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[1]Royce, op. cit., II, p. 52.

"jointly enter into a higher contrast" (PR 424) in a broader perspective.

As discussed in preceding chapters, an increased intensity within an entity or in a society occurs when a more complex and inclusive harmony of data is shared with the surrounding environment. Thus Whitehead states the conclusion that "The Universe achieves its values by reason of its coordination into societies of societies, and into societies of societies of societies." (AI 207). On the human social level where ethical values can obtain and can be increased by social relationship, Whitehead holds that "The stubborn reality of the absolute self-attainment of each individual is bound up with a relativity which it issues from and issues into." (AI 290). And he has previously noted that on the human level

> Beyond the soul, there are other societies, and societies of societies. There is the animal body ministering to the soul: there are families, groups of families, nations, species, groups involving different species associated in the joint enterprise of keeping alive. These various societies, each in its measure, claim loyalties and loves. In human history the various responses to these claims disclose the essential transcendence of each individual actuality beyond itself. (AI 290).

Here again Whitehead has claimed that the production of societies is a condition for the growth and development in individual depth and intensity of experience. It is obvious even on casual observation that the decision to relate oneself to broader and more inclusive societies beyond the narrow society that one's own self is, must have ethical significance. The claim will be expounded below.

Thus Whitehead emphatically states his conviction as to the importance of the development of great societies which can re-enforce and contain individual greatness and depth of experience. This claim in the following statement is open to possible misinterpretation if the emphasis is not seen in relation to the above given considerations: "The problem

is not how to produce great men, but how to produce great societies. The great society will put up the men for the occasions." (SMW 205). It is the individuals who have paramount importance to Whitehead, as they have, or ought to have, to those who claim to be humanists and liberals, including Christian liberals. Social life is only the "provision of opportunity" (ESP 73), the necessary condition for individual development and intensity of experience. And to be sure, communal relations are productive of new values impossible to achieve in individual isolation. But the importance of these achievements are ultimately the importance of increasing individual satisfaction and value intensity.

In sum, a society does not have value in itself but only as respects its ability to increase the value of individual existence: "The worth of any social system depends on the value experience it promotes among individual human beings. If the man be totally subordinated to the common life, he is dwarfed." (ESP 73). If the society is ethically reified to a position of claiming value in itself, it has been placed in the position of a forced and mistaken superiority. In the case where it is antagonistic to individual development rather than functioning as the provider of a stabilizing background upon which new value experience can freely develop, its assertion is evil. This is the evil of totalitarianism which, according to Whitehead, rests its claims on metaphysical and ethical misjudgments. As final evidence of Whitehead's concern with the absolute importance of individuals as over and, if necessary, against, the merely conditional and functional importance of any particular society, is his judgment that "God's purpose in the creative advance is the evocation of intensities. The evocation of societies is purely subsidiary to this absolute end." (PR 161). It is therefore individual satisfaction and intensity that is the end or final cause of creation, the creation of societies included.

Agreement to the claim that Whitehead does contend, and does substantiate his contention, that the value of individuals is in an absolute sense higher than the value of any society is important. For as is often critically and rightly noted, many philosophies of organism imply the contrary evaluation, evoked perhaps through the unintended and independent force of their fundamental metaphysical categories.

Thus value is developed through an increase in subjective intensity produced by increasing the complexity of the contrasted pattern of eternal objects able to be ingressed by the individual entity and supported by its social environment. However, because actual occasions are finite and concrete, there are some patterns of eternal objects which may be abstractly possible for joint realization but which are not concretely compatible for realization at <u>that</u> particular juncture of the creative advance. Since God's primordial nature is conceptual and not concretely actual, all value ideals can be simultaneously present, there awaiting that passage of the temporal world in which their concrete actualization is possible. And further, because the eternal objects conceptually entertained by God contain "unfathomable possibilities" of combinations (SMW 174), their totality cannot even be conceptually known by any finite creature always involved in some limitation of perspective. It would seem that for reason of this fact of inexhaustible novelty, Whitehead holds that the creative process of the world is everlasting; it is a continuous enactment of previously impossible conjoint patterns of values, some of which always await an indeterminate future. Whitehead concludes that "Process is the way by which the universe escapes from the exclusions of inconsistency." (MT 75). This conclusion seems very similar in origin and consequences to Hegel's recognition of the endlessness of the temporal

world, (his "bad infinite"; see Chap. I, Sec. H).

Thus Whitehead conceives that God alone can conceptually include all possibilities of value in his primordial vision--God as "the active entertainment of all ideals." And like Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, God's primordial nature contains "the urge to their finite realization, each in its due season." (AI 276, italics mine). Elsewhere Whitehead calls this purpose of God "the single purpose to achieve eternal harmony." (SMW 192). And Whitehead concludes, with further similarity to Hegel, "a process must be inherent in God's nature, whereby his infinity is acquiring realization." (AI 276). This notion rests on Whitehead's metaphysically prior claim that

> No specific finitude is an ultimate shackle upon the universe. In process the finite possibilities of the universe travel towards their infinitude of realization...the immanence of the infinite in the finite; whereby all bounds are burst, and all inconsistencies dissolved. (MT 75).

Whitehead is clearly asserting that there is a telos in the creative advance of the temporal world, a telos derived from God's aim at the eventual realization of all the ideals in his primordial nature. Such development however is to be understood as being dependent on the free and creative development of individual subjective aims, initially related to the ideal objects in God's primordial nature. As respects this individual development, Whitehead states that it is "nothing else than the Hegelian development of an idea", claiming also that "the final analogy to philosophies of the Hegelian school, noted in the Preface, is not accidental." (PR 254). The notation referred to claimed that the cosmological doctrine as interpreted from the religious perspective may perhaps best be conceived as "a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a realistic basis." (PR viii). It seems to this writer that Whitehead's estimate of his philosophy according to the traditional philosophical

classifications is a correct one. Of course, the realist basis and its categoreal analysis is predominant in terms of its comparative degree of attention in his writing, particularly in Process and Reality, his central work. Nonetheless this ought not to obscure a critic's evaluation of Whitehead's total philosophical scope, although it has often done so. In the final analysis I believe that there is a necessary relation of interpretation between the realist and the idealist elements in Whitehead's philosophy and that each obtain different explanatory insights from those of either traditional realists or idealists. And this would occur exactly because of the intricate interplay of the two perspectives. Such a titanic attempt at synthesizing the two traditionally isolated positions is perhaps a fundamental testimony to Whitehead's deep conviction that philosophy, like all pursuits, gains importance through its continuous attempt to broaden perspective to include views which were previously declared incompatible from a narrower perspective.

Section B. The Analysis of Evil and Moral Responsibility

Whitehead holds that there exists what may be called a developing moral order in the finite world, and this central claim must be explicated. As above noted, if particular conjunctions of values are attempted and forced despite the fact that they are presently incapable of harmonious realization, there will arise discord and there may arise destruction. To Whitehead such a situation is one type of evil. (See AI 276). He nonetheless claims that within the general advance of the universe there is included a moral advance toward actualization of those values which were not previously compatible for inclusion. He claims it is a metaphysical fact that evil will be eliminated in particular situations. Evil--in the generic sense here meant--is discord, lack of harmony, which on metaphysical grounds

is unstable. It promotes the eventual elimination of the entity or situation involved in this evil. (See RM 92-94). By contrast, "There is a self preservation inherent in that which is good in itself." And Whitehead concludes "The fact of the instability of evil is the moral order in the world." (RM 95).

Whitehead is <u>not</u> however claiming that there is a specific and predetermined ethical teleology in the actual world. As above discussed, in such type of world moral progress is not something that men can achieve precisely because it exists as a given fact. This is a terrific simplification of the true meaning of a moral order. To Whitehead, evil has real existence; it is not merely non-being (whatever that may mean in this traditional application). There is something positive in evil, for it can produce individual enjoyment, and is thus, in this respect and to this degree, good. (See RM 93). For in itself, all actuality has a value according to Whitehead's general metaphysical doctrine and consequently any satisfaction of an interest is of some positive significance. But, of course, it is also evil in respect to the entities beyond itself, as a "destructive agent among things greater than itself." (RM 93). The sober and unprejudicial judgment shown in these notions is rare and, I think, just. If something were evil <u>in all respects</u> it is difficult to understand how it could have been desired and acted upon for nobody would intentionally desire to cause evil to his own self. To be sure, he may inadvertently do so—but this is clearly a different matter.

As a further qualification to the elementary dismissal of evil as involving no value and the characteristically attendant claim that the elimination of evil must necessarily produce positive advance, Whitehead notes
96 that "The instability of evil does not necessarily lead to progress." (RM 94).

Elimination produces a loss to the social environment, the loss of what might have been. Evil is exactly this deprivation. Certainly the elimination of the evil is to be desired, but not because this act in itself produces a good but rather because it opens up the possibility that some good can be accomplished by further creative effort. Thus, in familiar examples, there is at best this negative value in the social activity of punishment or in the individual activity of atonement for sin, namely the value that the situation is then open for renewed individual creative activity, the only positive good. With a similar revisionary insight, Berdyaev has pointed out respecting the Christian consciousness that religious people have concentrated too much on a concern with individual redemption, (which can become a type of transcendental egoism), and far too little on the positive value and higher duty of individual creativity.

It follows then that since evil is something positive, God must be exempt from evil and consequently exempt from all internal inconsistency which is the note of evil: according to Whitehead, "The limitation of God is his goodness." (RM 147). "If He be conceived as the supreme ground for limitation, it stands in His very nature to divide the Good from the Evil, and to establish Reason 'within her dominions supreme.'" (SMW 180). And thus, because evil is positive, there are elements in the finite temporal world which are not also in God. (See RM 96).

For this reason, among other reasons, Whitehead's God can not be the sole creative force in the finite world since the world includes positive elements which God does not include. By contrast, when traditional theology held God as totally responsible for the being of the created world, it was necessary to decide that evil was non-being, for otherwise God would be responsible for evil. And this is heresy. As Whitehead states this conclusion: "If the theory of complete determinism, by reason of the

necessity of conformation with the nature of God, holds true, then the evil in the world is in conformity with the nature of God." (RM 92). The choice is forced between holding that God is either fully responsible for the created being of the finite world and therefore evil is necessarily non-being, or that God does not fully determine the finite world, that there exists finite creative freedom and that evil is ontologically positive, that is, real. The first approach is the familiar approach of Christianity in general, the latter is advanced by Whitehead and represents one, among several, breaks with traditional Christian doctrine. In short, Whitehead's God is not omnipotent. The consequences of the rejection are of great importance.

To Whitehead it follows that finite individualities are genuinely self-creative and can be responsible for both their own development and the influence their being will effect in the future actualities which encounter it. The original divine valuation of the eternal objects conditions the creative advance, being the initial object of every subjective aim. But God does not determine the particular individual valuations and expressions. Part of God's will is that the individual be the self-creative producer of his own freely developed will, thus determining his own influence in the creative advance of the world. "The world is self-creative; and the actual entity as self-creating creature passes into its immortal function of part-creator of the transcendent world." (PR 130).

Whitehead draws the consequence for experience on the ethical level that "God, as conditioning the creativity with his harmony of apprehension, issues into the mental creature as moral judgment according to a perfection of ideals." (RM 114). Acts are the expression of the individual feelings which derive from the original freely chosen subjective aim.

Whitehead draws the further consequence for ethics that

> The subject is responsible for being what it is in virtue of its feelings. It is also derivatively responsible for the consequences of its existence because they flow from its feelings. In our own relatively high grade of human existence, this doctrine of feelings and their subject is best illustrated by our notion of moral responsibility. (PR 339).

And more specifically, Whitehead asserts that an individual who can be judged morally responsible is judged on a double basis; "partly on the intrinsic strength of its own experience, and partly on its influence in the promotion of a high-grade type of order." (AI 291). Clearly there would be some type of reciprocal causality between the two although the evaluations are separable.

In determining one's values, (the decision of the self from the ethical perspective), the creature is therefore to be guided both by his aim at some envisioned purpose and satisfaction, and secondly, by himself as inevitably influencing future actualities, as "part-creator" of the finite world. Thus one's ideal of oneself in terms of the influence he chooses to effect will itself become a material part of the data that determines the initial choice of the self, and will increase the importance and responsibility for his choice. Such a recognition announces the ethical claim that one has a responsibility for his own future influence in the world, which type of recognition Rotenstreich, for one, denies that Whitehead's metaphysics can support.[2] Rotenstreich correctly states that according to Whitehead consciousness of one's self-identity emerges during the process of self formation. (See Chap. II, Sec. E). He goes on to infer that there can consequently be no guarantee that a subject will in fact

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[2]N. Rotenstreich, "The Superject and Moral Responsibility", The Review of Metaphysics, I, 1956, pp. 201-207.

consider himself related to the process of self-formation and take moral responsibility for it. Stated in this form the criticism is ambiguous as to two possible intended meanings, neither of which, I believe, substantiate the alleged conclusion that Whitehead's philosophy cannot give an adequate account of moral responsibility.

It must be true that responsibility for one's acts can begin only at the point where the individual has reached self-consciousness. Thus <u>any</u> account of moral responsibility must confront the fact that many experiences influence an individual to an action before the age when he can consciously react to the influence by evaluation. Certainly on the attaining of consciousness one can then choose to accept responsibility for his acts. But, furthermore, it remains remorsely necessary that any future evaluation is to some extent determined by one's past, unchosen psychical formation. Thus it must be true that individuals are not thoroughly responsible for all the elements that constitute their character, some, (although against the determinists, not all), having been irrevocably formed before the consciousness was reached.[3]

Yet <u>even so</u>, one must and can accept responsibility for his own self when consciousness <u>is</u> achieved simply and adequately because there is no one else who is this self. The force of the implication in this claim is ethical. Regardless of the fact that I did not totally form my own self, it is nonetheless <u>my</u> self and one of the facts about this self, as about all human selves, is that it was not consciously or freely created in its totality. Oddly there are people who will go on to blame irrevocably those who have been influential in their preconscious formation, without

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[3]One cannot find this recognition among the existentialists and other proponents of absolute freedom, but it is nonetheless, according to Whitehead, a necessary recognition--(see Chap. II, Sec. D)

recognizing that the other also is not totally responsible for the influence he will wield. Ethically one can indeed be totally responsible but factually he is not--and I see no contradiction between these claims, each stated from a different perspective. As Strindberg profoundly showed in his Damascus, the factual regress of preconscious influence is indeterminate, metaphorically ending with the snake in the Garden of Eden. But the snake cannot talk, and the blame cannot be placed. Probably there is nothing further to be said concerning this particular insight.

But again, we accept the responsibility of our own self upon achieving self-consciousness simply because it is our self and it is not anybody else's responsibility as much as it is ours. If we wish to say that it is, in doing so we lose the dignity of considering ourselves as morally responsible individuals; moreover we have refused our freedom and, in effect, our selves. It is experientially true that in many situations, and rightly so, a man will feel an insult to his dignity if another tries to absolve him from guilt on the grounds that he was not responsible for his action. This is the claim and rebellion of conscience; what Hegel calls "subjective freedom" which he contends, with some justice, was brought into consciousness with the Christian revelation.

There is, of course, no guarantee that an individual will accept moral responsibility for himself in any particular present situation or as regards his past acts. If this is the point that Rotenstreich's essay intends against Whitehead's account, he is surely correct. But does the fact that there is no guarantee that ethical responsibility will be accepted apply only to a Whiteheadian type account of moral responsibility? Does it not rather apply to any ethical account whatsoever? Perhaps it would be thought that theories which have, for example, a strong stress on the notion of eternal punishment for sin have a greater chance of compelling moral

obedience, as many misguided preachers seem to feel. But the obedience is achieved through fear and if this is taken to show moral behavior, it in fact shows the opposite. Fear is not a sign of a high sense of moral responsibility. On the contrary, it is a sign that morality is not present. In just this manner most children are monstrously educated and are quite ill prepared for a true understanding of moral responsibility and the nobility of conscience. Whitehead's notions suggest no such elements of fear or force. Moral responsibility obtains in his ethics on the recognition that every individual, as a part-creator of the world, has the responsibility of bringing into the world the highest possible value. Of course, again, one could refuse to accept the responsibility of this continuous task. But this, far from showing that Whitehead has no doctrine of responsibility,only criticises the individual according to that doctrine.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that Whitehead's doctrine of moral responsibility is thorough-going in a way that it is not in many other traditional ethical doctrines. To Whitehead the individual has a double responsibility--first to attend to his motives and secondly, to consider the probable effects his acts will have for others. Kant has attended to the first aspect, Mill the second, almost exclusively, at least as far as their writings assertively testify.[4]

Section C. Values as Ideals: Order and Love

It is my present purpose to analyze Whitehead's conception of moral values and the mode of their discovery, that is, his conception of what is

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[4]To be sure, Kant's entire philosophy combines to exhibit such a profound humane concern for the well-being of men that one must be prepared to recognize that his ethical insight in this respect far exceeds his statement. This very straight-forward recognition has been rather thoroughly obscured in the interpretations of Kant, the consequent critical results being grotesque and unjust.

to determine the ethically responsible will and how the commitment is recognized. This investigation will have the obligation of referring to both the infinite world of possible values (eternal objects) and the finite actual world (actual entities and societies). For it is Whitehead's conviction that any description of the actual world requires reference to both worlds, there being a relational activity between these worlds. The decision to explain the relevance of the two worlds to each other is the definitive search of philosophy: "The notion of 'understanding' requires some grasp of how the finitude of the entity in question requires infinity, and also some notion of how infinity requires finitude. This search for such understanding is the definition of philosophy." (ESP 114). And this occurs for the stated and important reason that "each world is futile except in its function of embodying the other." (ESP 90). Whitehead holds that this claim is a summary of his endeavor "to avoid the feeble Platonic doctrine of 'imitation' and the feebler modern pragmatic dismissal of 'immortality.'" (ESP 89 and see Chap. I, Sec. F).

That a radically new and non-traditional conception of God, (the infinite), is involved in this doctrine is clear; namely the conclusion that God is dependent upon the world as well as the world on God. Whitehead critically notes the singular fact that in classical thought, "Perfection was unrelated to transition. Creation, with its world in change, was an inferior avocation of a static Absolute." (MT 111). This Whiteheadian doctrine escapes Hegel's insightful and original criticism: "If infinity is thought by itself apart from the finitude of the existing world, then infinity itself becomes something finite; it is limited by the otherness of the world."[5]

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[5]Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York, Wisdom Library, 1959, p. 89.

The ethical novelty of this doctrine here pertinent is the implication that although ideals and values are eternal, against the pragmatists, they are not, against the Platonists, degraded in their ingression by entities of the finite world. On the contrary, they first achieve actuality in this activity. Whitehead's doctrine of the relational essence of all things implies the necessity that the eternal objects are not independent entities. In ingression by individual actualities they achieve functional relevance to the finite world, which, moreover, is the only fully actual world. In short, "All value is the gift of finitude which is the necessary condition for activity." (ESP 114).

On the higher levels of experience, there is a further function of the eternal objects. In their conceptual entertainment they function as ideals, with real relational significance in the finite world even though they are not yet concretely exemplified. "The vagueness of practice is energized by the clarity of ideal experience." (ESP 112) as present in theory but not yet actualized in fact. "Our exact conceptual experience... vivifies the ideals which invigorate the real happenings. ...It is the transformation of the real experience into its ideal limit." (ESP 113). Such a conceptual transformation requires a necessary reference to God in the guise of his primordial nature, God in his function as the ideal limit.[6]

To substantiate the claim that the actual world involves and requires a reference to ideals, Whitehead appeals to the only evidence that

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[6]See Chap. I, Sec. F concerning the function of the "ideal limit" as respects philosophical development. The interpretation of this notion of the "ideal limit" wherein God functions as the religious absolute will be considered below.

would be philosophically compelling for him, namely the experience of individuals. It has been remarked by Goheen that this appeal to experience does not necessitate but indeed suggests that Whitehead's ethics would be similar to the type of ethics that Hume most thoroughly endorses under the name of ethics; an ethics wherein the meanings of 'good' and of 'evil' are determined by the likes and dislikes of men, respectively.[7] This is, however, not true. Goheen misses the essential point that the appeal to experience does not in itself dictate what type of ethical thesis the philosopher will hold; it does not for example necessarily suggest that the theory will be naturalistic or subjectivistic. All philosophers believe and attempt to prove that they are appealing to experience. Plato produced his Doctrine of Recollection to describe how it is that all men have had the alleged primordial experience of the Forms. The important parameter that is obscured in Goheen's suggestion is the necessity of attending to the content of what it is that the philosopher believes men do experience.

Whitehead, as against Hume, or against Dewey, finds in experience the intuition of eternal ideals which function as individual but external standards for action in a manner that again recalls Spinoza's notion of the individual "moral exemplar". "There are experiences of ideals—of ideals entertained, of ideals aimed at, of ideals achieved, of ideals defaced. ... We are essentially measuring ourselves in respect to what we are not... [as] an external standard." (MT 141). Thus in short, there are ideal values, including moral values, which have relevance to the finite world as possibilities for actualization in that world of self-creating actualities. This

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[7] J. Goheen, "Whitehead's Theory of Value," in P.A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, 2nd. ed., New York, Tudor Publishing Company, 1961, pp. 435-61.

situation obtains exactly because the ideals are not yet realized but are here realizable, as Hegel, Bradley and Royce, among others, also held. As Whitehead states this

> If there were a necessary conformation of Appearance [the world expressed from a finite, limited perspective] to Reality [the totality of the world, with all ideals actualized--see Chap. I, Sec. C] then Morality would vanish. There is no morality about the multiplication table, whose items are necessarily linked. ...[morality] presupposes the efficacy of purpose. (AI 292).

Whitehead does hold that there are factors in the universe "constituting a general drive towards the conformation of Appearance to Reality." (AI 292). The progress however is not specifically predictable or univocal. It requires the introduction of novelty and the actualization of new patterns of ideals, and these activities depend on the will of finite individuals. (See Chap. I, Sec. C and below). Included among the factors of experience that are productive of this creative and intentionally produced progress in the universe is the ethically central experience of "the sublimation of the egoistic aim by its inclusion of the transcendent whole." (AI 293). This achievement occurs through a "harmony of the soul's activities with ideal aims that lie beyond any personal satisfaction." (AI 286).

According to Whitehead, such transcendent interests and aims derive from what is called an experience of "peace". It is the intuition that two general and absolute principles of obligation permanently underlie all moral aims and actions, "the principles of the generality of harmony and the importance of the individual. The first means 'order', and the second means 'love'." (AI 290-91). Types of order are to be rated in importance (value) "according to their success in magnifying the individual actualities, that is to say, in promoting strength of experience." (AI 291). The value of order then is to be subordinate to the more fundamental value of

love, the central and constant value required of all moral aims. The value is objective and eternal.

It is somewhat difficult to know whether Whitehead intends the claim that the value of love is the supreme value underlying all moral codes as a description of fact or as a recommendation, an assertion of what ought to be the case. If the former is intended, it may appear that Whitehead has misjudged the empirical evidence. For cultural anthropology, as one source of evidence, testifies to an astonishing variety of beliefs endorsed in social codes as ethical, some of which seem to deny the value of love. But perhaps we, and the anthropologists, are too prepared to be astonished and thus exaggerate the significance of the disparity on the wrong level. Although particular codes show very different applications and extensions of their central moral concepts, it may be that the concept of love is always present, albeit in different material interpretations. Perhaps some central ethical ideas such as love are not ignored in any society but acquire different and almost unrecognizable spheres of relevance and extension. It was not until the Christian era that benevolence or love was obligatory even as extended to one's enemies, and it was not until late in Western history that the sin of murder was seen to extend to the killing of slaves. But it would be patently false to conclude that the value of benevolence or the sin of murder had been totally unrecognized. In Professor Aller's persuasive statement of a similar conviction: "the material of ethnography supplies quite an amount of evidence in favor of the thesis that there is a common stock of values found everywhere. The differences in moral evaluations are not so much of content as of extent." And with specific application, he asserts that "It is questionable whether a member of the early Church would recognize

charity in the forms in which it appears today."[8] And of course the recognition here implied, namely that the meaning of concepts inevitably undergoes different interpretations and expressions, is a characteristic Whiteheadian conviction, as extensively noted above.

It is certainly true that Whitehead would find a definite moral significance connected with the notion of extension itself. As also noted above, the truly moral code would, in this example, require that one extend the obligation of love and concern to all mankind. In this sense therefore moral codes can be better or worse, but it may be that Whitehead is correct in implying that they all, to some degree, recognize a few central values as minimally necessary to social morality, paramount among these being the value of love.

To return to Whitehead's claim that the central ethical values for all moral aims, whether in fact or as a recommendation, are the values of love and harmony, it will be recalled that this aim and location of importance exactly corresponds with God's aim for the creatures as produced through his love. The aim is at a harmony of the sort which is able to increase the intensity and satisfaction of the experience of individuals,--the concern of love.

Creative and responsible actions that accord with these general standards of love and harmony seemingly are what Whitehead would mean by moral actions. The standards are objective and external to any individual although, to be sure, the desire for their realization is subjective. But all desires are subjective in origin, and the fact is beside the point. (See

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[8] R. Allers, "Ethics and Anthropology," The New Scholasticism, XXIV, July 3, 1950, pp. 251 and 253, respectively.

Chap. II, Sec. H).

Whitehead's doctrines imply that a narrowly pessimistic attitude, based on, and cumulatively productive of, a lack of faith in the possibility of progressive actualization of values can have effects that are evil in character. The sentiments rob the individual life of an urge to be a cooperating creator of such new expressions of values. Cynicism is non-creative, depriving life of "its zest for adventure" and its ability to transcend a narrow interest in its own "selfish happiness" (AI 288). The intentional transcendence requires both a grasp of the infinity of values that are possibilities for realization and the faith that they can be realized. As mentioned above, the experience of this recognition and this faith occurs in the intuition of peace, an intuition that is, according to Whitehead "the barrier against narrowness. One of its fruits is that passion whose existence Hume denied, the love of mankind as such." (AI 284). Moreover, a vision of the permanence of values transcending their present exemplification as "ideal limits" is also requisite to guide action, for freedom is not chaotic impulse—even the apparently spontaneous revelations of a genius required preparation and thus can be to some extent causally explained, ex post facto.

It appears then that goodness occurs through acting according to a trust in the reality of eternal values that can be actualized in the finite world. The trust issues from the intuition of peace and produces activity in accordance with the values of harmony and of love. The intuition promotes the desire to act creatively so as to increase one's sphere of interest beyond one's narrow self-interest. For Whitehead has said that "Evil is the brute motive force of fragmentary purpose, disregarding the eternal vision." (SMW 192), the vision of perfected harmony. Such evil, referred to in Chapter II as respects the "people of narrow sympathies,

purely self-regarding", is the evil that arises when there is a "loss of the higher experience in favor of the lower experience." There is produced a consequent loss to the social environment since evil is unstable and does not have important or lasting positive effectiveness in the creative advance. One's own "strength of experience" has been reduced and the relational influence of that experience consequently reduced in importance. This is what Whitehead calls the "evil of triviality"; "a sketch in place of a full picture." (ESP 119).

In such a perspective Whitehead claims that "Religion...is directed to the end of stretching individual interest beyond its self-defeating particularity." (PR 23). It is of the greatest importance to realize that according to Whitehead the attitude of narrowness is not only ethically evil but is also self-defeating. The recommendation to increase creative energy as being ethical obtains as well because according to Whitehead such activity is the only genuine self-realization and satisfaction, a complex conviction that is directly reminiscent of Spinoza's identification of virtue and power and the similar additional claim that virtuous activity is the only genuinely satisfying activity. To Whitehead narrowness is intentionally destructive of the obvious consequence of the metaphysical fact that all actuality is essentially relational, namely that intensity of experience and satisfaction is increased when relations are extended in both breadth and depth. When an entity ceases to relate entirely, it ceases to be actual. When it is curtailed in its relations, its existence is to that extent deprived of development. Intensity may thereby be replaced by conformation to habit which is non-creative, possibly therefore evil.

Man, as self conscious, is the only being who can intentionally act against his natural and essential need for relationship by choosing to

curtail his relations. This may occur by the mistaken estimation that happiness lies in selfish concentration on one's narrow interests. As noted, the result is both evil and destructive of one's true self-interest. Thus there arises a moral requirement that one wills to increase relation by broadening interest and concern, ultimately to include a relation of concern with the entire universe of values, eternal and actual. As is certainly obvious, the recommendation can obtain only on the human level. Animals can make no conscious choices of this sort, or of any other sort, and God can make no evil choices, being limited by his necessary goodness.

This ethical requirement to choose consciously to avoid the evil of triviality by the decision to increase relations through broadening interest and perspective can be relevantly discussed in relation to Whitehead's central philosophical category of "importance". According to Whitehead,

> The discussion of present fact apart from reference to past, to concurrent present, and to future, and from reference to the preservation or destruction of forms of creation is to rob the universe of essential importance. In the absence of perspective there is always triviality. (MT 115) [9]

Previously Whitehead has said that "perspective is gradation of relevance, that is to say, it is gradation of importance." (MT 13). Of course, the decision of importance itself arises from a particular perspective and is not unchanging or non-relational.

And Whitehead continues, "Importance, limited to a finite individual occasion, [as the people with narrow sympathies so limit it], ceases to be important." (MT 28). On the human level then, a better understanding of importance in experience will be developed by obtaining a broader relation

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[9]Actually 'wide' perspective is meant; <u>some</u> perspective is always present--see Chap. I, Sec. B.

of concern to past and present actualities and to the infinite realm of possible values that can be concretely realized in the future world. As discussed above, this is achieved through the aim to increase harmony and intensity through entertaining unexpressed possibilities of values, "the entertainment of the alternative." And Whitehead continues, "In its highest development, this becomes the entertainment of the Ideal...[which] exhibits itself in various species, such as the sense of morality..." (MT 37). In view of the above it can be easily understood why Whitehead has stated in apparently, but only apparently, unusual ethical language that "Morality consists in the control of process so as to maximize importance." (MT 19).

Whitehead has further claimed that "Importance depends on endurance, ...the retention through time of an achievement of value." (SMW 193). It is clear then that moral actions aim at obtaining endurance of values. This requires the achievement of harmony, stability of order, order being related to goodness in a direct manner for Whitehead. But, as against various critics, it is not here supposed that order is identical with goodness, as for example is supposed by Goheen and Schilpp, (see Chap. II, Secs. B and H). In Whitehead's own refuting statement,

> ...clarity and orderliness enable the possessor to deal with foreseen situations. They are necessary foundations for the maintenance of existing social situations. And yet they are not enough. Transcendence of mere clarity and order is necessary for dealing with the unforeseen, for progress, for excitement. Life degenerates when enclosed within the shackles of mere conformation. A power of incorporating vague and disorderly elements of experience is essential for the advance into novelty. (MT 108-109).

Although the selected importance of these remarks is ethical, their basis is metaphysical, as discussed at length in Chapter I, Section E. Situations either advance into novelty or degenerate and decay. There is no other alternative given the fact that the universe is an ongoing process in

which maintenance of a static content is impossible. The individual decision to introduce novelty is therefore an ethical duty since it is only through this means that the value of experience is increased. The advance is everlasting and no achieved stability can be taken as final. The inexhaustible possibilities inherent in the world through the ingression of the indeterminate number of possible combinations of eternal objects substantiate this conclusion.

But it is not necessary to also conclude that any possibility is equally possible in any particular situation. It is surely the case that past events combine to enforce the greater probability of certain developments which are, so-to-speak, more potential than other (merely abstract) possibilities. A denial of these remarks implies the belief that creativity is tantamount to non-causality or chaos, which is grotesque and certainly mistaken. As Whitehead indeed himself insists, there is inheritance from the past which induces formation. But, to return to our original point, Whitehead also insists that "the form of process is not wholly dependent upon derivation from the past. As epochs decay amid futility and frustration, the form of process derives other ideals involving novel forms of order." (MT 142).

A balance between these two recognitions is necessary, namely that there is inheritance from the past which nonetheless allows of the introduction of creative novelty. Exclusion of either extreme as the sole interpretation of the universe amount, I believe, to consequent unintelligible doctrines. At any rate it is clear that Whitehead's account is an attempt to synthesize the two extremes. The balance issues in Whitehead's fundamental doctrine of creative process or evolution which modulates between the extremes of mere possibility, lacking directional influence or aim, and rigorous directional determinisms. According to Whitehead, the

universe is not only evolving but creatively evolving. To a real degree it is not possible to predict the future qualitatively, although there is certainly causation which can be discovered after the fact.[10]

Oddly and unfortunately, in various discussions Whitehead appears on the one hand to emphasize order as an exclusive value, on the other to suggest that any novelty is itself desirable, as if, from the point of view of value, novelty were self-validating (whatever that may mean). It would rather seem that he intends the claim that because the introduction of novelty is the necessary condition for promoting creative advance, it is good if it is ultimately able to promote a higher type of order. For advance ought ultimately to be aimed always at this goal. Thus Whitehead does state his awareness that although novelty is the condition for the achievement of value, it can also produce evil if it introduces a chaos that cannot be creatively formed into a higher order: "Novelty may promote or destroy order; it may be good or bad." (PR284).

Section D. Social Ethics: Moral Codes

The several immediately preceding points, among others, force Whitehead's well-known conviction that the claim to the existence of static unchanging moral codes is a dogmatic and dangerous error. "The notion of the unqualified stability of particular moral codes is a primary illusion which has vitiated much philosophy." (MT 18). By contrast, it is to Whitehead an ethical requirement to carefully expand and modify standards as the particular social situation changes. What was once omitted as irrelevant or was unknown can become relevant and important. It is Whitehead's stated

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[10] See Chapter II, Section D for an analysis of freedom as meaning self-determination.

conviction that "The moral code is the behavior-pattern which in the environment for which it is designed will promote the evolution of that environment towards its proper perfection." (AI 291, italics mine). Whitehead's location of importance as referrent to the particular rather than the general, (on the human level, the individual rather than the society), is here directive in his insistence that it is the needs of the particular society that require attention. Universal homogeneity, if such were possible, would be a secondary interest (see below), as is the conservative's interest in maintaining continuity at the expense of real novel needs.

In a rare exhibition of explicating reasons for his conclusions, Hegel points out that

> Once the origination of an institution has been shown to be wholly to the purpose and necessary in the circumstance of the time, the demands of history have been fulfilled. But if this is supposed to pass for a general justification of the thing itself, it turns out to be the opposite, because, since these circumstances are no longer present, the institution, so far from being justified has by their disappearance lost its meaning and its right. [11]

For what is here believed to be very similar reasons, Whitehead concludes that "The details of [moral] codes are relative to the social circumstances of the immediate environment." (AI 289). And at its extreme, he claims that God's own purpose is "always embodied in the particular ideals relevant to the actual state of the world." (RM 152, italics mine).

These conclusions imply the recognition that temporality and situationality are parameters in judging the rightness of moral standards and acts. Whitehead would further imply that it is an ethical duty to envision the relevance of new values as possibilities that ought to be introduced as

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[11] Hegel, op. cit., Philosophy of Right, p. 17.

obligatory. Thus new ethical duties ought to be envisioned. They are a requirement for ethical progress. This suggests the evaluation of Whitehead's ethical theory as one which might be classified as 'creative ethics'. Such a theory does not necessarily contradict the Intuitionist type ethics unless the latter were to claim that one accepts as absolute and unchanging only those claims already recognized as duties, not admitting the possibility that new duties may arise. But whatever basis of justification such a thesis could produce, Intuitionist ethics (which Whitehead concurs with to a point) need not subscribe to it.

The type of ethical theory that Whitehead's ethics clearly does dispute is, as above noted, those that claim to have achieved absolute finality in announcement of values and duties. Nonetheless Whitehead feels, I think rightly, that the denial that such absolutistic codes are possible does not deny the possibility of ethics. Agreement to this claim is important. If one, not heeding Aristotle's caution, asks from an ethical theory more exactitude and stability of conclusion than it can achieve and, a fortiori, can not produce such exactitude, skepticism as to the possibility of providing any ethical theory can arise. The skepticism, like all skepticism, is dangerous, possibly leading to ethical subjectivism or nihilism. And the skepticism is not in this case legitimate. For one cannot logically conclude that ethical theory is impossible if what was demanded of it, namely absolute values, was not in fact necessary for it to obtain.

If this recognition that Whitehead enforces by implication could not become commonly agreed to, ethical subjectivism would pervade a society that has, like the present Western societies, become aware of the final right of individual freedom. This latter recognition, inherent in the liberal or democratic spirit, can be turned either toward communal creative

progress or toward individual ethical anarchy. No one can ignore the solemn fact that the latter attitude has begun to prevail and issue in characteristic actions. As Whitehead noted, "We are at the threshold of a democratic age, and it remains to be determined whether the equality of man is to be realized on a high or a low level." (AE 77).

Thus the perspectival determination and the relational nature of moral codes, like all things in Whitehead's universe, is recognized and stressed. This should not however, as implied above, lead to the conclusion, a non-sequitur, that to Whitehead moral standards are merely relative in the mistaken sense of subjective. Since the age of the Sophists and Plato philosophers have recognized that these two opposed positions are not exhaustive of what can be intellectually seen. What is here seen by Whitehead is that relationally defined standards can be accepted to have the same degree of objectivity in those circumstances to which the standards apply as absolute standards are alleged to have in all circumstances. The differentia does not reside in the existence or non-existence of objectivity but simply in the claims made concerning the extension of applicability. The absolute code claims objective relevance for all time; the particular relationally determined code for that time and place in which the relevant circumstances still obtain, and not beyond this.

It is true that to Whitehead moral standards, in particular social codes, are created by men, originating in individual decisions determined by the present location of importance. However, it is by no means necessary to conclude that the decisions must remain private. In Whitehead's succinct statement:

> If we could obtain a complete analysis of meaning, the notion of pure privacy would be seen to be self-contradictory. Emotional feeling is still subject to the third metaphysical principle, that to be 'something' is 'to have the potentiality for acquiring real unity with other entities.'" (PR 324).

According to Whitehead all actualities are in relational communication so that objectivity obtains as a necessary metaphysical aspect of the activities of entities in the world. Thus although all decisions are subjectively originated from some individual perspective, any can be communicated. Consequently any judgment can be publicly and critically discussed. Indeed Whitehead has stated this conclusion concisely and unambiguously: "All origination is private. But what has been thus originated, publicly pervades the world." (PR 472 and see Chap. I, Sec. B). The imputation of subjectivism in ethics, or indeed of epistemological skepticism, need only arise in a doctrine that holds the additional belief that what is privately originated cannot be communicated. Here the individually originated perspectives cannot be subsequently shared or held in common. This theory in ethical translation does indeed effect a kind of ethical solipsism. But this is a dogma and one which is clearly refused by Whitehead.

Basically the outcome of any doctrine that holds that ethical standards originate from individual decisions depends upon the analysis of the self. To Whitehead, the self is a relational individuality, whereas certain theories of extreme individualism take it to be a self-enclosed independently existing entity. (See Chap. II, Sec. E). Whitehead critically notes the effect of this latter doctrine to ethical theory, precisely the difficulty that has been erroneously attributed to him: "The doctrine of minds, as independent substances, lead directly not merely to private worlds of experience, but also to private worlds of morals. The moral intuitions can be held to apply only to the strictly private world of psychical experience." And Whitehead adds, also critically, "The western world is now suffering from the limited moral outlook of the three previous generations." (SMW 195).

Elsewhere Whitehead states that "What is known in secret must be...

verified in common. The immediate conviction of the moment in this way justifies itself as a rational principle enlightening the objective world." (RM 133). In short, Whitehead is insisting that something that is subjectively originated can be objectively real and communally known just in so far as all individuals are relationally available to some other individuals. The conclusion as respects the subjectively originated ethical code is assumed to be obvious.

In his ethical analysis on the social level Whitehead implies the further judgment that even when an ethical code is accepted as relevant and binding in that particular society, it cannot totally guide actions. This would be Whitehead's particular recognition of the familiar philosophical awareness that although ethical theories can make general recommendations, they cannot claim to advise individuals in particular situations. Every situation is unique and requires a contextual evaluation. One cannot claim to have reduced all particular duties to a stated clarity and manageableness. This claims too much, and is, in truth, absurd. Precisely because the criteria are general and each situation is ultimately particular, contextual interpretation is always necessary, although, to be sure, often difficult. An individual must form his own evaluation as to the best manner of achieving the general goals in any particular situation. Such attention stresses the genuine moral requirement to attend to the particular needs of each individual as an individual and not simply as an instance of a generalized group; a dehumanising sentiment. This attention is the claim of love and is paramount in an ethics based on concern for the importance of individuals, as Whitehead's ethics undeniably is.

There can of course be some general formal <u>conditions</u> established for achieving value, as Whitehead does recognize: that is, there are certain

general values that all moral codes should be inclusive of, namely the values of harmony and of love. However, how the values can be specifically actualized will differ in each historical situation and for each society. And, moreover, the very meanings of 'harmony' and of 'love' will themselves develop and change since the meaning of concepts is dependent upon what is learned from their enactment in experience. (See Chap. I, Sec. I and above, Sec. C). It is surely nonsense to imagine that even a single person's understanding of the meaning of 'love' or 'harmony' does not develop as his experience and the experience of the race develops. As one of its higher insights the world at some point in history understood that God is love. And indeed, as Whitehead says, the history of the world divides at this point.

A theory which disputes these notions may do so by attempting to give content to the notion of what acts in particular are good or evil (as for example is done in the Ten Commandments). This however would limit the creative development in ethical awareness that Whitehead thinks is a requirement for ethical progress. Or the ethics may be purely formal and then ought not claim that it can give concrete direction for particular ethical situations. It can claim only that it presents the formal conditions that any ethical act must fill as a necessary but not sufficient condition. It would contradict its own legitimate intention if it assumed a material role.

Section E. Freedom and Tolerance: Adventure as a Value

The consequences of Whitehead's denial that absolute and unchanging moral codes can be formulated in content are revelatory of further ethical implications. As against the evil suppression of freedom that is a consequence of the dogmatic claims to final certainty made by absolutistic ethics,

Whitehead stresses the necessity for tolerance towards the novel opinions of individuals; his emphasis on the social value of what he calls 'adventure'. Finite minds aware of the limits of finitude cannot claim to predict definitively which suggested innovation, if any, will have real future value. The future universe, including its ethical dimension, cannot be totally known to men, not only because men are finite and therefore have partial ignorance, as Locke suggests, but essentially because ultimate novelty cannot be mechanically predicted. In his own statement Whitehead asserts that "The duty of tolerance is our finite homage to the abundance of inexhaustible novelty which is awaiting the future..." (AI 59). For this reason Whitehead holds the quality of adventure, openness to novelty, to be a necessary element in a civilized society.

It is Whitehead's estimate that freedom, which is the claim for adventure beyond the safe stipulated limits socially accepted, "Haunts the higher civilizations." (AI 280). The obligation to allow creative introduction of new values applies on all levels of social products. In particular, Whitehead holds that the freedom of adventure is necessary for positive morality and for religious doctrine, thus denouncing the possibility of static maintenance in those areas which are the most usual locations of conservatism. Whitehead is well aware, as above noted, that such innovations can produce initial disorder in societies. But he maintains the existence of values higher than the maintenance of any particular, and necessarily incomplete, order.

Some novel events however may produce a conflict that lacks the possibility of being reformed into a harmonious community. As Whitehead states this, "Insistence on birth at the wrong season is the trick of evil." (PR 341). Nonetheless we cannot pronounce the event finally evil, for it may occur that the future order will find a place for this

remembered event and incorporate its significance within that society, establishing a community based on this memory. As Whitehead notes, the presupposition of slavery was a commonplace for social thinkers in the ancient world, whereas the presupposition of freedom is presently a commonplace in Western society, being one of its deepest communal premises. But the idea is at least 2000 years old and was revolutionary and destructive in its place of origin.

Whitehead is also aware that there is a certain amount of unity and stability necessary within a society, since he finds that "there is a degree of instability which is inconsistent with civilization." (SMW 208). This necessary stability however is not to be confused with the search for security and homogeneity, either within a society or among nations, wrongly believed to be a psychological and factual prerequisite to social peace: "The middle class pessimism over the future of the world comes from a confusion between civilization and security. ...On the whole, the great ages have been unstable ages." (SMW 208).

In the creative ethics that Whitehead expresses, freedom to evoke new values is itself conceived as a value, since enactment of all other goods is conditional on the activity of freedom. In short, "life in its essence is the gain of intensity through freedom." (PR 164). Thus on the human level the creative use of freedom is itself an ethical obligation, for, it will be recalled, "God's purpose in the creative advance is the evocation of intensities." (PR 161). This notion that freedom itself is a value can be contrasted with the views of an absolutistic type of ethics which holds obedience as the highest value and does not transcend the ethics of law. There such freedom to create new values that Whitehead recommends in his notion of adventure is not ethically admissible, the absolute moral laws and the consequent duties being claimed as final. Thus in

so far as Whitehead's ethical theory stresses the value and obligation of creative freedom, it is not to be classified as an ethics of law but, as above suggested, an ethics of creativity. And in so far as this emphasis derives from Whitehead's claim that God's purpose is to evoke satisfaction through such activity, it is clear that a new conception of God is here implied. God does not claim obedience as the highest relational value of man to himself, nor does he claim worship to be such; rather, he wills mans freedom and creativity as completing his own purpose. (See Chap. IV, Sec. C).

Section F. Ethical Duties of Individuals

It is at present necessary to elaborate the analysis of the ethical duties and obligations as referrent to individual men, and to discover how the individual may form himself to be able to perform such duties. The analysis will ultimately appear as a discussion on this level of the two values Whitehead claims must underlie all ethical aims and actions—the values of harmony and love. As is true of Plato, among others, Whitehead's metaphysical categories have an intended coherence and generality that allows parallel analysis to be given on the level of society and of the individual as regards proper ethical development. Nonetheless the implication is an analogical one and not thoroughly parallel in certain aspects. An example occurs in regard to ethical responsibility. A society is not an ethical individual or a single ethically independent reality. And this is, for example, why every German, as indeed every human, can feel personal guilt for the existence of Nazi Germany although they do not in the same manner genuinely feel guilt concerning Hitler's existence, he being an ethically autonomous individual. To insist that the analyses of societies and of individuals from the ethical perspective are necessarily in all

respects parallel would be to beg many important questions that are the precise questions that must be independently answered. Certainly one may claim that individuals are the microcosm of which society is the macrocosm, but the language is metaphorical and not directive as respects particular categoreal determinations.[12] If it is taken to be so, insufficiencies in analysis develop, as is indeed occasionally the case with Whitehead's own discussions. (See above, Chap. II). Thus an independent ethical analysis on the level of individual obligations and duties will be necessary.

It is ascertainable that Whitehead's recommendation to combine a pervasive order with the ability to provoke creative response and evocation of novelty is obligatory on the individual level as well as on the social level. For as noted extensively, meaning is developed in relationship. Thus although in general an individual must achieve a certain stability of self direction in order to be an effective agent for himself and for others, as his experience develops, his understanding will modify his past evaluations. Ethically the individual ought not to claim that he has achieved a rigid or final content of valuations, for to do so is to pass into the evil of narrowness, "the lower experience". (See Chap. II, Sec. G). As one's aims become increasingly developed and defined through different experiences creatively responded to, their very meaning changes and may in the extreme case be individually rejected as evil. This is to a certain extent in agreement with Aristotle's notion that one achieves an ethical character and ethical knowledge by doing ethical acts. It extends the notion to include the recognition that what was formerly evaluated as ethical can be later seen as evil or as inferior to new values subsequently

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[12]To be sure, this claim itself represents a discovery and cannot be treated as a truism in philosophical methodology. The microcosm-macrocosm analyses are however quite characteristic of Whitehead.

encountered and admitted into comparison. The experience is, I think, a common one, although when it occurs late in the individual's life is often productive of an unresolved ('neurotic') conflict rather than of an actualized resolution to change one's perspective functionally. In so far as this conflict remains, it is destructive and according to Whitehead's assessment, evil, decreasing intensity and energy of experience. One has the ethical obligation to evoke the creative energy to broaden his subjective ordering of values to include the new and larger ethical insight.

To introduce the analysis of specific ethical obligations on the individual level within a society, it is perhaps advisable to note the general fact that some amount of individual social consciousness and willingness to perform certain social duties is necessary for a human society to obtain in the first place. This must be an obvious point. Thus it is singularly peculiar to register astonishment at discovering the existence of social consciousness in some particular society, ordinarily a so-called primitive society that one is encountering, say as an anthropologist. For if <u>some</u> social consciousness did not exist, there would be no such society. Thus it is not as important that Whitehead's metaphysics affords an exceptionally lucid explanation of the real existence of social relation as that it enables him to go on to stress the <u>value</u> that such community has to every individual. In this respect he claims that the value is beyond the merely functional or practical value of utility for survival power. Like Spinoza, Whitehead claims that individuals are essential aids to each other in individual self development. Thus one's true self-interest, if correctly understood, can be known to be necessarily dependent upon relation with others and on their well being. In intentional isolation of interest, (a type of intentional solipsism), no individual can achieve genuine self realization. True individuality requires relation to what is beyond the narrow self. (See

Chap. II, Sec. G). Of course even in community the indeterminate number of potential values cannot be actualized but, Whitehead claims, this can be approached more effectively than in isolation and, of course, more extensively. And new values arise communally that are definitially impossible of individual creation, for example friendship or loyalty, among numerous others.

It is therefore doubtful that Whitehead would recommend that the level of moral and social virtue be transcended to a level of isolated intellectual virtue as Aristotle, for example, did. In this sense the naturalistic aspects of Whitehead's metaphysics would prevail more strongly than did Aristotle's, Aristotle not being always aware of the influence of the Greek tradition upon his thought. It will be recalled as one supporting example of this above suggestion that to Whitehead, "wisdom is knowledge in action." (AE 43). One's highest virtue and happiness will be realized in some society, if realized at all. Since human individuals, like all individuals, are essentially and naturally social, as the extent of relationships is increased, the individual realization is increased. The recommendation is clearly to expand relations, not, against Aristotle, to transcend the need for relations to some supposed individual and self-sufficient activity. There is no such activity. And there is no experience and relationship in which one cannot learn something, although to be sure there are degrees of probable significance.

Thus it must be true that to Whitehead a society is not formed by an arbitrary 'contract' to aid the selfish desires of the component individuals but is rather a natural expression of the essential relatedness of all actualities and arises out of the sharing of some subjectively important common interest. Whitehead states that in the solitariness of what is called religious consciousness (the individual self confrontation and self

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judgment of character), "The spirit asks, What in the way of value is the attainment of life? And it can find no such value till it has merged its individual claim with that of the objective universe." (RM 59).

Whitehead holds that such a decision to refer one's own interest to the interest of the universe is based on a religious insight. God, according to Whitehead, "is that element in virtue of which our purposes extend beyond values for ourselves to values for others. He is that element in virtue of which the attainment of such a value for others transforms itself into value for ourselves." In short, "He is the binding element in the world." (RM 152). And thus Whitehead, reflecting the pervasive contemporary interest in loyalty as a value, characteristically extends the scope of its object to the conclusion that "Religion is world loyalty." (RM 59). Such a religious vision issues in the moral insight that individual worth of character is beyond "obvious happiness or obvious pleasure." (RM 77-78).

Religion as meant by Whitehead does not refer to adherence to any traditional doctrine as a social act but rather characterizes the inner commitment of the individual. Such a commitment, beyond egoism in its transcendence of the interests of the narrow self, is essentially what religion is to Whitehead: "Religion is the art and the theory of the internal life of man...this doctrine is the direct negation of the theory that religion is primarily a social fact." (RM 16). If this doctrine seems to us to be extreme, it may be because of the obvious and dangerous truth that present so-called religious commitments have largely embraced the other extreme.

It is not possible adequately to discuss Whitehead's implied ethical theory without various references to the foundation of ethical insight, namely to the religious dimension of the spirit. As noted above, ethical insight derives from the intuition of peace, "the sublimination of the

egoistic aim by its inclusion of the transcendent whole." (AI 293). This is one of the factors productive of progress in the civilized world as well as in the individual's moral development. The claim of this relation requires no defense--its denial seemingly would. In this intuition of peace there is the recognition of the permanence of ideal aims and the faith in the eventual achievement of progress in the fineness of experience by "a grasp of infinitude, an appeal beyond boundaries." (AI 284). This vision announces the claim and the obligation of love, the passion that Whitehead calls "the love of mankind as such." (AI 284). In Platonic fashion, Whitehead holds that "the test of the better nature...is that love passes from selfishness to devotion. The higher forms of love break down the narrow self-regarding motives." (AI 286).

The above discussion presents various implications for a plausible analysis of justice from a Whiteheadian ethical perspective. It would seem that in the ethical, as against the legal, dimension of experience justice in human relations must be understood as conditional on the higher value of love. For it seems plausible that Whitehead could relate his concept of justice to the permanent ethical value he has identified as harmony or order, the commitment of an individual to increase social well-being. However to Whitehead the absolute value of love is higher than that of harmony. As against the preoccupation of justice with social order, love is concerned with the individual's well being and value. In this respect Whitehead's evaluation of the ethical centrality of justice would for example oppose Plato's estimate of its primacy. And this is certainly sensible. In so far as Plato's interest was primarily referrent to <u>social</u> well-being, justice would be his central concern. Justice, however, in its integrity, is intentionally impersonal and Whitehead's primary interest in the value of <u>individuals</u> requires the transcendence of the level of justice to the claim of

love. In society, this would require justice as a condition for its achievement; it is however not sufficient to attain perfect social relations as Whitehead sees them.

Holding love then as higher than justice, it would follow that, in the extreme example, one ought to respond with love in a situation where he has had evil or hatred directed against himself. For to respond with hate, and its characteristic violence, is to increase individual suffering and thus decrease the value in the world. Destruction is always evil. To call such activities expressions of justice, just revenge, or to term them punishment would be euphenistic to Whitehead. That such activities have been interpreted as the expressions of justice on the divine level, paradigmatically by Dante, would suggest to Whitehead an extreme moral inferiority inherent in all doctrines built on the analogy of Heaven and Hell. (See below).

The justice in punishment would ethically obtain only if the act could be productive of some eventual benefit and improvement to the sinner. But eternal damnation, or its secular equivalent--capital punishment, instructs nobody except perhaps by an evocation of fear. This however is not moral education, and if one thinks that it is, he has tacitly reduced morality to legality. Certainly one may argue that in not returning evil for evil the individual 'represses' desires for vengeance that may decrease his own future ethical concern or energy. This may, for example, produce a slavish sense of injury or resentment arising from a feeling of wounded self-love--sentiments which Nietzsche critically and profoundly analyzed. But this argument, far from proving that it would be moral for the individual to decrease his sense of resentment by acting on it, would on the contrary serve to show clearly that the individual is simply not yet truly moral.

If psychologists combine to teach that this attainment of true moral consciousness is rare, we are, of course, not astonished. But even were it to be suggested that the attainment is not ever fully possible to man, the concept is nonetheless valuable as what may be called a heuristic concept, functioning, in Whitehead's language, as the ideal limit. This limit concept is the guide and judge of action. For ethical achievement is surely a matter of degree; it need not be possible of absolute attainment for the commands to function purposively. Perhaps this was Plato's occasional attitude to his Ideal State. Whitehead appears to hold that absolute ethical perfection cannot be reached in the temporal world. This is concluded from a perspective already discussed and here extended. Morality is a matter of knowledge as well as of emotional commitment, and as elsewhere concluded, total knowledge is not ever available to the finite being.

Section G. Ethical Evaluation of Individuals

It is an important question whether or not an individual can achieve ethical perfection as respects his emotional commitment even though it is necessarily true that intellectually he will always fall short of total ethical knowledge. As Aristotle long ago taught, morality requires the education of the self towards the point where one does receive pleasure in doing that which is virtuous, pain at effecting evil. For his own reasons, in particular the belief that inclination or desire could never be directed towards unselfish attention to duty, Kant denied that such a result could ever obtain. Whitehead, it would seem, intends to imply that in the true ethical experience of love, as achieved in the intuition of peace, such an inclination towards goodness could be attained. The intuition raises the individual's ethical perspective beyond the trivial conflict of egoism or

altruism. The self's interests, as the true self, makes no value priority or distinction of concern between his own happiness and that of others. One could then no more desire to harm the other through effecting evil and suffering than he could (unless pathological) wish to harm himself. Of course the attainment of such feelings is, again, profoundly difficult, perhaps inevitably rare. Plato's Philosopher King, returning to service in the social world, would perhaps be motivated by such an extremity of virtue. The virtue is aristocratic as respects the spiritual dimension and is, in this dimension, what Berdyaev calls "the aristocracy of sacrificial service."

And further, if such a commitment to ethical service produces a sense of congratulatory self-righteousness, an estimation of sacrificial martyrdom in the individual, his moral education is still defective. Any feeling that elicits an evaluation of moral superiority issuing in moral self-righteousness is an ethically inferior sentiment. The evil of such emotions has been profoundly exposed in the literature of Ibsen, Strindberg and Lawrence, among others. The judgment of one's own superiority, as indeed most judgments of character, ordinarily would originate from comparatively evaluating one's own moral character against that of others. However, from Whitehead's stress on the complexity and uniqueness of every individual, one could suggest that any judgment of another individual, moral or otherwise, is to some degree imprecise and blind. If the individual is alive, the judgment could be influential and destructive.

A deeply rooted ethical problem must be here identified. The problem refers to the difficulty of knowing what is and what is not one's proper ethical concern--the decision as to the just extension of one's influence. (Sometimes, to be sure, we are not aware of the influence we are producing; but this case will not concern us here, not because it is not an ethical problem, but because it is a different one.) By choosing to judge or to

influence another in some particular situation, one can in fact destroy the individual's achieved unity of aim by disorienting his trust in that commitment. And it may be that the individual is incapable of a new and higher reorientation; although it may still be correct, with Socrates, that on the highest level, "An unexamined life is not worth living." The tolerance that Whitehead suggests as a virtue on the social level must be applicable here to effect the recommendation that one refrain from such total judgments of others with the humble recognition that one's own judgment is limited. It is derived from an individual perspective that may lack insight into the valuations achieved from another's different perspective; and both may be ethical.

Regardless of what acts an individual effects, one cannot claim fully to know his aim or intentions, or to understand his unique vision of the ethical situation. The genius often appears popularly as the evil person mainly because his novel vision cannot be comprehended within any categories of positive evaluation then available--a fact to which the fates of Socrates and Christ furnish the traditional and shattering testimony. Of course, it is true that we are always judging others, and ought to do so, particularly in relations of chosen love and relations of duty. For judgment is one manner of teaching and love--in one perspective--is the desire to teach and a trust in the good will of the two so related. But what we ought to judge is the particular act or situation effected, a quite different thing from claiming to judge the individual in terms of his character.

Perhaps the genuine humility and decision to refrain from final judgment of another arises from a recommendation of the type that is focused in the Christian command to "Judge not"--judgment is the province of God, as it is of Whitehead's God, (see Chap. IV). As paradigmatically exemplified in Ibsen's Peer Gynt, one cannot predict just who it is that will be

saved, all human judgments of apparent conclusiveness being only general guesses. Such judgments cannot be exhaustively definitive of any individual, each being particular and unique. Whitehead leads one to the conclusion that in respect to ethical evaluation, to some degree we are all Socrates' "pretended judges" as contrasted by Plato with the "true judges". To be sure, there are various degrees of accuracy in judgment, implying the consequence that there can be improvement in ethical insight. This is the moral incentive in the world towards such improvement, with an ever present humility guiding this aim--the reference is to the ontology of hope. (See below, Sec. K).

Section H. Wisdom as a Virtue

Returning to the claim that the element of adventure is necessary for moral progress, it appears that the possession of wisdom is, to Whitehead, a necessary component of adventure. For Whitehead has said, "Duty arises from our potential control over the course of events. Where attainable knowledge could have changed the issue, ignorance has the guilt of vice." (AE 26). Consequently education, including self knowledge, achieves ethical significance and becomes an ethical obligation, as the Greeks well knew. Morality must aim at greatness of experience--according to Whitehead "moral education is impossible apart from the habitual vision of greatness. The sense of greatness is the ground work of morals." (AE 77). To Whitehead "greatness" or wisdom signifies both intellectual achievement and definite ethical achievement. It is, for example, his estimate that historically, "The folly of intelligent people, clear-headed and narrow-visioned, has precipatated many catastrophes." (AI 55). The urgency and moral concern in these remarks are noteworthy.

Whitehead, in Platonic fashion, has clearly related human virtue and

greatness to the possession of wisdom. And like Plato, (although this is commonly obscured), Whitehead holds that wisdom has both theoretical and practical expression: "The importance of knowledge lies in its use, in our active mastery of it--that is to say, it lies in wisdom." (AE 43). It is entirely obvious that the general criterion of width of vision required for moral behavior, see Chaps. I and II and below), is productive of wisdom: "Wisdom is proportional to the width of evidence made effective in the final self-determination..[the] persistent pursuit of the deeper understanding, ever confronting intellectual system with the importance of its omissions." (AI 54-55). And further: "The triumph of consciousness comes with the negative intuitive judgment. In this case there is a conscious feeling of what might be, and is not." (PR 417). Freedom of thought, which Whitehead relates to "speculative reason", is specifically linked to moral and religious experience: "The passionate demand for freedom of thought" is according to Whitehead, "a tribute to the deep connection of speculative Reason with religious intuitions." (FR 66 and see Chap. I, Sec. E).

Thus Whitehead has concluded that "the ultimate moral claim that civilization lays upon its possessors is that they transmit, and add to, [the] reserve of potential development by which it has profited." For it is only such freedom of speculation, an aspect of the adventure of the spirit, that can introduce the novel ideas which are productive of social and individual progress. In short, such an adventurous use of reason has the "character of reaching after the upward trend" (FR 23), so that there is, according to Whitehead, "a strong moral intuition that speculative understanding...is one of the ultimate elements in the good life." (FR 38),

It is assumed that this intended profusion of quotations from Whitehead has itself produced the testimony to his conviction that wisdom,

as inclusive of intellectual and ethical achievements, is a possession of truly moral individuals. As Whitehead does occasionally suggest, to a certain extent the obligation to attain wisdom is a non-social obligation; it has direct relation to the individual but may have only eventual value for the society indirectly. One prepares himself for occasions that may never arise. Nonetheless, ultimately the preparation is ethical, arising from concern for what may occur in the unpredictable future.

Morality also includes the partially non-social obligation or duty to increase one's understanding of human emotions and passions, both good and evil, by openness to their exhibitions and by recognition of such elements in one's own self. To be sure, the latter recognition, a type of ethical self-knowledge, can be uniquely painful. But it is only by increased self-consciousness of one's own ethical experience that genuine sympathy and ethical understanding of others is attained. This is in part the moral value of great art, which testifies to the intensity and variety of human emotions--good and evil--without any obscurationist prejudice or intention. One first understands jealosy with the aid of Othello, perhaps recognizes then the passion within his own self, and is certainly better able to achieve a depth of understanding and sympathy with another individual in the irrational abyss of this central human passion.

A further individual ethical duty of a non-social nature is the requirement that one obtain some understanding of the development of human history. In this manner, any novelty which is individually introduced is not merely productive of change but involves an inclusion and transcendence of what was known in the past. Many supposedly original proposals would be curtailed if they were known as the duplication of things that had been attempted and were previously productive of evil. Of course, it is possible that the social situation may have so changed that the evil would not again

occur, (as Whitehead surely would have critically reminded me). It is, for all purposes, certainly useless to act as if the past had no lessons to teach, whether for reapplication or rejection. In regard to education Whitehead notes that "Whatever be the subject which we teach, our main task is to inculcate how to inherit, appreciatively and critically;...[to learn] how to face the future with the aid of the past." (ESP 212). There is implied here the recognition that a creatively evolving society must inherit from the past and build on it. Evolution is progressive by intentional direction.

Section I. Moral Progress: Courage and Sacrifice

Referrent to this notion of moral progress, I shall begin an explanation of a plausible concept of courage from the Whiteheadian perspective. This ethical value is one which the ancients highly honored in philosophy and elsewhere, but which has received scant attention from moderns--suggestions as to the causality here decisive would be trivial unless extensive. The virtue is seriously pertinent to the modern world and would, I believe, be a central one in Whitehead's ethics.

Whitehead recommends the ethical necessity, above noted, of understanding the existence of greatness in human aims and acts as sporadically illustrated in history. This recognition would be possible on any view of man that is not prejedicial. It could help deter the conclusion that human experience must mean the trivial experience of individuals as leveled by a homogeneous bourgeois acceptance of, and contentment with, things as they are. Distinctions, if there made, are not given in qualitative terms, (that is, the referrent frame of values are not questioned), although perhaps a quantatative increase of the distrubition of the alleged values is demanded. However ethically one would frequently re-evaluate the accepted structure in order to continuously substantiate the aim at individual fineness and

integrity. And Whitehead would note that these qualitatively improved values must be consistently exemplified in both statement and action, or ought to be so.

The available examples of human greatness are, according to Whitehead, one of the means of evoking the urge towards individual integrity by recognition of the strength of courage as possessed by special historical figures, rarely but truly. Courage does not reside in a passive or pessimistic submission to life as it is. This is pseudo-heroism: an agreement to accept a life of low values because it is assumed to be incapable of improvement. Courage is rather, Whitehead implies, the ability to adventurously aim toward creative improvement, no particular shackles of evil being accepted as necessarily final. Despite the overwhelming testimony of particular tragic epochs, there is a moral order in the world to be actualized by the creative introduction of novelty. And one does not create <u>in spite of</u> the tragedy but, so-to-speak, by accepting it. This is the aim to transcend the particular tragic situation if any such action is still at all possible.

It requires the courageous decision to renounce one's secure position in the traditional social structure of one's environment and to risk ostracism and isolation, the risk of being foresaken by one's social world. The example of Socrates is inescapably pertinent. Furthermore, such nobility of sacrifice must not be interpreted as a martydom which produces values only beyond one's self, if at all. Socrates did not die only <u>for</u> his ideals but in order to uphold these ideals, a positive value. It is history that has made him into a figure available for pity. And it is <u>we</u> who pity him. This attitude is totally unrevelatory of the profounder aspect of the meaning of his death: the dignity of sacrificial service to virtue. (From Phaedo, present at Socrates' death: "I did not pity him,...he died so

fearlessly, and his words and bearing were so noble and gracious...).

In the extreme, Whitehead notes that courage accepts the final risk: for according to Whitehead "It belongs to the depth of the religious spirit to have felt foresaken, even by God." (RM 19). And here Christ is the historically permanent example. As Whitehead suggests, other examples are available in history. The liberty is here taken to extend illustration by a series of quotations tastefully and eloquently explanatory of Whitehead's implied meaning of courage. From Berdyaev:

> Chivalry is eternal by the task laid upon it. It brought into the world heroic values: the value of sacrificial honour and sacrificial loyality. Personality was forged in chivalry. ...The morality of chivalry is a morality of values and therefore is in profound contrast to all bourgeois-democratic morals of well-being and order,... The knight sacrifices himself and his goods but never sacrifices value: to value he remains absolutely true.

Again this is placed in contrast with the "bourgeois sacrifice of creativeness for the sake of good order and well-being..."[13] From Professor Buchler, in a uniquely sensitive and precise analysis of Don Quixote, knight:

> The Don...by a metaphysics that was crude but not vulgar ...knew that deed as well as word exemplified judgment, and his own endlessly committed judgment reflected itself in a life that was all of one piece. Having experienced intensely, perhaps madly, he perceived the affinity of action and statement and art, and was dedicated to the fulfillment of his utterance in all of these possible forms. Nor could he outlive the division of his indivisible existence, capitulating wholly, in perfect consistency, unlike his reformers who would eventually leave this life without a like submission to the testimony of experience.[14]

And here it is deferrent and perhaps appropriate to note Professor Hocking's description of Whitehead's thought as being itself "a knightly adventure of

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[13] N. Berdyaev, The Meaning of the Creative Act, New York, Collier Books, 1962, pp. 246-47.

[14] J. Buchler, op. cit., Nature and Judgment, p. 54-55.

ideas."[15]

In sum then it may be said that to Whitehead the courageous heroism of adventurous creativity in both thought and action is ethically necessary in order to introduce greater goods for the world, even at the risks of social isolation or death. One must transcend the given law through the integrity of his own novel vision, even when one's "obvious happiness" might be judged at stake from a perspective lower than the perspective of courage. In Berdyaev's statement, "Egoism and cowardice are inwardly related."[16]

Of course, one may be forced, or force himself, to sacrifice for no valuable ethical purpose whatsoever, and with Mill against an extreme and distorted Stoicism, this type of sacrifice is purely destructive, evil and meaningless. To Whitehead all life and the energy of life has inherent value. Individual life however is not the highest value and there can be occasions where death or chosen isolation is the ethically noble choice, as above illustrated. But no man ought to be able to make and enforce this choice for another. The countless number of dead and dying slaves is an ineradicable testimony to human sinfulness, the sin of destroying meaning at its foundation. As Whitehead puts this recognition, when individuals are socially entitled to use brutal force against other individuals, consciousness of "the Souls of Men" (AI 87) has been omitted.

The use of persuasion, by contrast, produces "a greater bond of sympathy" and eventually leads to a "reverence" of the value of conscious individuals that "is the foundation of the respect for man as man." (AI 93).

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[15] W.E. Hocking, "Whitehead on Mind and Nature," in P.A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, 2nd. ed., New York, Tudor Publishing Company, 1961, p. 404.

[16] N. Berdyaev, op. cit., The Meaning of the Creative Act, p.245.

In the past and the yet only partially civilized present, when any such action of brutal destruction appears necessary, as in war, we simply, as Whitehead puts it, "avoid the term 'murder.'" (MT 20). Socially we legislate and socially agree not to legally condemn the act as we would condemn murder. Moral consciousness however, cannot be legislated--and it is conscience of this sort that produces social revolutions. And this in spite of the fact that at the time of the introduction of a novel and critical idea the individual, more likely than not, will be considered an enemy of society.

But one must recognize the weight of natural necessity. There do exist situations of an evil or tragic character that one can no longer do anything to alleviate. Here, as Daniel Williams points out in his valuable essay on ethical obligation in process philosophies, one can only invoke himself as a "witness to integrity when no significant moral choice is possible."[17] Such witnessing will itself have effects of a moral significance on future events in so far as any individual decision or expression is also a judgment and affects others in a similar way (ontologically) as do actions. The statement that the universe is essentially social and relational does not refer only to direct actional influence but to interrelations of all types. Thus a feeling which does not result either in action or in outward expression is nonetheless a judgment and has influence since one's feelings influence his own actions in the future. As Whitehead knew, but Plato for example, did not, there is not a radical split between feelings and intellect. Ultimately our choices flow from our feelings, in the higher beings by an interrelation of the forces of desire and intellect. These

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[17] D. Williams, "Moral Obligation in Process Philosophy," Journal of Philosophy, LVI, 1959, p. 270.

points combine to assert the moral significance of conscience and the ethical obligation one has as respects any feeling he freely creates. One's feelings are his own ethical responsibility simply and adequately because, as Whitehead well knew, they are formative of one's decisions. To Whitehead, interest guides all choices and interest is at ground an emotional decision. (See Chaps. I and II).

Section J. The Ethical Commitment: Its Foundation

It must be here noted, to be extensively discussed below, that to Whitehead the fundamental ethical intuition of peace involves a recognition of tragedy as well as issuing in the positive experience of love and concern. This recognition is an inherent element in the deeper moral insight. It is therefore true, according to Whitehead's claims, that as one increases the extent and depth of his moral sensitivity there is a coincident increase in his suffering--an extension of empathy with the suffering of others. To be sure there is achieved a deeper level of satisfaction and hope if the suffering is occasionally transcended, but further suffering continuously occurs in its ever deepening forms. This recognition is not profound; everybody knows this, for the development of the race is in this respect paralleled by individual development from childhood toward the goal of mature relations with increased sensitivity of the self towards the world. It is when one inquires as to why the decision to ethically commit oneself to the deeper dialectic of increased suffering and increased hope of significance is individually willed that profundity can enter. Mill's statement that all men have inherently a sense of dignity is the barest answer, a purely formal answer. And Mill's statements lack insight into the terrifying painfulness of the decision. Whitehead's response, implied by various doctrines, would seem to involve a religious recognition.

One envisions a sense of man's dignity, himself included, in the experience of the creative possibilities and the responsibility of actualizing the ideals potentially present in the divine nature. Dignity arises in the recognition of oneself as part-creator of the world, as possessing a type of freedom which is such that whatever one does he is exerting influence and an influence that is in fact everlasting. This sense of responsibility and dignity thus achieved is a profound and shocking revelation. It could indeed evoke a thorough-going re-evaluation of the meaning of the human self as respects its task. This insight, when coupled with a love of mankind, provokes the ethical decision to widen consciousness and openness to experience despite the recognition that the passion towards greatness and intensity of experience is ultimately painful in its tragic revelations.

Freedom is no longer conceived as a right but as an obligation. In the intuition of peace, at ground a religious experience, the individual is able to open himself to the recognition of the inevitable tragic elements in life and enabled to accept and justify them by their significance as an urge towards higher aims. As Whitehead states this, peace as the intuition of the permanence of values, "sees the tragedy as a living agent persuading the world to aim at fineness beyond the faded level of surrounding fact." In short, peace is the understanding of tragedy, the grasp "of the service of tragedy," and this understanding produces "the purification of the emotions." (AI 285).

It must be noticed that this understanding of tragedy achieved in the intuition of peace ultimately refers to the recognition of the ethical claim of love, also achieved in the understanding of peace. Together they combine to produce the motive force for ethical commitment, aimed towards the increase of harmony and value of experience among human individuals.

The existence of such love and faith in man is referrent from Whitehead's emphasis on God's relation of love to man and his refusal to interpret God as commanding obedience and ruling through fear. As the lure for feeling and the initial object of desire, God's love persuades the awakening of the passion of love in man:

> The power of God is the worship he inspires. ...and worship is a surrender to the claim for assimilation, urged with the motive force of mutual love. The vision never over-rules. It is always there, and it has the power of love presenting the one purpose whose fulfillment is eternal harmony. (SMW 192).

And elsewhere Whitehead states that "If the modern world is to find God, it must find him through love and not through fear." (RM 73). And it would seem that Whitehead is correct. Given the chaotic evil exhibited in the modern world, if one attempts to find God through fear, he is perhaps more than likely to find the Devil. And this without any effort at all on the part of the Devil.

Thus the religious experience of peace enables one's transcendence of the tragic suffering and evil in the world by the offer of faith in the permanence of values achievable through love. Without this intuition of peace, Whitehead suggests that ethical commitment would be impossible. For without the intuition life would be robbed of its zest for adventure and civilization denied its reason for existence. (See AI 291). But the moral individual requires such a spirit for, as above noted, only by the introduction of novelty can life progress rather than stagnate. Thus Whitehead has concluded that "The fact of the religious vision, and its history of persistent expansion, is our one ground for optimism. Apart from it, human life is a flash of occasional enjoyments lighting up a mass of pain and misery, a bagatelle of transient experience." (SMW 192). Whitehead holds that this urge towards creative advance by the introduction of novelty, (the

function of the spirit of adventure), is a second requirement for ethical experience on the individual as well as on the social level. (See above). It, as was noted regarding the element of peace, is also related to and supported by religious experience: "The worship of God is not a rule of safety --it is an adventure of the spirit ... The death of religion comes with the repression of the high hope of adventure." (SMW 192). Thus the two qualities of peace and adventure, both essential for genuine religious experience, are also essential for individual moral experience. If the individual possesses the qualities derived from these elements, he is by virtue of this possession enabled to become a truly moral individual. He is, in this possession, a truly religious individual as well.

Again it must be recalled that to Whitehead the quality of being religious applies to the internal life of a man and not to external behavior associated with churches and subscription to their dogma. If a man is truly moral he is also religious and so too the other way around. Thus although Whitehead grounds moral insight in certain religious experiences, religion does not impose obligations on the individual that are other than, or in conflict with, ethical obligations. Thus one must not conclude that the content of ethical duties is different from the religious and from the moral perspectives. Morality is, to Whitehead, simply the practice of the claims of the religious insight. As Bradley states this same point: "If anything ought to be done, then it must be a moral duty; and the notion of religious duty, as such, outside of and capable of colliding with moral duty as such is preposterous nonsense."[18] In the history of thought however, notable philosophers and theologians have held an opposing opinion.

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[18]Bradley, op.cit., p. 168.

Kierkegaard, as a familiar example, declares that when a man is religious, his moral behavior may differ from that of a non-religious individual and may be in fact condemned from the latter perspective. Here one recalls Kierkegaard's assessment that Abraham's sacrifice of his son, commanded by God, is an act that would be condemned from the ethical perspective and yet is a right act from the religious perspective. Now it would seem that Kierkegaard makes this evaluation because he is assuming that moral judgments and standards are always fixed and inflexible whereas he does not take this to be the case in religiously evaluated duties—as he interprets the genuine religious consciousness. There duties are always individually and uniquely evaluated. Whitehead however does not assume that the rigidity of ethical codes is a necessary situation. But, to be sure, if it were necessary, or if he thought it were so, he would probably conclude with Kierkegaard that religious duties might transcend and oppose moral duties.

If one holds that morality in any general sense cannot include creative innovation within stability, he may indeed wish to go on to claim that true obligations are in some way 'beyond good and evil', (as Nietzsche did for reasons very similiar to Kierkegaard's stated reasons). The problem only arises, and is differently solved, if one does not recognize that genuine morality is itself creative, for the original attitude to the concepts of 'good' and 'evil' is thereby limited. Whitehead, of course, does not accept the limitation.

Furthermore, it does seem as if the attitude of limitation would equally, and perhaps more justly, apply to traditional religion which produces dogmatic claims to finality that far surpass the authoritarian tradition of the ethical theories that do not have religious foundations. Kierkegaard has redefined genuine religious consciousness, and Whitehead has

also applied a similar re-evaluation to moral as well as religious consciousness. Perhaps Whitehead is being more just in so far as he begins by re-evaluating the very basis of morality, namely the notions of 'good' and 'evil' and not, like Kierkegaard, by condemning the notions to final inferiority on the ethical level.

Section K. Moral Progress

It may be that the upward trend in the universe that Whitehead envisions is partly dependent on the activity of creative morality and the inheritance of its products in time. For the mere creation of change is not at all necessarily productive of a general progress, unless indeed this is all that one means by progress, namely, change. But this is unusual and is surely not Whitehead's meaning. His statements imply the claim that development refers to change which is ethically significant. (See below). Progressive morality may perhaps be considered as a process wherein the duties that were once necessary to command later become habitually inherited through custom. In this manner creative energy can be directed towards the introduction and enactment of new and 'higher' duties. As Hegel claims in his particular theoretical description of moral evolution, in the genuine ethical community, itself not as yet actualized,

> ...when individuals are simply identified with the actual order, ethical life appears as their general mode of conduct, i.e., as custom, while the habitual practice of ethical life appears as a second nature which, put in the place of the initial, purely natural will, is the soul of custom permeating it through and through, the significance and the activity of its existence.[19]

Thus any type of moral development is by no means univocal although it can be theoretically identifiable. That such development is by no means

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[19] Hegel, op. cit., Philosophy of Right, p. 108-109

yet obvious in history in all dimensions of moral behavior cannot furthermore be taken to show that it is impossible. The serious and tragic nature of its lack can emotionally lead to pessimism concerning its possibility. But pessimism is an attitude and has no necessary or obvious ontological justification as the fundamental nature of things. In order to achieve a faith in the possibility of creative evolution in ethical development as directed by human individuals, one requires, according to Whitehead, a love or respect for men—a minimal requirement, without which it is not possible to produce the requisite faith. Here one must conceive that men can be ethically respected and morally improved, for the opposite is monstrous, evoking a type of ethical nihilism as respects this world. Such a sentiment of nihilism could obtain even within a religious perspective, shamefully exemplified for all history in the scornful cruelty of a type of Medieval Christian absolutism which condemned men as sinful and unable to improve by their own powers. This misuse of religion notwithstanding, Whitehead seems to find that a respect and love for man is necessarily based on a religious intuition, the intuition of peace. Thus it would be held by Whitehead that the experience of the love of man achieved in this intuition supports the belief that any individual can change from an evil to a good propensity, for perhaps unaccountably complex reasons—here it can be recalled as a lesson that Plato never explained how or why certain individuals do rise from the Cave world and others do not.

Thus it is abundently illustrated that and how the ethics that is implied in Whitehead's philosophy would necessarily rest on a religious foundation, as does his faith in the possible moral development in the universe. This latter faith is perhaps impossible apart from some religious convictions for it could then only be based on the actual evidence of man's

development in the process of history. And history is not inspirational. There is certainly some evidence of intellectual and creative development which men have inherited and revered and for which the humanists, as the most persuasive supporters, claim respect. But this inheritance justifies very few, and even among these other values are conspicuously absent. Albeit there is real inheritance from the past as regards mental and artistic receptivity, the passions and emotions of men receive no parallel inheritance locatable from fact. Emotionally each man begins where every man before him had begun. And perhaps, as respects moral development, later generations have been less ethically concerned. As Whitehead speculates in this respect: "There can never have been any period when the gentler modes of human relations were wholly absent. Indeed the ferocity may have been the later development, due to the increase of intelligent self-interest." (AI 76).

It must be questioned briefly whether or not, in view of historical evidence, an ethical theory without a trans-natural foundation can gain persuasive and lasting emotional or intellectual support. If ethical activity must be based on a respect for men or for human possibility, when such respect is not achieved, genuine ethical motivations could not obtain. It is doubtful that a man can sustain himself with dignity and without dehumanization in a valueless universe for if one has no respect for men, his own self is necessarily included. The query has inadvertently passed into the more general question as to whether a purely naturalistic ethics is persuasive or whether rules achieved from that perspective can have only legalistic or pragmatic force and sanction. As natural beings, men fundamentally desire their own happiness and it is, in short, not at all clear that such a desire is worthy of respect unless the <u>content</u> of that aim is so,

as Kant very persuasively argued. It is not within the writers ability, nor, and this is fortunate, within the scope of our immediate purpose, to argue the fundamentally important question as to whether an ethical theory is possible without some foundation in a trans-natural dimension.

It may be suggested as a final remark that the question is perhaps not one that can be finally decided by any general evidence but is rather decided as a postulate or a faith, a presupposition seriously balanced against the spectre of nihilism. In the last analysis the faith, without a foundation in religious belief, may be a sentiment. But this does not mean that the judgment is mistaken. The question of truth or falsity does not arise here. It is the fundamental premise--the choice of life as being significant--and any ethical argument will presuppose the premise, or it contrary. It is clear enough at any rate that Whitehead's faith in moral progress does rest on the presupposition of a religious dimension and its availability to human intuition. The further questions considered could not be argued from Whitehead's own theory because he nowhere, to my knowledge, gives suggestions as to his relevant convictions.

Section L. The Tragic Situation: Sin, Guilt and Evil

The remaining part of this chapter will be an attempt to discuss Whitehead's relevant ethical notions from the perspective of a single theme, namely the various generic situations of tragic import. No defense of the central significance of this perspective will be given. Its justifying evidence hopefully will become manifest in discussion. It will be intermittentently concluded that the tragic aspects revealed as inherent in the ethical dimension of experience can only be rationally explained by a transcendence to the religious dimension, the latter to be analysed for this purpose in Chapter Four. In the various supremely anguishing tragic situations,

religious considerations enter and to some extent alleviate the finality of the tragedy and guilt. Without the introduction of Whitehead's religious notions, particularly as respects the function of God's consequent nature, the element of irrationality which obtains in tragedy remains as final.

It is necessary to recall that Whitehead is aware that there are always boundaries to finite vision or perspective, limiting present knowledge. (See Chap. I, Sec. B). Moreover, since the universe is always creatively changing, the needs of the future are uncertain and prediction ambiguous. On the ethical level this fact evokes the consequence that an intention to produce good can produce evil due to the ambiguity of the future as respects the effects of any particular action. According to Whitehead, "Every construction of human intelligence...is more limited than was its original aim." (FR 87) and may, in this subsequent limitation, effect an evil that was not foreseen. Every act is to some degree a moral risk. If it occurs that the act produces more good than evil (within the limited perspective in which any act can be judged by men) then the act is to that degree right and justified. For given the human situation as Whitehead sees it, a right act does not have to be absolutely right but must at least produce the greatest amount of good possible in the given situation. But the evil is real.

For such reasons, it is not possible to ignore the tragic fact that human guilt will never be transcended by any individual. Even if the individual's intentions were ethical and he knows that they were so, guilt can accrue. For Whitehead implies that the consequences of an act are also the moral responsibility of the agent as producer of that act. Thus if evil consequences issue from one's act, the individual is to that extent guilty even if the intentions were otherwise. To ignore this type of guilt can

indicate an evaluation of the self as isolated from its influence in other lives. However, metaphysically the self is just such an activity of reciprocal and influential relations and therefore, ethically, an individual ought to assume the responsibility of his influence.

To ignore this type of guilt further suggests that there is a deficiency in the analysis of the relation of love. Certainly if one's intentions were truly ethical he is thus far not guilty of evil. But because the act may nonetheless produce the evil of suffering, he must, through love, assume the guilt of having caused this suffering. Without his free enactment of that deed the suffering might not have occured. Or at least not in that particular way. One must consequently distinguish between sin as an intentional act and evil as a consequence of an act producing unintended suffering. One, with Aristotle, may further want to distinguish the blameworthiness of acts done in ignorance as against those done through ignorance. The former are thorough-going ethical mistakes (sin), occuring from inattention to ethical duties--what Whitehead claims in the "narrowing of attention." The latter type acts refer to acts done when one was ignorant of particular circumstances that are relevant to the outcome of the act and that render it productive of suffering or catastrophe. Examples of the latter type situations can be found functioning as the plots of numerous Greek tragedies, Oedipus Rex being perhaps the most profound exemplary case.

Certainly we can differentiate the moral worth of an individual, estimated by the character of his intentions, as differentiated from the miscalculated effects of his acts. But the individual himself, if related to others in a bond of genuine love and sympathy, as Whitehead recommends, can feel no release from pain and guilt. Since finite individuals cannot obtain necessary rules of absolute correctness as regards any acts, one must

be prepared to accept the guilt that will accrue if an intentionally ethical act produces suffering. This applies not only to what one does do but, in fact, to what one might have done but did not. A freely chosen moral guilt must be incorporated in human consciousness as a final burden of finitude. If one is only interested in his own soul and the character of his motives, he has not fully accepted the ethical burden of individuals in a relational situation and is not yet related to individuals with the total commitment of love. Exclusive concentration on one's own self can be productive of moral egoism and self-righteousness. It may be that the human evils that such absolutistic beliefs produce is recorded with unparalleled insight in Ibsen's character Brand, in his play of that name. As an unrelenting religious moralist, Brand is identified, and rightly so, as the Devil, having through the intolerant absolutism of his beliefs caused irredeemable harm. No acts are necessarily good in all respects--and one cannot plot his own salvation by concentrating on that goal.

The misery and suffering that arises in a good man who discovers that he has unintentionally produced evil and pain in the experience of others is an irrationality that perhaps cannot be explained in human terms alone, as the Greek tragedians would seem to have early recognized. Nietzsche accused Socrates of destroying tragedy by attempting to make the ethical dimension purely rational in claiming, for example, that no evil or suffering can befall a good man, the only real evil being one's own moral corruption. And perhaps Nietzsche was correct; or perhaps there is a deeper level of tragedy, a level that is not destroyed by Socrates' ethical rationalism but indeed is first made possible on its transcendence. One ought to attempt a rationalization of ethics as far as possible, as Socrates did. When irrationality then appears, it may produce a higher level of

tragedy. A discussion of these suggestions will occupy us later.

It must also be recalled that to Whitehead all actualization requires exclusion of certain alternative possibilities, since all actualization is finite and involves limitations: "Whatever is realized in any one occasion of experience necessarily excludes the unbounded welter of contrary possibilities. There are always 'others' which might have been and are not." (AI 275). In ethical activity, one aims at broadening one's insight and actions beyond the values of the narrow self. Ultimately the aim is to achieve relations with the entire universe of values, actual and ideal, in order to knowledgeably introduce that novelty which can best increase value in the world for that particular passage. But, as discussed in Chapter II, a significant evaluation and determination of attitude toward every item of value is not possible to the finite creature always involved with some limitation of perspective. Thus men are always to some degree ignorant and limited, although to be sure, there are greater and lesser degrees, depending on the degree of effort made--morality, that is, moral obligation, is clearly operative here.

Moreover, an individual cannot act on incompatible value intuitions he may have, although some of them may be thought to have equal value. One makes some decision, presupposing its relevance and higher value, and acts on it. It may however occur that the insight was not in this case correct and the evil of destruction is inadvertently produced. The result is loss and suffering. In short, even if one does the best he can in evaluating the individual situation, it may often not be good enough. Because men are not omniscient, with value intuitions incapable of joint realization they may choose the wrong rather than the right alternative. If the struggle between values is seen as taking place in the Greek mind, Antigone is the classic example of this type of tragic conflict. For it is always tragic

to have to choose between two goods which are incompatible--and history may indicate to us that the chosen alternative was the inferior one.

Moreover, with equally ethical intentions, two individuals may have conflicting aims which cannot be harmoniously realized together although the realization is attempted: "History can only be understood by seeing it as the theatre of diverse groups of idealists respectively urging ideals incompatible for conjoint realization. The evil lies in the attempted conjunction." (AI 276). In general we may note Whitehead's conviction that "There is evil when things are at cross purposes." (RM 94) and this whether the purposes be actualized or only conceptually entertained by one or more individuals. In short, there is evil or imperfection according to Whitehead which "results from the fact that there are possibilities of harmony which either produce evil in joint realization, or are incapable of such conjunction." (AI 276).

As a final illustration of the inevitable tragic issues of life, we recall Whitehead's notion that all life requires interplay with its environment and "in the case of living societies this interplay takes the form of robbery. ...life is robbery. It is at this point that morals become acute." And, Whitehead insists, "The robber requires justification." (PR 160). This is a passionate plea for explanation of the inevitable tragedy, a certain refusal of its brute irrationality. Below we will confront Whitehead's attempted rationalization of what appears seriously irrational from the ethical perspective.

In all cases of evil there is a loss to the social environment and because this loss is consciously known, suffering is produced: "mental functioning introduces into realization subjective forms conformal to relevant alternatives excluded from the completeness of physical realization." (AI 258). It must be recognized that the individuals in such contingent but inevitable

circumstances do not themselves intend to produce evil and are not therefore sinful. The evil arises from the nature of finitude itself, the evil of the suffering produced by the destruction of what might have been but was not. In Whitehead's statement of this situation we are told that "This finiteness is not the result of evil or of imperfection. It results from the fact that there are possibilities of harmony...which experience necessarily excludes." (AI 275-76).

The inability to reach true stability from the ethical perspective produces the consequence, above discussed, that genuine ethical satisfaction cannot be reached in the finite world. This is the fate of finitude; again it is part of the very meaning of finitude in the sense that the situation is irrevocable. There exists a necessary tension between the responsibility of creative freedom and the aim for happiness or satisfaction. The individual who is the ethical individual is ipso facto unable to achieve final happiness in the temporal world since he intentionally allows the requirements of duty to make the achievement of stability impossible. A tragic and irrational recognition of the inescapable and unjust conflict between virtue and happiness is forced. To Whitehead, true self realization would require an internalizing of value relations to all individuals by extending one's own self interests and concerns to include every item in the universe. Metaphysically this is describable as the refusal to achieve relation by exclusion, that is, by negative prehension--a dismissal from one's subjective aim and interest. If such a positive completion of internalizing of relations were achieved, in a sense the individual as subject would pass over into the object and there would remain no otherness or externality of exclusion, no impersonal or objectifying relations.

Each entity does in fact include the entire universe in a fundamental metaphysical sense according to Whitehead, either, as above stated, by

positive or negative prehension of every item, that is by inclusion or rejection. In an ethical sense however, one must choose to perform this activity of internalising all relations by positive attention rather than by negative exclusion from relevance before one attends to the possibility of inclusion. This attention requires ultimately a love of mankind and a feeling of concern for every individual whose value as an individual is also a value for us. But because our perpsective is always to some degree limited, this prediction of a final annihilation of the divorce between subject and object is not actualizable on the level of finitude. As suggested, to the degree to which it is obtained, it is accomplished through a relation of love that places one's interests beyond the superficial and elementary opposition of egoism and altruism.

The doctrine is reminiscent of the Platonic eros and of various neo-Hegelian Idealists' stress on the overcoming of otherness and externality of relations. One desires to be a concrete whole of all individualities. But as both Plato and Hegel knew, this will is doomed to frustration in the finite world. From the Whiteheadian perspective here explicated, it is precisely the ethical will that commits itself to this necessary deprivation. On the aesthetic or mystical level the unity is perhaps achievable, albeit briefly. It is what Wordsworth sought and what Whitehead revered in him. But such achievement is rare.

The will as the ethical will however cannot ever be completely fulfilled in time without ignoring the complexity of the ethical dimension and, accordingly, the complexity of the duties. Interestingly, the East often identifies the aesthetic and the ethical levels, reducing the latter to the former. There is very little specific categoreal analysis of man and for this, among other reasons, the East does not recognize the tragedy that is inherent in the ethical level as specifically analyzed beyond the generic

aesthetic analysis. Ethically the good will cannot reach its goal in the finite world: in a Platonic metaphor, the striving (eros) to return to our true being as a unity and experienced wholeness is unfulfilled in time. The tragedy is a fact and a necessary consequence of finitude. Whitehead deeply recognized the inevitable tragedy in finite lives and from his particular perspectival location of importance, would perhaps note that, above all, it is an irrational situation. And the situation must remain, for in the finite ethical world what ought to be is never identical with what is--the ground and the continuity of ethical obligation. There is no last moral task and consequently no possibility of achieving ethical stability and unity, as above extensively discussed.

Above all the tragic situation of finitude arises from the recognition of what Whitehead calls the ultimate evil in the world, a type of evil that is more pervasive than any of the above-mentioned consequences of finitude. The ultimate evil is referrent to his central metaphysical doctrine that the finite world is in constant process and change: "The ultimate evil in the temporal world is deeper than any specific evil. It lies in the fact that the past fades, that time is a 'perpetual perishing'. Objectification involves elimination. The present fact has not the past fact with it in any full immediacy." (PR 517). Whitehead notes the further fact that humans have the ability to recognize this loss and to recognize that achieved values are excluded from presence by perishing in their immediacy: "The world...is haunted by terror at the loss of the past, with its familiarities and its loved ones. ...the higher intellectual feelings are haunted by the vague insistence of another order, where there is no unrest, no travel, no shipwreck: "There shall be no more sea.'" (PR 516).

It is here that Whitehead's rationalism rebels--a rebellion that arises from the deepest level of intellectual and emotional commitment. It

becomes necessary for him to ask the question of the meaning of this ultimate tragedy of finitude and the rationality of the inevitable tension in the unjust disparity between virtue and happiness. It would be unethical to ignore the tragic consequences of flux by an attempt to stabilize one's own individual world. But its existence is irrational: injustice, from the ethical perspective, is analogous to the irrationality of contradiction from the logical perspective.

Thus from the painful depth of the recognition of the tragic and the depth of the desire for an explanation of this irrational situation, Whitehead asks the question that the Greek tragedians did not ask: the question that requests the rationalization of the tragic. "Why", asks Whitehead, "should there not be novelty without loss of this direct unison of becoming among things." (PR 517). That Whitehead can ask this question and how he can answer it will be analyzed in the following chapter.

It should be here recalled that to Whitehead all explanation must be given in terms of final cause as well as efficient causation and material explanation. Thus he is here asking what <u>purpose</u> the tragedy found in the ethical dimension of experience can be understood to have. This is the final question of ethics and can only be answered by a transcendence of the ethical sphere, namely the finite world, to the religious dimension. To ask <u>why</u> finitude has this tragic character is to ask a very special type of question. It is to question whether the injustice and suffering in the finite world can be given meaning from a perspective of explanation that is broader than the finite perspective. Notably the Greek tragedians did not ask the question, for to a pre-Christian consciousness, the question could not arise in manageable symbols. There was nobody in particular who was responsible for the tragedy--their silent appeal was to the irrationality of Fate.

Moreover, although the Hebrews envisioned an omnipotent God, He was not conceived as specifically responsible to individual men; only man's responsibility of obedience to this God was stressed. The answer to Job was an answer of faith and also not rationalizable. But it was an intuitive recognition that there was a deep problem to be explained. As Whitehead notes, "The book of Job is the revolt against the facile solution, so esteemed by fortunate people, that the sufferer is the evil person." (RM 49). To Whitehead the request for explanation is not a refusal of faith, as it is also not to Hegel or Royce, among others. On the contrary, the latter requires and is deepened by the former: "The ages of faith are the ages of rationalism." (RM 83).

Thus the understanding of the tragedy in the finite world cannot be achieved from the ethical perspective within that world. It not only requires religious considerations, but religious considerations of a specific kind. In preliminary conclusion then I suggest that Socrates' ethical belief that virtue itself produced happiness did not answer the question of the meaning of the tragedy that occupies Whitehead. It seems rather that Socrates did not recognize the tragedy that arises on that level. From the perspective of his intellectualistic rationalism, Socrates declared that the only true evil was one's own moral corruption. The response, however, lacks insight into the suffering that men in fact do feel from the harm or destruction, physical or mental, forced on those they love. And there are other tragic losses, less dramatic but more continuous, all of which produce evil and all of which Whitehead deeply understood.

The insights of Socrates apply deeply, but only, to one's interior life, the goodness of one's own soul , and lack consciousness of man in the world as a natural being with emotions as well as intellect. To Whitehead,

as against Socrates, it is the total being and not only his mind that has inherent value in itself, and where love exists, for others. The destruction of life or of the values and energy of life is indeed tragic to him. Again it may be that the recognition that the whole man and not only his mind is worthy of respect can only come into the world in a post-Christian consciousness, even if the consciousness is subsequently secularized. It is the claim to the importance of each individual as a total individual and not only the importance of his mind wherein the obvious location of dignity first would be placed (if it is placed at all) in a world not related to a God of love. For other reasons, the same lack of insight into the importance of the individual as an individual pervades the East. And again, no concept of the tragedy of finite suffering or death exists there. The recognition of the values of individuals in themselves is a minimum requisite for tragedy to obtain. It may be that Whitehead's thorough-going subscription to this conviction partly accounts for the fact here cited that the recognition of tragedy and suffering pervades his ethical and religious perspectives.

The tragedy is in some sense metaphysically grounded in so far as man desires happiness as a natural individual but, as an ethical individual, has the conflicting obligation to be virtuous. The tension between the nature of finitude and the ethical goals of finitude, as implied by Whitehead, reflect the tension within man himself as, one the one hand, a natural being, on the other, a being inherently and consciously related to a transcendent value dimension. Moreover, and this point is essential, man has, to Whitehead, inherent value in both aspects. In a purely naturalistic world, or indeed, in a pantheistic world, the tension does not arise. It is exactly for this reason that I have suggested, on the obvious risk of circularity, that the ethical implications of Whitehead's metaphysics rest on certain religious convictions which, in precipatating the recognition of

tragedy, raise the rationalistic demand for the existence of a transcendent religious dimension. It is in this manner, and in this manner alone, that it could be shown that the irrational tension inherent in the natural world is not the final ethical reality.

Chapter IV. The Explanatory Relevance of Whitehead's Religious Philosophy to His Ethics

Section A. The Question of Tragedy

This chapter will introduce and briefly interpret several of Whitehead's doctrines in a religious perspective, some of the doctrines having been so classified by Whitehead, others having only implicit religious significance. The transition from ethics to religion is necessitated by the recognition that the tragedy inherent in the finite world cannot be rationally explained within the ethical sphere. The demand of rationalism is to overcome the irrationality so produced. For it is irrational to discover that however virtuous an individual is, he can nonetheless not reach happiness. Moreover, the good that was present inevitably perishes in its immediacy, as do all things in the finite world of process. As a genuinely ethical individual related to others with love and concern, the above discussed tragic consequences of finitude will evoke personal suffering. And when it is oneself as an active influence that unintentionally produces the tragic consequences of evil, the individual will feel a sense of guilt. It is a noble guilt, freely chosen as an ethical burden of finitude.

Whitehead has himself clearly stated that the longing to discover a meaning to the unjust tragic situation of finitude on the ethical level is a religious longing. Stated from the religious perspective, the situation announces the problem of theodicy, the justice of God. And as noted above, the essential fact of existence that must be justified by being given meaning through rational explanation is the fact of the inevitable evil and destruction in the finite world, an evil that obtains regardless of the ethical intentions of finite creators: "The most general formulation of the

religious problem is the question whether the process of the temporal world passes into the formation of other actualities, bound together in an order in which novelty does not mean loss." (PR 517). This is what is to be explained.

The theme is continuous in Whitehead's writings. Elsewhere we find the same passionate demand, expressed with an important addition: "We ask of Theology to express that element in perishing lives which is undying by reason of its expression of perfections proper to our finite natures. In this way we shall understand how life includes a mode of satisfaction deeper than joy or sorrow." (AI 176, italics mine). According to the ethics above imputed to Whitehead, morality required the decision to transcend one's own desires for 'obvious', merely private satisfaction. In this transcendence, achieved in the intuition of peace, one commits himself to a life of adventurous creativity, aimed toward increasing harmony and intensity of experience for oneself and others. The aim is ultimately judged by the claims of love.

In this commitment it was seen that morality required the decision to determine one's life as a goal towards this ethical perfection even though the perfection is never reached in the finite world. Here Whitehead is seen to have asked that we find some justificatory explanation of this commitment which, by transcending any selfish desires, is a dedication to a type of tragic heroism. To do so one must also have transcended the desire for present satisfaction by conceiving of a "mode of satisfaction deeper than joy or sorrow,"--(for all men desire satisfaction or happiness)-- and this, as also above quoted, by discovering a justification of the fact that such a life is an expression of "perfections proper to our finite natures." What Whitehead is here asking is the reason why finite life is of such a nature that the dedication in the face of tragedy is the fulfillment of its

proper perfections and also includes a "deeper" satisfaction. He is searching for those elements in the nature of things which rationally explain these ethical assertions--and here it must again be recalled that in any situation, when Whitehead requests an explanation, he requires reference to final cause as well as efficient cause, that is, reference to purpose.. If this particular inquiry can be so completed,then one would no longer need a further explanation of why a finite individual ought to involve himself in this tragic ethical commitment. One will have discovered that this is the true ethical goal of finitude, and this because such lives do fulfill the purpose of finite ethical life and in this manner approach and eventually achieve genuine satisfaction.

If no rational explanation of the inevitability of suffering in a truly ethical individual were to be forthcoming, Whitehead's philosophy would include the existence of unappeased tragedy in the ethical dimension. And since the situation is irrational, if the intellectual justification cannot be discovered, Whitehead's rationalism will have reached its limit. It will be argued that a persuasive answer can be suggested. Of course, it is clear that the importance of this answer is far greater than the fact that it justifies Whitehead's guiding rationalistic faith. For the faith does and must reach <u>some</u> limit beyond which there can be no explanation. Any system stipulates some fundamental notion which functions as a limit or ground--in short, the 'given' as judged from <u>that</u> particular perspective. (See Chap. I, Sec. D.). Thus all that would have happened is that Whitehead was forced to draw that limit here rather than elsewhere.

It is useful and cautious to recall however that Whitehead has affirmed that God is the limit of rationality and the ground of rationality. (See Chap. I, Sec. G). Here it is perhaps also useful to recall Whitehead's statement concerning the ultimate ground of the rationalism, "the ideal that

is seeking satisfaction":

> The preservation of such faith must depend on an ultimate moral intuition into the nature of intellectual action—that it should embody the adventure of hope. Such an intuition marks the point where metaphysics...gains assurance from religion and passes over into religion. (PR 67).

Thus it would seem that one undergoes a stipulated demand to rationally explain in Whiteheadian terms any irrational situations that present themselves on a level prior to the religious level. Of course, it is possible that Whitehead was mistaken in the claim that God is the limit of rationality and that the irrationality discovered on the ethical level cannot be explained within his philosophy. But one has at least a strong incentive and, indeed, an intellectual duty, to attempt to justify Whitehead's stated estimation.

Section B. The Religious Explanation: The Kingdom of Heaven

It has not yet been shown what are, according to Whitehead, those aspects in the nature of experience that insure the truth of the revelation of ethical life and its final satisfaction. Essentially the revelation referred to is the intuition of peace. The ethical meaning and consequences of this insight were discussed in Chapter III; the availability of other of its aspects to answer the final, and fundamentally religious, question of the meaning of the tragic situation must now occupy us as our final inquiry.

According to the summary statements at the end of Process and Reality, there are four creative phases through which the universe becomes actual. There is first God's primordial nature, the valuation of all eternal objects, which is "deficient in actuality, but infinite in its adjustment of valuation." (PR 532). Secondly, there is the temporal phase of finite physical origination wherein "Full actuality is attained; but there is a deficiency in the solidarity of individuals with each other." (PR 532). And thirdly, there is

the completing phase, what Whitehead holds to be "the phase of perfected actuality", termed God's consequent nature, and alternatively, the kingdom of heaven. (PR 532 and see RM 148 and PR 531). It is here that the many individual actualities are unified in God and achieve a valuational relation to God's primordial nature: "the many are one everlastingly, without qualification of any loss either of individual identity or of completeness of unity." (PR 532).

In this phase, "immediacy is reconciled with objective immortality." (PR 532) and "succession does not mean loss of immediate unison." (PR 531). This nature, as derivative from the temporal world and consequent upon its development, is therefore also "in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty." (PR 529). It is therefore necessarily and everlastingly incomplete. Nonetheless, it is, Whitehead claims, a unity. For in the consequent nature, the many are absorbed into a final unity and that nature is, according to Whitehead, "just as much a multiplicity as it is a unity." (PR 531). In so far as Whitehead has stated that God's consequent nature is everlasting, having no termination in time, because the finite world objectified therein has none, it is difficult to understand how this phase achieves unity. At all events, it would seem impossible, <u>from this statement alone</u>, to conclude, as Whitehead does, that God's consequent nature is a unity.

It would seem that if any unity is to be obtainable it must occur outside of time and not in everlasting (or endless) time, which is still within the parameter of temporality. The concept of eternity is the symbol of an existence or consciousness outside of time, and it must then be that God, as respects his consequent nature, has an eternal vision of all that has been and will be. Such a vision must occur not in time as a temporal duration but in an instant; the symbol of the atemporality of an event. God's

unifying vision then would be a vision of the entirety of all things; in traditional terminology, a vision of eternity in an instant, as Royce, for one, claims it must be. This is also reminiscent of Hegel's concept of the "true infinite" which contains all finitude within it, a concept he opposes to the notion called the "bad infinite", or everlastingness. The latter, by definition, cannot be completed, and cannot a fortiori form a unity. Whitehead's following passage can plausibly be interpreted as descriptive of the true infinite: "The world is at once a passing shadow and a final fact. The shadow is passing into the fact, so as to be constitutive of it; and yet the fact is prior to the shadow." (RM 85, italics mine).

Moreover, Whitehead has repeatedly said that God is an actual entity which clearly again requires that both as respects his consequent nature and its relation to his primordial nature, God is fully determinate and completed. And as an actual entity, his subjective aim must also have reached satisfaction; God as the harmony of harmonies, wherein all ideals (eternal objects) have been actualized. Moreover, the consequent nature functions as a superject, having objective relevance to living entities and therefore must again be determinate and completed, at least from God's perspective.[1]

Of course, it does not and need not follow that the unity of the universe is yet known or experienced as completed in the finite world since this world is in the temporal dimension and therefore has a limited perspective. And as above noted, Whitehead has indeed said, I think rightly, that we cannot understand God's vision. But this should not be taken to imply that we cannot draw any analogy to God's vision of eternity in an instant. It is

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[1] See Chap. I, Sec. C, God as the "Ideal Knower", conscious of totality, there analyzed as Whitehead's meaning of the notion "Reality".

just such a discussion that Royce has provided in his important analysis of "self-representative systems", wherein God's vision of eternity in an instant is analogically compared to the barest experience of the conditions for such an experience as found on the human level. It is claimed that unity is achieved in an everlasting series by a constancy of purposeful aim fulfillable only by certain unique entities and no others. And with a real and obvious similarity to the Whiteheadian doctrine here suggested, Royce states that

> ...the One and the Many are so reconciled...that the Absolute Self, even in order to be a Self at all, has to express itself in an endless series of individual acts, so that it is explicitly an Individual Whole of Individual Elements. And this is the result of considering Individuality, and consequently Being, as above all an expression of Will, and of a Will in which both Thought and Experience reach determinateness of expression.[2]

From our finite perspective imbued with temporality, what is to be has not yet been decided and is not yet knowable. God, as omniscient, has consciousness of all that will be, although he has not, against traditional claims, created all that is or will be. Thus Whitehead states, concerning God's consequent nature, as above partially quoted,

> The world is at once a passing shadow and a final fact. The shadow is passing into the fact, so as to be constitutive of it; and yet the fact is prior to the shadow. There is a kingdom of heaven prior to the actual passage of actual things, and there is the same kingdom finding its completion through the accomplishment of this passage. (RM 85).

And apart from these special reasons, we cannot comprehend God's vision because, according to Whitehead's general claim, any finite experience is temporally and subjectively limited and cannot be imagined to have a direct

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[2]Royce, op. cit., I, p. 588.

experience of totality. In a similar and supporting interpretation of what he calls "the de facto totality of actual entities as present in the divine immediacy", Hartshorne states that "the inability of human beings to determine a unique cosmic present or simultaneity need not prevent God, who knows things directly, from experiencing such a present." And referring to this experience, Hartshorne calls God "the actual infinite."[3] The suggestion here is then that God's consequent nature, the kingdom of heaven, is indeed a completed whole of all that there is in the universe, both actual and ideal, and this through the experience of that eternity in an instant.

According to Whitehead the completed perfection is achieved through God's ethical purpose as expressed in his judgment on the world: "The wisdom of subjective aim prehends every actuality for what it can be in such a perfected system." (PR 525). In this aspect as the judger of the world, we again understand that God "does not create the world; he saves it... [through] the overpowering rationality of his conceptual harmonization..." (PR 526). According to the doctrine, God "saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. [The consequent nature] is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved,...uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage." (PR 525). This is accomplished by God's ability to produce "the ultimate unity of the multiplicity of actual fact with the primordial conceptual fact." (PR 525). (God's purpose, it will be recalled, is aimed at reaching an "eternal harmony"). Thus this consequent nature can be seen as the "ideal limit" above variously referred to; a 'limit'

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[3] C. Hartshorne, "Whitehead's Idea of God," in P.A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, 2nd. ed., New York, Tudor Publishing Company, 1961, pp. 545 and 546, respectively.

in the sense that it is all-encompassing, 'ideal' in the sense that it includes the actualization of all ideals (eternal objects) and is indeed the "harmony of harmonies".

What is necessarily excluded from this final harmony as unsalvageable are apparently those aspects of the temporal world which were evil. For if evil is self-destructive, as Whitehead claims, it must consequently perish. God does not exclude evil entities from the kingdom of heaven as a vengeful judgment of anger. The result is simply in accordance with the metaphysical necessities as Whitehead sees them. For according to Whitehead, God is not exempt from the metaphysical necessities but is rather their paradigm exemplification. Thus Whitehead concludes that "The results of destructive evil, purely self-regarding, are dismissed into their triviality of merely individual facts; and yet the good they did achieve in individual joy, in individual sorrow, in the introduction of needed contrast, is yet saved by its relation to the completed whole." (PR 525). For it must here be recalled that according to Whiteheadian doctrine, even evil, in so far as it can produce individual satisfaction, has some positive value which can be saved. (Whitehead's metaphysical principles require that if a thing is actual, it cannot be entirely lacking in value.) This judgment of the world is made according to God's primordial valuation of all ideals, the basis of all order and value, and through the judgment the temporal world is "perfected by its reception and its reformation as a fulfillment of the primordial appetition." (PR 527). In sum, Whitehead concludes that "the temporal occasions are completed by their everlasting union with their transformed selves, purged into conformation with the eternal order which is the final absolute 'wisdom.'" (PR 527). This again is the kingdom of heaven, the perfected actuality.

<u>Section C. The Religious Explanation: The Intuition of the Kingdom of Heaven</u>

Whitehead claims that there is a fourth, and apparently final phase in the creative process of the universe; the perfected actuality of God's consequent nature "passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience." (PR 532). And discussing this situation from a religious and ethical perspective, Whitehead concludes concerning this fourth phase, "the kingdom of heaven is with us today. The action of the fourth phase is the love of God for the world. It is the particular providence for particular occasions." (PR 532).

This fourth phase would seem to be necessary for at least three rather straightfoward reasons: first, as Whitehead notes, for the metaphysical reason that there is a universal relativity of all things. Thus God's consequent nature is not itself a completed and final fact as respects the fulfillment of its potential relations. It, as all things, has functional relationality and therefore must be experienced. The other two reasons are primarily ethical in character and will be elaborated below. One such reason concerning the ethical necessity of the fourth phase is that it is here and here alone that the religious longing for the justification of the tragic situation of finitude is satisfied. Furthermore, and thirdly, Whitehead suggests that without this relational activity, God's nature would itself be incomplete as respects the expression of his essential love for the world. There is to Whitehead something higher than God alone with himself and that is God in relation to the world. This is a very significant insight and a relatively new dimension in religious thought as expressed by philosophers.

Relating this schema to our original inquiry, it is perhaps already clear that it is in the third phase that the perishing of finite actualities,

the tragic fate of the temporal world, is transcended by the permanence of that world in God. But the fact of this happening is not enough. It is further necessary that there is an intuition of the kingdom of heaven so that the fulfillment of the ultimate longing is experienced by individual finite creatures. Thus this fourth phase is necessary in so far as it is in this phase that the individual actualities of this world can become aware of this fulfillment of their longing through an intuition of God's consequent nature. This must be the content of the intuition of peace which, Whitehead claims, involves "a grasp of infinitude" and is an "intuition of permanence." (AI 284-85). It arises in immediate experience and "is the purification of the emotions" (AI 285); "It is not a hope for the future, nor is it an interest in present details." It involves a "surpassing of personality" (AI 283), issuing in "the love of mankind as such." (AI 284)--the foundation of all ethical values and aims.

Ultimately the intuition of peace is an intuition of love and love is a unique type of experience. It does not require a future reward but is self-sufficient and experienced as immediately significant. As Whitehead notes regarding God's love: "Love neither rules, nor is it unmoved;...It does not look to the future; for it finds its own reward in the immediate present." (PR 520-21). If God is seen as being the complete totality in immediate unison with all actualities, it may be that the experience of love reveals this ethically pertinent relation. Perhaps contemporary actualities can thus be individually related in mutual immediacy and experience each other directly in the present, which is, it would seem, a factual prerequisite for genuine love and sympathy. The point requires analysis in so far as Whitehead has, as above noted, insisted that there is causal independence of contemporary occasions, a claim that is indeed destructive of the possibility of ethical relations.

Referring to the analysis of freedom given in Chapter II, Section D, it there appeared that freedom or self-determination of occasions was related to Whitehead's doctrine of the causal independence of contemporary actualities. As Christian explained, the necessity of this doctrine arises so that the categoreal condition of subjective unity can be met. The latter required the achievement of determination and completeness of valuation, which in turn required that new data arising from contemporary occasions is not incorporated into the entity. If it were, the concrescence would never terminate and subjective unity or completed individuality never achieved in time.

Now in the analysis of self-identity from the ethical perspective, it was above suggested that the self as the ethical self is indeed a postulate never able to be completed in the temporal world without having the individual pass into ethical evil. The conclusion arising through relation of these individual suggestions is of paramount importance. It may be that Whitehead's doctrines imply that on the ethical level individuals as ethical are related to other contemporary individuals and this through the mutual immediacy of love. Thus it would then follow that subjective completion is never reached because ethically it cannot be reached unless one ignores, (through narrowing of attention), the ethical duty of love--precisely the duty to continuously achieve new relations of concern with all individualities contemporaneously present to ones own self. The experience of love is exactly the unique experience which sustains such relations. The conclusion is therefore perhaps persuasive since it ought not to be accidental that Whitehead has considered love to be the central ethical value. Given certain of his metaphysical notions, it now appears that it is the only experience that would make genuine ethical relationship possible.

How the relation of love would allow mutual immediacy among contemporary actualities is admittedly ambiguous. Whitehead does say that "Perhaps in the mutual immanence of occasions...the relations of the mental poles to each other are not subject to the same laws of perspective as are those of the physical poles." And immediately before, he noted that there are truth-relations to contemporary Reality which, not being direct causal relations, "can only be estimated by an imaginative leap, which has as its basis for justification the truth-relations to the past and our experience of the stability of the types of order involved." (AI 247). Here it seems intuitively appropriate to recall Aristotle's analysis of the highest form of friendship as being firmly based on the love of another's goodness, an intrinsically stable promise of the lasting truth of the judgment.

This transmission between mental feelings of contemporary occasions Whitehead suggests has "some empirical support, both from the evidence for peculiar instances of telepathy, and from the instinctive apprehension of a tone of feeling in ordinary social intercourse." (PR 469). The suggestion is to some extent bizarre, but not absurd. It is possible that Whitehead could explain the supposition of mutual immediacy in the experience of love as being based on such phenomena and as revelatory of the religious dimension. For thus one could surpass his own narrow, allegedly bounded, self, and experience others as internally related to his self through God, in mutual immediacy with all actualities through the completed unity of his consequent nature,experienced in the intuition of peace. And it is this intuition that gives rise to the relation of love. These suggestions are speculative, but again, not absurd. At any rate, it is true that some account of how contemporary occasions can relate in mutual immediacy is necessary if ethical activity is to be totally explicable. And that is why this lengthy discussion has been interpolated.

In ethical activity itself it is obvious that there is never complete fruition. As Whitehead states in this respect, "The effect of the present on the future is the business of morals." (AI 268), but because the future is everlasting, there is no permanence or finality here, if one remains truly ethical. However, Whitehead further notes that "there must be some immediate harvest. The good of the Universe cannot lie in indefinite postponement. The Day of Judgment is an important notion: but that Day is always with us." (AI 268). According to Whitehead, it is Art which "takes care of the immediate fruition,...Its business is to render the Day of Judgment a success, now." (AI 268). Art has the value of showing "human effort achieving it own perfection within its own limits." (AI 279). But the image of Art as providing the Day of Judgment is here taken to be only analogical. The Day of Judgment must be concerned with the Reality of immortality and art only represents the world "clothed with the Appearance of immortality." (AI 281).

Thus the final intuition of the reality of immortality is given by God from his love for the world. It is received in an experience that gives rise to, and is the ground of, man's love for God and for mankind. This latter experience alone, according to Whitehead, makes ethical relation possible, and this precisely because it is therein immediately seen to be meaningful and desirable, being the perfection of finitude. The essential point to be noted here is that the experience of peace is that element in human experience which makes the tragedy which is inherent in the nature of things intelligible without ignoring the everlasting reality of this tragedy on the finite level of the universe. Peace grasps "the service of tragedy" (AI 285); it is "the understanding of tragedy, and at the same time its preservation." (AI 284). And this intuition of peace, basically the intuition of the kingdom of heaven, fulfills the craving that immediate experience does not perish

but is (objectively) immortal. Further, the tragic situation of perishing and destruction, irrational if taken as final, is given meaning by the faith that the finite tragic world is transported and transmuted in God's everlasting and perfected nature.

The meaning of finite existence has become known through the intuition of a perspective beyond the finite. And it is an immediate fact of relevant experience, for as Whitehead notes; God "gives to suffering its swift insight into values which can issue from it." (RM 148). In this intuition of peace it will be recalled that the self, as truly ethical, transcends its narrow interests. "The sense of worth beyond itself is immediately enjoyed as an overpowering element in the individual self-attainment.", as it would be, for example, in relations of genuine love. And Whitehead continues: "It is in this way that the immediacy of sorrow and pain is transformed into an element of triumph. This is the notion of redemption through suffering, which haunts the world." (PR 531). In sum, to be an ethical individual involves the consequences of suffering, for satisfaction of the ethical will can never be reached in the temporal world. But the suffering is given meaning by the intuition of worth beyond oneself and the faith in the existence of perfection in the kingdom of heaven. What here perishes, there remains eternally. And here it is perhaps justified through the fact of amazing relevance to again quote Royce: "All things always work together for good from the divine point of view; and whoever can make this divine point of view in any sense his own, just in so far sees that they do so, despite the inevitable losses and sorrows of the temporal order."[4]

Through the immediate experience of peace the tragedy in the universe

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[4]Royce, op. cit., II, p. 425.

is transcended from gross evil to "tragic Beauty." (AI 294). This Whitehead says is "the secret of the union of zest [adventure] with Peace: That the suffering attains its end in a Harmony of Harmonies." (AI 294-95). And as Whitehead concludes, referring to the revelation of peace "this Final Fact": "In this way, the insistent craving is justified—the insistent craving that zest for existence be refreshed by the ever-present, unfading importance of our immediate actions, which perish and yet live for ever more." (PR 533).

Again this notion of the religious vision of tragic Beauty does not mean aesthetic beauty. It is what Whitehead refers to elsewhere in his statement that "the teleology of the Universe is directed to the production of Beauty" (AI 264 and see below); the eternal harmony that is God's essential purpose. It includes tragedy and "that Happiness evoked by actualized heroism."

As respects our second claim that God's nature is only fully completed through this active relation to the finite world, it must be noted that the suffering of man is also the suffering of God: for Whitehead clearly states his belief that "the ascription of mere happiness to the nature of God is a profanation...The result [God's consequent nature] is Tragedy, Sympathy and the Happiness evoked by actualized heroism." (ESP 101-2). The suffering of God issues from the fact that man is an element in his being. It is paralleled by the suffering of man, which suffering is only transcended through the intuition of God and of the world in God, as perfected and immortal. Whitehead claims that "God is the great companion—the fellow sufferer who understands." (PR 532). This aspect of God as a suffering God and reciprocally as a God of love can be paradigmatically symbolized within the Western tradition by the meaning of Christ. Whitehead would seem to be alluding to this traditional symbol although he does not, to be sure, confine his meaning within it: "The world lives by its incarnation of God in

itself." (RM 149).

In Christian terms this act of God is not done because man has deserved this sacrifice. Rather it is an unmerited consequence of God's providence. This claim that love has higher value than justice is a fundamental Christian insight and is indeed operative in regard to Whitehead's God as it was above also seen to be in the ethical life of men. For Whitehead does claim that the intuition of peace, which is made possible by God's love, occurs through God's "particular providence for particular occasions." (PR 532). Moreover, Whitehead elsewhere states that this intuition is "largely beyond the control of purpose. It comes as a gift." (AI 284).

But more important for the present purpose than any speculation concerning the specifically Christian relevance of Whitehead's religious doctrine is the recognition that Whitehead does intend to stress the most important new meaning that the symbolic significance of Christ has introduced into religious consciousness. Indeed Whitehead stresses this new recognition with perhaps more conviction and concern than many traditional Christian apologists: "The emphasis upon the divine factor in human nature is of the essence of religious thought." (ESP 98).

Section D. Ethics and Religion

A brief summary of the claim that the fourth phase of creative process, the intuition of God's consequent nature, is ethically necessary may be here profitable. Genuine ethical life cannot be accomplished without the vision of peace, the intuition of the kingdom of heaven, at which time the individual is able to rise above his narrow interests and creatively act through unselfish love for mankind. We also can now understand that it is this vision which gives meaning to the creative ethical striving; it enables the individual to understand the tragedy and to also perceive its

final justification. Whitehead's analysis implies that it is God who gives intelligibility to the inevitable suffering and evil. Such factors are inherent in finite creators--and this is essential--God requires finite creativity in order to perfect his own aim at the ideal harmony, which aim Whitehead claims is indeed fulfilled. In this sense it is again clear that Whitehead is introducing the radical notion that God requires the world for expression of his own purpose, as the world requires God to attain its final meaning. For God wills man's free self-creativity in order to achieve his own aim. Creativity is here given a religious meaning. And in this sense it may be said that for an individual to accept his heroic task as a part-creator of the finite tragic world is itself religion. Creativity is individual and unique and it is, ultimately, a final ethical responsibility.

Thus Whitehead seems to be suggesting that because the creative process of the universe is not complete until the fourth phase, the final truth of religion requires man's recognition of God and of the finite world in God. In short, if this is not accomplished the rationality of the world is deficient and God's love incompleted. God directs creation by his urge towards eternal harmony, translated humanly into the urge and duty toward actualizing ethical life. But God is not omnipotent as a creator and his directing creativity requires the freedom of man through which alone the ethical dimension can be created. Of course it can also be ignored, and this is the reason why there is moral responsibility in the world, centered in Whitehead's concept of "adventure" (production of novelty) and the aim towards increasing harmony, essentially achieved through love. The claim that man partakes of the divine nature issues into the claim that God's love is dependent on man's creativity for its fulfillment; doctrines of mutual relevance. It produces God's happiness, "evoked by actualized heroism."

Whitehead thus seems to be prophesizing a new religious dimension

a religious act, wherein men, as part-creators of the world, complete and know that they complete, the work of creating the world as God had aimed. It is only men who can do this by ethically choosing to do so, with the intuitive understanding that this is their perfection. Creativity is higher than happiness. One chooses a commitment to tragic heroism of the type symbolized by Christ--a choice made for perhaps the most important reasons history has ever known. To Whitehead the creative person has transcended the claim for selfish or private satisfaction. In the vision of peace one possesses a love of God and of man through worship of God's vision and his actualization of the eternal harmony. This is ethical life. Its final aim is to include all individualities within its own purpose in a relation of love, what the Christian tradition may mean by caritas. By constrast, "Evil is the brute motive force of fragmentary purpose, disregarding the eternal vision." (SMW 192). And apart from the religious vision, God's love is incompleted and man's misery is a final burden to both man and God. In sum:

> Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realized; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes. (SMW 191).

Section E. Ethics, Metaphysics and Whitehead's Methodology

In final and brief summary of the foregoing, it is concluded that Whitehead does indeed refer to God to obtain a final explanation of the ethical situation and its tragic issue. The necessity is not only produced to rationalize our emotional response to the human situation but is, ultimately, necessary to rationalise the meaning of the nature of finite existence as seen from the ethical perspective. It was suggested that the manner in which this rationalisation is accomplished depends upon the religious insight into the immortality of the finite world in God as the kingdom of heaven. Further

speculation concerning the nature of immortality, particularly as respects ethical individuals, is developed in an Appendix, being somewhat more detailed than the very general scope of the present analysis.

Now since to Whitehead all ultimate reasons require explanation by final cause, if the alleged explanation of ethical phenomena was to be possible it would necessarily include a complete justification of the elements in terms of the purpose of their existence. Thus if the explanation could be given it had to be understood in advance that it was only possible if Whitehead had introduced elements of a religious or moral significance into the very foundation of his metaphysical categories. For an explanation of the nature of finitude is a metaphysical problem as well as an ethical or religious problem. Philosophically, the ethical dimension in Whitehead is dependent upon the metaphysical and the religious, and if an explanation of the former is to be achieved, it is by a spiralic relation of interpretation between his metaphysics and his religious philosophy. For the religious dimension must itself be grounded, but unexpressed, on the metaphysical level. In Whitehead's relevant statement of this suggestion: God's "conceptual actuality at once exemplifies and establishes the categoreal conditions." (PR 522).

Thus the conclusion as respects the final religious foundation of ethics is not surprising in the sense of being unexpectable. For there is an implicitly religious reference for all the levels of analysis of Whitehead's philosophy, in particular, the metaphysical level. No analysis of the latter could become totally intelligible or significant without such a reference. The conclusion as respects the religious foundation of Whitehead's implied ethics is in fact a general conclusion. To be sure, its obviousness would first be manifest when questions of ethics are raised for in an intended ethical analysis there is overlapping and dependence of

content as well as explanatory or methodological dependence. (See Chap. I, Sec. G regarding the latter.).

This philosophical situation of reference occurs because Whitehead's criterion of coherence and his conviction that God is both the metaphysical and the religious ground of intelligibility demand explanations that are ultimately partially circular but, nonetheless, <u>are</u> explanations. The explanations are in terms of final cause; and this much noted point is important in the attempt to explain Whitehead's philosophical intentions and method as well as to explain his ethical theory. And as has been also variously suggested in above chapters, the exhibited aspects of Whitehead's philosophical structure manifestly impose an estimation that introduces a different evaluative emphasis in the interpretation of his philosophy and location of its fundamental perspective. His metaphysics has, by compulsive direction, been interpreted in a manner that links his perspective with the Idealist tradition, in particular, the Idealism of Hegel and the neo-Hegelians, Bradley and Royce. The conclusion is to this writer inescapable, especially as regards the ethical dimension. The imputation is here made more emphatically than has been generally suggested although, to be sure, not exclusively. The aesthetic level of individual actual entities is analyzed to a large extent as a realist would, and it is, of course, the fundamental metaphysical level to which all explanation is ultimately referred. But according to Whitehead, God is himself an actual entity. It should be recalled that "the reasons for things are always to be found in the composite nature of definite actual entities--in the nature of God for reasons of the highest absoluteness, and in the nature of definite temporal actual entities for reasons which refer to a particular environment." (PR 28).

The exhibited dimension of Whitehead's philosophy which has developed through the independent force of the derived ethical concepts has

suggested that his philosophy can be relevantly interpreted from the Idealist perspective of Hegel and the neo-Hegelians. For the purpose of summarily illustrating this conviction, it may be useful to conclude with two statements from Hegel. The matter of one concerns the transition he effects between his ethics and philosophy of religion: "Although ethics is autonomous in itself--independent of religion--it nevertheless reaches its absolute ground and justification only in religion." Finally the matter concerned with the transition between ethics and religion necessarily generalizes itself into a comment on the foundation of the philosophy itself: "Philosophy thus understands religion as one of its own presuppositions and as a particular articulation of the absolute totality."[5] And this is what has been said about Whitehead, and, I hope, persuasively.

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[5]Hegel, op. cit., Encylopedia of Philosophy, pp. 261 and 283.

Appendix. Speculation Concerning Immortality

A problem related to Whitehead's ethical and religious philosophy must be confronted. It has been claimed by critics, and rightly so, that Whitehead's doctrine of immortality as objective immortality is not totally adequate for religious purposes and inspiration, at least not as these have been traditionally interpreted in accordance with the orthodoxy of common opinion. For it will be recalled that according to Whitehead when an entity becomes objectively immortal it has ceased to have subjective immediacy. Thus the permanent life in God's consequent nature may be of value for living individuals who intuit the perfection of that nature. It would however lack value for the unconscious entities there objectively immortal. Thus the fear of the individual concerning his own death is not appeased for a paramount loss is exactly the cessation of concsiousness. Whitehead makes no commitment for or against the more religiously significant notion of personal or spiritual immortality which are inclusive of the existence of consciousness. In his own estimation of his philosophy's implications: "The doctrine here developed...is entirely neutral on the question of immortality, or on the existence of purely spiritual beings other than God. There is no reason why such a question should not be decided on more special evidence, religious or otherwise..." (RM 107).

The ommision of discussion has led various critics to assume that his doctrine of objective immortality is meant to apply to all actualities including humans. It is my present intention to suggest that this conclusion is not a necessary one. It will be claimed that Whitehead's metaphysics and given religious philosophy can themselves suggest a doctrine of personal immortality when combined with various notions of ethical import. If the

suggestion achieves some plausibility, it will provide indirect persuasion as to the validity of the central ethical discussion given in above chapters. For the analysis of immortality will be given from the ethical perspective there developed and will rest on several conclusions that have been above reached, these functioning as the "more special evidence" Whitehead suggests as necessary.

Whitehead has stated that the individual actualities which become objectively immortal in God's consequent nature do not lose their individual identity. (See PR 532). There is necessarily implicit here the fact that the entities so objectified in God have at some time achieved individual self-identity. According to the analysis given above, an individual can achieve self-identity only when it has a determinite attitude of evaluation towards every item in the universe and has achieved one self consistent function, however complicated. The function, or subjective aim, is completed in both direction and content. This completion issues into the superject character of the entity at which time it becomes objectively immortal, to be objectified by later actualities and, in God's consequent nature, everlastingly. It also seemed that according to Whitehead's notions societies can obtain determination, albeit, as against actual entities, not indefinitely. Thus the society as a society is not objectively immortal, although the individual entities within it are since, analytically, every actual entity is immortal, being a superject.

The temporary permanance that is acquired in a society is achieved through the inheritance of an unchanging defining characteristic that is subjectively relevant to each member entity of the society. As novel situations occured, it was noted that a society could respond either by reducing the novelty to irrelevance or by evi dently the superior method of evoking a creative response to the novel element. This was achieved by origination

of a corresponding novelty in the society's own felt evaluational perspective. Human individuals, in whom the soul is a society, can react to novel elements in either of these two ways. The first type reaction occured by a refusal to broaden perspective so that the new factor was eliminated as irrelevant in respect to the inherited narrow perspective. This activity, equivalent to an intentional decision to limit attention within one's own determinately fixed world of relevance, was above cited as one type of sin. It destroyed the ethically valuable decision to widen perspective through a creative response. Thus it produced the "loss of the higher experience" in favor of the "lower experience" of retaining stability. This activity involved destruction of what might have been and consequently was included in Whitehead's definition of evil.

However, as also noted, if such an intentional narrowing did not occur, the individual can never reach a completed stability or self-identity. The perspective can always undergo broadening, even as respects the present situation. Moreover, as respects the future, there is always the introduction of novel circumstances requiring re-evaluation of aim. Thus the activity of the ethical will never obtains a static completion, even temporarily. And thus the self-identity of the ethical individual cannot be reached in time. Consequently it was concluded that this self remained a postulate, an ideal, not ethically realizable in the temporal world.

Those individuals who have denied their creative essence and reached a self-identity by an intentional closure can indeed beomce objectively immortal as respects the member actual entities composing the soul society. As noted above, the aspects of these individuals that will become immortal in God's consequent nature are those processes that did produce some good, the evil events being self-destructive. Thus on death these individuals do

undergo the perishing of themselves as a subject, for in objective immortality subjective immediacy is lost. It is what may traditionally be meant by the notion of eternal death since it does not seem plausible that eternal death would mean total disappearance, God being omniscient. It is, rather, death as a subject, which is, to be sure, an ethically superior notion to any alternative religious doctrine of the eternal damnation of sinners. The evil individual's life fulfills all the necessary conditions for objective immortality to obtain; in particular the fact that it has reached a completed self-identity and stability.

The suggested conclusion as respects the individuals who were ethically good is perhaps already obvious. Those individuals who have lived genuinely ethical lives by having denied themselves any premature closure and trivial type of supposed satisfaction cannot have reached any completed self-identity, for they have refused to do so. Thus as respects the ethical characteristics or processes constituting these individuals, it must be that since these actualities do not obtain completion they cannot issue into a superject. Thus the processes of ethical significance in the genuinely ethical individual cannot be among the entities that are objectively immortal in God's nature. They do not fill the necessary prerequisite of having a determinate attitude of valuation to every item in the ethical universe. Thus, in short, the individual as respects such processes, cannot become objectively immortal on death, losing subjective immediacy, because they are not completed as subjects.

On the positive side, it is perhaps clear that ethical individuals, as respects the ethically significant processes, could possibly achieve what is traditionally meant by spiritual or personal immortality. For in such individuals, subjective immediacy and consciousness would obtain. Whitehead maintains that man is finite but also partakes of the divine nature. Thus

it would be plausible that he could partake of spiritual immortality as God reputably does in Whitehead's analysis. And the conclusion is metaphysically superior since according to Whitehead God is not an exception to any of the metaphysical principles. Since God is spiritually immortal, as above quoted, man should have the possibility of being so. It is believed that together Whitehead's religious philosophy, his metaphysical and methodological stipulations and his implied ethics do allow such a doctrine.

The speculation rests on a tacit denial of the traditional assumption that immortality requires the permanent existence of some soul substance. It is clear to this writer that if activities can exist as mortal, they logically could also exist as immortal, if some adequate notion of the self-identity of such activities could be given. Such an analysis was attempted in Chapter II, Section E. At all events, according to Whitehead, activities can be immortal since God is indeed immortal as an activity rather than as a substance.

It could logically be objected that although ethical individuals cannot achieve objective immortality as respects the ethically significant aspects of their past, they do not either achieve subjective immortality, but are simply not immortal. But on this showing it becomes impossible to understand what Whitehead might mean by his claim that genuinely ethical individuals achieve a satisfaction that is deeper than the trivial enjoyment of the evil individual, because they do not ever achieve satisfaction in this world. For their task, namely the ethical task, cannot be here completed. The situation is unjust and therefore, from the ethical perspective, irrational. Thus Whitehead might in fact favor the doctrine of spiritual immortality to the abstractly possible notion that ethical individuals are not immortal in any manner at all. Again, and further, rationality is also at stake in so far as God's aim at eternal perfection and harmony would seem to

require the eternal presence of the ethically good.

Such a procedure of proof is not philosophically unprecedented. One can, for example, find a very similar argument for spiritual immortality in Royce. The argument is also consequent upon his rationalistic and Idealistic demands that everything be explicable in terms of purpose and his notion that the self's purpose, as the ethical self, cannot be completed in time.

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